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PREFACE
The idea for the study began to germinate when I 
became aware of the case. Morales v. Turman, which estab­
lished a constitutional right to treatment for incarcerated 
juvenile delinquents. I believed the district court's 
treatment of Morales to be courageous, as well as imagina­
tive, and was curious about the policy-making process that 
had taken place and its effectiveness.
I began this study, even though the case was on 
appeal, because I felt whatever happened at the appellate 
level would affect neither the process nor the immediate 
results of the original court's opinion. At this time 
(April 1, 1977) the case has been reviewed by the Fifth Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court on a procedural 
issue but not on the merits. The procedural issue was 
concerned with what types of cases are properly heard by 
three-judge courts at the district court level. The Dis­
trict Court for the Eastern District of Texas found a three- 
judge court to be unnecessary, but the Fifth Circuit disa­
greed and reversed the case on that issue.
On March 21, 1977, following the completion of this 
study, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion on the
iii
three-judge court procedural issue (No. 76-5881). The 
Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for 
further consideration on the merits.
The issue under contention was the interpretation of 
"a statute with statewide applicability." If the prevailing 
conditions and practices in the institutions housing juve­
nile delinquents, under the supervision of the Texas Youth 
Council, are construed to fall within the definition of 
statutes with statewide applicability, then a three-judge 
court should have been convened. "The appellate court rea­
soned that the challenged, unwritten practices of the juve­
nile institutions administered by the Texas Youth Council 
were revealed during the trial to be statewide in impact and 
that, therefore, they were equivalent to a statute with 
statewide applicability . . . "
The Supreme Court disagreed, saying "the three-judge 
court procedure is not 'a measure of broad social policy 
. . . but . . .  an enactment technical in the strict sense 
of the term and to be applied as such.'" The Court said 
the relevant criteria for convening a three-judge court, 
according to the Fifth Circuit, were "not properly apparent 
until considerable factual development of the breadth and 
content of the Texas Youth Council's administrative prac­
tices had taken place." The opinion held, under these cir­
cumstances, the Fifth Circuit had "transformed the juris­
dictional inquiry from a threshold question to one depending
iv
upon the shifting proof during litigation," and that such a 
transformation injected "intolerable uncertainty and poten­
tial delay into important litigation."
The Supreme Court concluded that a single-judge 
court was the proper forum for consideration of this case 
and, therefore, the Fifth Circuit's reversal on the proce­
dural issue was incorrect. However, the opinion recognized 
that the district court's judgment was "reviewable on the 
merits in the Court of Appeals."
The State of Texas may then proceed again before 
the Fifth Circuit on the issues of the case, such as the 
right to treatment. Whether the state will continue in its 
attempt to overturn Morales is uncertain at present, but it 
appears there is a possibility the Supreme Court is prepared 
to discuss the issues concerning the circumstances and prac­
tices relevant to incarcerated juvenile delinquents. 
Otherwise, the Court would presumably have simply reversed, 
rather than remanded, the case for further deliberation on 
the merits.
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ALICIA MORALES, ET AL. V. JAMES TURMAN, ET AL.:
A CASE STUDY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
INTRODUCTION
In September of 1974, Judge William Wayne Justice 
of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas announced the case of Morales v. Turman. The main 
thrust of the opinion was the incarceration phase of the 
Texas juvenile justice system. Some attention was also 
given to the procedures by which juvenile delinquency is 
adjudicated as well as matters involving probation and 
parole. Morales did not come about in isolation. Prior to 
Morales, the main subject for attention had been the due 
process rights of juveniles during adjudication. There had 
also been some discussion of procedural rights even at the 
Supreme Court level. More recently, the federal judiciary 
has begun to investigate the circumstances and conditions 
surrounding incarceration or institutionalization of juven­
iles. Morales stands out because of its unique attempt to 
set standards for incarceration of Texas juveniles and its 
demand that Texas authorities comply with those standards.
This dissertation is a case study of the Morales 
decision, including the setting in which it took place.
The analysis utilizes, in broad form, the standard systemic 
approach of the Policy Studies Organization in the Policy 
Studies Journal.^ It is, in other words, a policy study—  
one which recognizes that policy cannot realistically be 
studied in isolation. The causes or events which precipi­
tated the creation of policy and the effects of that policy 
must be taken into consideration before the study can be 
meaningful or complete. The model of this approach is dia­
grammed as follows:
causes — --------- \  public policy------------- ^  effects
I_______________________________ I
Consideration of the causes of judicial intervention 
in the juvenile justice system requires a study of more than 
the immediate causes of this particular case. It is asserted 
in this study that three important impediments existed which 
had to be dealt with before the Morales decision was possible. 
These were the parens patriae doctrine, the "hands-off" doc­
trine and the lack of a constitutional principle upon which 
to proceed. The first chapter explains the history and 
philosophy of these stumbling blocks. The second chaper 
provides a "road" to Morales in that it explains and
^See eg. 5 Policy Studies Journal (Urbana, 111. 
Political Science Department, University of Illinois, 
Winter, 1976), cover.
describes the réévaluation and reinterpretation of the 
previously mentioned impediments.
Chapter three explains the "cause" phase of the dia­
gram as it applies specifically to the Morales decision.
At this stage it becomes necessary to examine the juvenile 
justice system as it exists in the State of Texas and point 
out those qualities that have made it ripe for investigation 
and adjudication.
The fourth chapter is an analysis of the policies 
established in the Morales decision. Not only are the poli­
cies explained,but also there is an attempt to indicate what 
is original in Morales as compared to what policies had pre­
viously been set down in other cases.
The final chapter examines the effect of judicial 
intervention. The question here is whether the courts can, 
in a realistic sense, intervene effectively in the adminis­
tration of juvenile institutions. In other words, the ques­
tion is whether or not courts, with their restricted enforce­
ment ability, can bring about change in society's penal 
institutions. Investigation of the actual change in the 
structural and procedural operation of the Texas Youth 
Council, and the institutions under its supervision, as a 
result of Morales is instructive, not only to the courts, 
but also to those who study the judiciary, whether they 
advocate judicial activism or self-restraint. As the 
General Counsel for the Texas Youth Council stated, "I
don't believe judicial activism is a good thing. Courts 
shouldn't write policy. On the flipside, in this instance, 
thank God Judge Justice was there 1"
The discipline of political science has, for a long 
time, been concerned with the processes which bring about 
change and the policies that emerge in response to change.
A more recent concern has been with the effect of those 
policies on society's institutions. The question in this 
study is whether courts, announcing policy through judicial 
decision-making processes, can effect change in institutions 
designed to house juvenile delinquents. There is also an 
attempt to analyze institutional change in terms of the 
degree to which it is in accord with the pronounced policies.
It is apparent that if change does not occur as a 
result of public policy pronouncements, then the study of 
forces of change and the analysis of policy itself is an 
isolated and limited experience. Therefore, policy studies 
must discover the actual changes that take place as a result 
of policy pronouncement and those that are mandated but do 
not occur. Also it must be taken into account to what 
extent the policy's decree is modified by institutional needs 
and implementation. When these questions have been dealt 
with, policy can be analyzed in terms of effectiveness which 
is far more informative than a simple statement of what the 
policy calls for.
As mentioned earlier, there is a serious question 
as to whether or not courts, with their limited enforcement 
capabilities, can realistically accomplish change. This 
study is an attempt to answer that question through close 
examination of Morales v. Turman. It is obvious that the 
"truth" of the matter will not be discerned from such a 
limited endeavor as this one. However, it is a building 
block in the overall research. Many such studies may some­
day provide linked answers to the questions surrounding 
judicial intervention and its effectiveness.
CHAPTER ONE
THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE
The study of juvenile justice is one part of a major 
American dilemma— that of crime. The promise to bring about 
change in this problem area has been a major political plat­
form commitment at least since 1960 and, more specifically, 
since President Johnson's request in 1967 for a thorough 
investigation of the prevailing methods and institutions in 
American society that deal with crime. This chapter not 
only provides a general understanding of why the system is 
as it is and how it works, but it also singles out those 
factors within the system which have impeded growth or change 
in the traditional methods of dealing with juvenile crime.
The term "juvenile" is commonly defined as one who 
is under 18 years of age. However, some jurisdictions use 
other age limits such as 17 or 16. Juveniles have long, if 
not always, been accorded different treatment than adults 
when suspected of socially deviant or norm violating behav­
ior. However, the difference apparently has been due to the 
prevailing circumstances and the presiding judge's person­
ality rather than to statutory or constitutional decree.
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Furthermore, the difference has historically been more or 
less limited to the imposition of sentence rather than the 
entire character of the proceeding.^ The statutory basis 
for proceeding against a juvenile in a manner different from 
an adult is historically a rather recent innovation. Primary 
responsibility for the establishment of institutions specif­
ically designed for dealing with juveniles rests with the 
Quakers. "Quakers were active participants and leaders in
virtually every humanitarian scheme undertaken in New York
2
in the decades following the Revolution."
^Lewis Mayers, The American Legal System (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1964), p. 146. According to Mayers:
"Even in the early centuries of the development of the 
English criminal law, there appears occasionally a 
recognition that a youth is not to be dealt with as 
harshly as an adult, or near-adult; and our colonial 
legislation reflected this recognition quite clearly 
at specific points. Speaking generally, however, 
neither in the English law, as it existed in the 
seventeenth century and as it was transported to this 
country, nor in the laws of the colonies was express 
recognition given to the youthful offender as a sep­
arate category. For the most part, only official and 
judicial mercy, exercised without any express legal 
warrant, stood between the youthful defendant and the 
extreme rigors of the criminal law. But the power of 
the court at common law to suspend judgment and re­
lease the defendant, his sureties guaranteeing to pro­
duce him for sentence on order of the court, was early 
used more frequently in the case of youthful than 
adult offenders; and its use in our courts in the 
case of youthful offenders emerges as a regular prac­
tice early in the last century, receiving statutory 
recognition for the first time, apparently, in 1869."
2
Sanford J. Fox, "Juvenile Justice Reform; An His­
torical Perspective," 22 Stanford Law Review 1202 (1970).
A report dated 1822 compiled by this group of 
reformers and entitled Report on the Penitentiary System in 
the United States " . . .  called public attention to the cor­
ruptive results of locking up children with mature criminals, 
citing this contamination of innocence as one of the major 
evils that had resulted from prison reform. The "prison 
reform" being mentioned here refers to the early establish­
ment of prisons to take the place of corporal punishment 
and, in many cases, capital punishment as practiced by ear­
lier colonists. This reform was also the work of the Quakers, 
The result of the 1822 Report was the establishment 
in 1824 of the House of Refuge in New York. The emphasis 
was primarily on predelinquency. Only those who could be 
"saved" were to be committed here. Juveniles who were con­
sidered criminals were still to be dealt with by the criminal 
courts. "Major offenders were, from the beginning, left in 
the adult criminal system."^
The change in penal institutions in the early 1800's 
was due to a change in the theoretical foundations concern­
ing the criminal. American ideology had begun to reject the 
retributive theory of punishment which was based on the idea 
that people commit crimes because they choose to do so with 
no attention to societal conditions as the cause of crime.
^Ibid. at 1189. 
^Ibid. at 1191.
The Quakers recognized causes of crime other than 
personal choice. Their primary focus was on poverty or pau­
perism as a contributing factor to a life of crime. Further, 
they felt that being reared under conditions of poverty was 
a certain indicator of a future criminal. Therefore, taking 
the poor child out of the home and placing him in an institu­
tion, such as the House of Refuge, was a crime prevention or 
predelinquency technique.
The primary focus of the reformers was a "help the 
young" attitude. There were, however, other contributing 
motives which help account for the system as it grew and took 
shape. Other than the reformers were those businessmen, 
politicians, and others who sought to emphasize control and 
resocialization rather than a "help the young" attitude.
These groups were motivated by a number of not so 
idealistic social needs. One was the need as seen by the 
police and others to keep idle children off the streets. A 
second motive was the socialization of immigrant children to 
accept American values as determined by upper-class leader­
ship. Thirdly, business leaders were interested in develop­
ing a process whereby young people would develop the skills 
necessary for making them a viable part of the expanding 
factory system. Another motive for taking children out of 
the home was apparently to fulfill the need, on the part of 
some women, to find a proper role in an industrializing, 
urbanizing society. Also, society was somewhat concerned
10
with aiding children in developing a capacity to earn a 
living.^
There is a final and extremely important factor 
involved in the evolution and expansion of the juvenile sys­
tem. It involves " . . .  the natural inclination of agencies 
to expand their power and their staff.
Jameson W. Doig, "Juvenile Justice: Discretionary
Power and the Control of Youth," 3 Policy Studies Journal 
(Autumn, 1974): 68-69. According to Doig:
"Recent research suggests that five motives were 
especially important in the creation and evolving 
powers of the juvenile courts, boys' and girls' 
homes, and probation officers, and in the passage 
of laws to expand their domain;
(1) an interest (on the part of police and other com­
munity officials) in removing idle youth from the 
street, where they might cause trouble or commit 
crimes;
(2) a desire (especially among upper-class leaders) 
to have ways to remove the child from the home (par­
ticularly immigrant homes), in order to educate and 
socialize the young to accept 'American' values;
(3) a demand (by business leaders) that young people 
be taught the discipline and minimal skills neces­
sary to permit the expanding factory system to absorb 
them and operate efficiently;
(4) a need (on the part of some women in the "child- 
saving" movement) to find acceptable social and pro­
fessional roles in an industrializing, urbanizing 
society;
(5) perhaps least important, a concern that young 
people be given the tools and education needed to 
earn a living within the existing economic and social 
structure."
Gjbid. at 69.
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Whatever the predominant motives were, the 
reformers were primarily responsible for the establishment 
of the resultant institutions. They were uncertain and not 
in agreement as to a replacement for the retributive theory 
of punishment. But, whether they focused on deterrence or 
rehabilitation, the result was the development of institu­
tions such as the House of Refuge. The idea was that child­
ren should be treated, not punished, but the emphasis was on 
discipline and submissiveness, and punishment was often 
severe.^ "For many of the boys who had committed punishable 
offenses, the reform meant the change from freedom to incar-
g
ceration, rather than a transfer from prison to House."
Also the House of Refuge and other similar estab­
lishments usually practiced religious intolerance. Since 
the Quakers and their counterparts were almost entirely Pro­
testant, Catholic children who were committed to these insti­
tutions were forced to practice coerced heresy.
The point is this: it is highly questionable whe­
ther the establishment of such "Houses of Refuge" can be
Fox at 1195, note #43. For instance. Professor Fox 
said, "Inmates who betrayed a trust, for example, faced the 
following consequences: 'This punishment consists in flag­
ellation with a whip of strings, in solitary confinement to 
their cells, either with or without the accompaniment of a 
low diet; in forbidding anyone to hold communication with 
the offender without permission, and in extraordinary cases 
of flagitious conduct, in wearing an iron on one side, 
fastened to the waist at one end and to the ankle at the 
other.'"
®Ibid. at 1194.
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classified as humanitarian reform. However, the movement 
was apparently totally accepted by society and the courts
9
as a matter of humanitarian progress.
The New York House of Refuge was the archetype of the 
congregate system for dealing with delinquent youths. In 
the mid-1800's, a new attitude began to prevail which put 
emphasis on family life. The idea was the juveniles should 
be placed with families, rather than institutionalized.^^ 
Instead of placing children in institutions, these reformers 
argued for the development of a system of foster homes. 
Preferably the children would be sent out of the city and 
into the country. It began in New York in 1853 with the 
establishment of the New York Children's Society. By 188 9, 
"it was reported that 48,000 children had already been sent 
out of New York by the Children's Aid Society.
The culmination of this period of reform was the 
1899 Juvenile Court Act in Illinois, which established the
9
Ibid. at 1204. Fox said, "The unqualified adoption 
by the courts of the philanthropic protestations of the re­
formers and their disregard of any punitive purpose were 
major factors contributing to the creation of the myth that 
the New York House of Refuge marked a noble triumph in child 
welfare rather than the complex and ambivalent development 
that it was."
^^Ibid. at 1208. Fox explained that, "By the 1850's 
a new outlook for juvenile corrections had developed. The 
emphasis of the Chicago Reform School was on creating a family 
life for children rather than on education and religion as in 
the House of Refuge."
^^Ibid. at 1210.
13
first court for juveniles separate from adults. The
systematic development of the idea of a juvenile court took
place in the United States. Forerunners of the Illinois Act
12can be found in Massachusetts law. According to Jameson 
Doig;
During the 19th and early 20th centuries, a system 
of special courts, probation officers, juvenile-aid 
units in police departments, and juvenile "homes" 
was created to identify and treat delinquent youth; 
and the reach of these institutions was extended well 
beyond the range of governmental power over adults 
accused of crime— involving the adoption of laws that 
applied only to juveniles (e.g., truancy and incor­
rigibility statutes), and judicial acceptance of a 
lower standard of proof needed to justify coercive 
control over errant youth. To simplify somewhat, 
the motivations for creating and expanding this 
juvenile-justice system have been interpreted in two 
divergent ways: first, as shaped by reformers who
sought to help young people develop into emotionally 
and intellectually competent, productive adults; or 
alternatively, as generated by the demands of busi­
ness and political leaders and others, whose con­
cerns were varied, but with little attention to pro­
viding a positive outcome for young people them­
selves.13
Apparently the first court for dealing specifically with 
juveniles was established in Cook County, Illinois in 1899.
Juvenile courts were to serve the purpose of separ­
ating juveniles from the hard core adult criminals and the
12
Edward Eldefonso, Law Enforcement and the Youthful 
Offender: Juvenile Procedures (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 158. According to Eldefonso, "In 
1869, a Massachusetts law provided for the presence of an 
agent or officer of the State Board of Charity in all crim­
inal proceedings against a child under 16 to 'protect their 
interest.' In 1877, another Massachusetts law provided for 
the use of the term 'Session for juvenile offenders' wherein 
a separate record and docket should be kept."
^^Doig at 67.
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resulting influence such hardened types would have on 
children. In 1899 Illinois passed the Juvenile Delinquency 
Act which established the first juvenile court in Chicago. 
The Act called for a number of procedural changes in deal­
ing with youth. "Hearings were supposed to be informal and 
nonpublic. Records were confidential, and children were 
detained not in adult prisons but in facilities of their 
own.
These changes, however, were not the only nor the 
major deviation from the adult criminal procedure. The 
legal basis for dealing with errant youth was altogether a 
different philosophy from that which governed the procedures 
and attitudes governing adult procedures. The legal theory 
which underlies the juvenile justice system from apprehen­
sion through adjudication and finally, in some cases, insti­
tutionalization, is the common law doctrine of parens 
patriae. Under this doctrine, juvenile courts proceed with 
the judge acting in the role of a kindly parent with neither 
crime nor punishment in mind, but only the best interest of 
the c h i l d . T h e  duty of the juvenile court was not to
14
Patrick T. Murphy, Our Kindly Parent . . . The 
State; The Juvenile Justice System and How It Works (New 
York: The Viking Press, 1974), p. 4.
^^Eldephonso (1967) at 159, explained the early 
theory of "parens patriae." "'Parens Patriae' describes a 
doctrine of the English Court of Chancery, by which the king, 
through his chancellors, assumed the general protection of 
all infants in the realm. The theory . . . was that the 
sovereign as a 'pater patriae,' possessed an obligation to 
oversee the welfare of the children in his kingdom, who.
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determine guilt but merely to intervene in order to save the 
youth from a downward career. The child, under the parens 
patriae doctrine, was viewed as essentially good. Therefore, 
the state was interested solely in his nurture and care, not 
in arrest and trial.
The consequence of this attitude was that juvenile 
cases proceeded as civil cases and the rules of criminal 
procedure were deemed altogether inapplicable. The juvenile 
was without any of the procedural protections enjoyed by 
adults who had committed criminal acts. "These results were 
to be achieved without coming to conceptual and constitu­
tional grief, by insisting that the proceedings were not 
adversary, but that the state was proceeding 'parens 
patriae.'
Parens patriae was not the sole stumbling block to 
judicial intervention into the incarceration and subsequent 
treatment of juveniles. Change was further hampered by what 
has become known as the "hands-off" doctrine. "Courts have 
traditionally abstained from hearing suits brought by inmates 
against their keepers. This practice became so prevalent
17
that it acquired its own name— the 'hands-off doctrine.'"
because of the frailties intrinsic to the minority, might be 
abused, neglected, or abandoned by their parents or other 
guardians. The king, through his Court of Chancery, could 
thereby step in and provide the requisite parental protec­
tion and care."
^^In re Gault, 387 U.S. 16, 1967.
^^John w. Palmer, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners 
(Cincinnati: The W.H. Anderson Company, 1973), p. 136.
Id
Stated simply, this means that "Courts are without power to
supervise prison administration or to interfere with the
18ordinary prison rules or regulations."
Apparently the source of this doctrine is not inter­
preted as a rule of law but as a policy of judicial absten- 
sion in line with the overall judicial philosophy of judic­
ial self-restraint. Reasons for the "hands-off" doctrine 
are varied but they include separation of powers, states' 
rights, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, lack of judicial 
expertise in penology, the fear that judicial intervention 
will undermine prison discipline, reluctance to overburden 
the courts and, of course, the cost of judicially mandated 
change.
It has been argued that the administration of cor­
rectional institutions is the responsibility of the execu­
tive branch of government; consequently, if change is to 
take place, it must be initiated and directed by that branch. 
According to Palmer, "it was thought that the administration 
of penal institutions was a function of the executive branch.
18
"Beyond the Ken of the Court:;: A Critique of
Judicial Refusal to Review Complaints of Convicts," 72 Yale 
Law Journal (1963): 506. See also Fred Cohen, The
Legal Challenge to Corrections: Implications for Manpower
and Training (College Park, Maryland: 1969), p. 1. Cohen 
says, "Until quite recently those who administer our cor­
rectional systems could confidently pursue their varied goals 
by virtually any technique deemed satisfactory to them. True, 
there existed external scrutiny and review; legislative com­
mittees or citizens groups might ask occasional questions, 
but the courts rarely interfered and legislative guidelines 
on basic policy and decision-making criteria either were 
nonexistent or so vague as to be nonexistent."
17
Review then should be by the executive branch of
19government. . . . "  Stated in another manner relating
specifically to the federal government, "The prison system
is under the administration of the Attorney General . . .
and not of the district courts. The court has no power to
interfere with the conduct of the prison or its discipline
It is also believed, according to the concept of
reserved powers, that it is the state's responsibility to
proscribe an act as criminal and set the punishment for such 
21
acts. Thus, the states should be immune from federal
intervention into state penal affairs. Not only does this
immunity apply to federal intervention, but also, so the
arguments go, to individual citizens of the state. The
doctrine of sovereign immunity refers to an individual's
inability to sue the state for relief without that state's
22stated permission to do so.
Another argument supporting the "hands-off" doctrine 
is that judges have no expertise in the area of penology.
^^Palmer at 95.
^^"Beyond the Ken. . . ."at 515.
21
Philip J. Hirschkop and Mike Millemann, "The 
Unconstitutionality of Prison Life," 55 Virginia Law Review 
(1969): 812.
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Palmer at 135 explains this. "Various reasons 
advanced in support of the doctrine are: the idea that 'the
King can do no wrong'; that public funds should not be dissi­
pated to compensate private injuries; and that government 
officials need to be free from the threat of suit to function 
most effectively for the common good."
18
This argument is directly related to another which is that 
if the courts do interfere, their lack of knowledge and 
expertise may cause disruption in prison discipline or worse, 
that judicial intervention will create disciplinary prob­
lems.
The federal courts have been particularly reluctant 
to intervene in penal affairs for fear the result will be 
an overwhelming number of cases followed by a severe over­
burdening of the d o c k e t . S o m e  courts fear financial 
expenditures as well as unrealistic caseloads. The cost of 
judicial intervention is a relevant issue. Of course, 
courts are unable to appropriate funds, and it is becoming 
increasingly obvious that penal reform is an expensive pro­
ject.
With regard to juveniles then, judicial intervention 
in the juvenile justice system, except for those instances 
where the juvenile court judge intervenes, has been espec­
ially hindered. First, because of the parens patriae
23
"Beyond the Ken. . ."at pp. 508-9 says, "The reason 
underlying refusal to review the administrative decisions of 
prison officials is the unquestioning acceptance by courts 
of the assertion repeatedly made that judicial review of such 
administrative decisions will subvert the authority of prison 
officials, the discipline of prisons, and the efforts of 
prison administrators to accomplish the objectives of the 
system which is entrusted to their care and management."
^^Daniel Sheehan, Jr. "Prisoners' Redress for 
Deprivation of a Federal Right: Federal Habeas Corpus and
the Civil Rights Act," 4 St. Mary's Law Review (1972): 339.
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doctrine, juveniles have lacked traditional due process 
safeguards and, therefore, the necessary weapons for ques­
tioning the manner in which their cases are brought before 
the court, adjudicated, and disposed of. Without notice of 
charges, right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross- 
examination, the privilege against self-incrimination, right 
to a transcript of the proceedings and the right to appel­
late review; the arrest, adjudication and incarceration is 
a closed system leaving little open for examination, criti­
cism, and change. The "hands-off" doctrine has further hin­
dered judicial investigation by closing the post-conviction 
institutions to judicial scrutiny.
It is not certain, of course, that the juvenile jus­
tice system would be any more successful without the parens 
patriae and the "hands-off" doctrines to prevent judicial 
supervision of the system. The attempt is made to look at 
that question in later chapters. It is possible based on what 
little research is available to make some observations about 
the system as it functions in contemporary American society.
On examination, it becomes apparent that the dif­
ferences between the adult criminal justice system and the 
juvenile justice system are more semantic than real. There
are, in reality, procedures for arrest, trial, and incarcer-
25ation. Only the vocabulary is different.
25
Murphy at 4-5 explained:
"A new vocabulary was improvised to symbolize this 
new social order. There were no criminal complaints
20
Upon committing certain socially unacceptable acts 
the child is processed through a system remarkably parallel 
to the adult criminal justice system. The most obvious dif­
ference between the two systems is the lack of procedural 
safeguards available to the juvenile due to the doctrine of 
parens patriae and the civil nature of the proceedings.
This system has dominated American thought and practice for 
nearly 75 years. Only recently has there been serious con­
cern as to the reliability of the system. Cautious glances 
into the system have been taken by a few lawyers, fewer 
courts, and probably even fewer interested citizens. The 
revelations that have come as a result of these inquiries 
have been, for the most part, unfortunate.
The problem is aptly explained by Morris and Hawkins
who say.
filed against the children— merely petitions. There 
were no warrants— only summonses. There were no 
arraignments— but hearings. There would be no juries 
and no real trials. There was no need for lawyers, 
because there were no adversaries, inasmuch as the 
mutual aim of everyone involved was not to contest, 
object, or even seek the truth of the charges against 
the juvenile and or his family, but simply to treat 
the juvenile and his family, regardless of guilt.
. . . When a child is convicted of an offense and 
his removal from society is deemed necessary, he is 
not imprisoned with a correctional agency but, 
instead, committed to a Youth Commission or a State 
Juvenile Correctional Division— where, of course, he 
may not be punished. He is sent not to a jail but 
to a training school or camp where he learns from 
his kindly parent the state how to lead a good life. 
There are no 'cells' but 'rooms,' and there are, 
naturally, none of the accoutrements of adult pri­
sons such as facilities for solitary confinement."
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Nobody doubts the benevolence and good will behind 
the efforts of the juvenile courts and the state 
youth commissions. Nor is it possible to doubt the 
great power they wield over the lives of children 
and their families. What we should have doubts and 
also anxiety about are the problems which develop 
when these types of rescue operations become insti­
tutionalized. Too often what happens is the rescue 
operations ignore the preferences of those who are 
being rescued. And this is a crucial reason for 
reconsidering what is being done in this a r e a . 2 6
In studying the juvenile system of justice, whether 
philosophically, historically or empirically, the central 
focus has been the juvenile courts. It should be obvious, 
however, that juvenile courts cannot be adequately dealt 
with nor realistically appraised without including those pro­
cedures by which a child is brought to the court's attention, 
as well as the institutions that deal with the child follow­
ing the court's pronouncement.
Only two such thorough research attempts have been 
made to date. One was undertaken by the National Council of 
Jewish Women (NCJW); the other was included in the study by 
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis­
tration of Justice.
The NCJW study was a penetrating examination cover­
ing 34 states. According to Edward Wakin:
The survey was no mere sampling; it was a pene­
trating examination of one of our most basic and 
most vital democratic institutions, and its effect 
on those it was created to serve: children and
2 6
Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins, The Honest 
Politican's Guide to Crime Control (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 157-158.
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society. Two very startling basic facts emerged: 
First, most citizens, even those who have been active 
in their communities, do not concern themselves with 
the problems and issues of our juvenile justice sys­
tem. Second, most communities do not deal adequately 
with the needs of either children in trouble or their
families.27
The result of the study was a stark, agonizing and thorough
condemnation of the system by which American society deals
with errant youths. Wakin found that:
By the time of the NCJW study, the optimism of 75 
years ago had changed to concern about the enormous 
discretionary powers of the courts and about decis­
ions affecting a child's entire life that could be 
made in three to five minutes by a busy judge. A 
system created to protect children was not only 
failing in its mandate; it was operating to their
detriment.28
In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforce­
ment and Administration of Justice summarized its findings 
on the administration of juvenile justice. It found a wide 
discrepancy between theory and fact.
In theory the juvenile court was to be helpful and 
rehabilitative rather than punitive. In fact the 
distinction often disappears, not only because of 
the absence of facilities and personnel but also 
because of the limits of knowledge and technique.
In theory the court's action was to affix no stigma­
tizing label. In fact a delinquent is generally 
viewed by employers, schools, the armed services— by 
society generally— as a criminal. In theory the 
court was to treat children guilty of criminal acts 
in noncriminal ways. In fact it labels truants and 
runaways as junior criminals.
27
Edward Wakin, Children Without Justice (New York: 
National Council of Jewish Women, Inc., 1975), p. x.
^®Ibid. at 24.
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In theory the court's operations could 
justifiably be informal, its findings and decisions 
made without observing ordinary procedural safe­
guards, because it would act only in the best inter­
est of the child. In fact it frequently does nothing 
more nor less than deprive a child of liberty without 
due process of law— knowing not what else to do and 
needing, whether admittedly or not, to act in the 
community's interest even more imperatively than the 
child's. In theory it was to exercise its protec­
tive powers to bring an errant child back to the 
fold. In fact there is increasing reason to believe 
that its intervention reinforces the juvenile's un­
lawful impulses. In theory it was to concentrate on 
each case the best of current social science learn­
ing. In fact it has often become a vested interest 
in its turn, loathe to cooperate with innovative pro­
grams or avail itself of forward-looking m e t h o d s . ^9
The results of the system described in these two
studies present cause for reconsideration. Further cause
stems from the realization that the system does not work-
in mid-November, 1975, newspapers and magazines across the
nation announced the latest statistics on crime gathered,
compiled and released by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
As has for some time been the trend, an increase in criminal
activity was reported. A particularly awesome element of
this situation is that of juvenile crime. The FBI's annual
report shows sharp increases in the number of teenagers
arrested.
The FBI report arbitrarily classifies particular 
crimes as "major." These include criminal homicide, forcible 
rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny-theft
29
Task Force Report; Juvenile Delinquency and Youth 
Crime, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 9.
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and motor vehicle theft. The number of teenagers charged 
with these seven crimes was nine percent higher in 1974 than 
in the previous year. By way of comparison, the adult sta­
tistics showed a rise of only one percent. The report also 
points out that about one-half of all those arrested for 
burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft were teenagers. 
Perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that 10 percent of 
the 16,000 persons charged with criminal homicide were under 
18. Furthermore, the overall picture shows that, "Nation­
ally, persons under 15 years of age made up 10 percent of 
the total police arrests; under 18, 27 percent; under 21,
43 percent; and under 25, 58 p e r c e n t . A  Newsweek article 
elaborated further on the dilemma:
Juvenile crime has risen by 1,600 per cent in twenty 
years. More crimes are committed by children under 
15 than by adults over 25— indeed, some authorities 
calculate that half of all crimes in the nation are 
committed by juveniles. Last year, police arrested 
2.5 million youngsters under 18. In Los Angeles, 
juveniles account for more than one-third of all 
major crimes, and in Phoenix, officials estimate 
that juveniles are responsible for 80 per cent of 
law violations. In Atlanta, juvenile arrests for 
arson have tripled since 1970, and in New York, 
since 1972, burglary and rape charges against juve­
niles have nearly doubled.31
One means of dealing with juvenile crime has been to 
institutionalize children who commit criminal acts. Prior
^^Crime in the United States, FBI Report (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1975).
^^Jerrold K. Footlick, Lucy Howard, Susan Agrest, 
and Peter S. Greenberg, "Children and the Law," 86 Newsweek 
(1976): 66.
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to the Morales decision, there were in fact no judicial 
alternatives in Texas to institutional commitment or total 
release. The commitment of juveniles to institutions has 
been questioned in recent years by a variety of sources, 
including the federal judiciary. The focus of this disser­
tation is on judicial intervention in order to provide 
change, specifically within the correctional phase of juve­
nile justice. There are not, as yet, foolproof suggestions 
as to the reliability of judicially mandated change. How­
ever, some have suggested that this means may not be a via­
ble one. According to Doig, the judiciary has not been able 
to create change effectively.
Lack of effective treatment in such insti­
tutions, as well as staff brutality, have been the 
subject of a number of court suits and judicial 
decrees mandating change. . . . Preliminary informa­
tion indicates, however, that very little effective 
change is actually produced by such judicial inter­
vention. 32
There is another study that agrees with Doig's view.
In the summer of 1970, the Center for Criminal Justice of
the Harvard Law School undertook a study of the effects of
judicially mandated change. Specifically, the research
33focused on the case of Morris v. Travisono and its effect 
on the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institution. In 
this case. Federal Judge Raymond J. Pettine set forth
^^Doig at 70.
^^310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
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specific procedural standards for the handling of disciplinary 
34matters.
In summarizing the effects of judicial intervention, 
the study concedes that courts are not particularly well 
suited for such a role. The reasons given for such a con­
clusion include the lack of judicial expertise and the fact 
that courts are not well enough staffed to provide the sort 
of supervision required by such cases. Furthermore, devel­
opment of prison regulations involves a great deal more than 
the simple resolution of factual controversies.^^
However, these conditions have not, at least in 
recent years, precluded judicial intervention. Courts have 
used the devices of class action suits, declaratory judg­
ments and the advice of experts to overcome the obstacles.
The most compelling reason for judicial intervention may be 
the lack of viable alternatives. Legislatures and citizens 
groups have simply not fulfilled the promises of social pro­
tection and rehabilitation. The Harvard study points out 
that despite some limits to the effectiveness of judicial 
intervention, "at least they may succeed in eliminating ex­
treme abuses, or perhaps more optimistically, in setting a 
model and a tone for eventual internal reform . . .
34"Criminology: Judicial Intervention in Prison Dis­
cipline," 63 The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and 
Police Science (1972): 200.
^^Ibid. at 227.
^^Ibid. at 228.
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The primary impetus for change has come from the 
federal courts where adult prisoners have successfully 
claimed a violation of constitutional rights. The relevance 
of these cases for litigation involving juveniles is not 
clear. The primary question remains, "What right is being 
claimed?" The justification for judicial intervention in 
juvenile institutions has been that these institutions do 
not "treat" the youthful offenders. However, there is no 
constitutional right to treatment for juvenile offenders; at 
least this was the case prior to the Morales decision. 
Because Morales held that incarcerated juveniles have a con­
stitutional right to treatment, it has been heralded as a 
major turning point in the law as it applies to youthful 
offenders.
It has been asserted in this chapter that histor­
ically there have been three important impediments to 
judicial intervention in the juvenile justice system.
37The Newsweek article said at 69-70:
"In what could be the most significant juvenile 
decision since Gault, U.S. District Judge William 
W. Justice last fall condemned the entire Texas 
Institutional structure for its 'widespread physi­
cal and psychological brutality.' Juveniles were 
not rehabilitated but 'warehoused,' Justice charged 
in a 204-page opinion. He said they were beaten and 
tear-gassed as punishment and given tranquilizers to 
quiet them without medical supervision. The judge 
ordered the state to close two of its reform schools 
and convert the rest to halfway houses and group 
homes. Texas officials have responded that the 
total cost of such changes makes them impossible, 
and the state is appealing. Eventually the U.S.
28
These are the parens patriae doctrine, the "hands-off" 
doctrine, and the lack of an effective constitutional claim 
on the part of youthful offenders. The next chapter reveals 
the road that led to the Morales decision by analyzing the 
reinterpretation that has taken place with regard to these 
stumbling blocks.
Supreme Court will be asked to pronounce a judgment 
on the conditions of juvenile incarceration that 
would apply to every state."
CHAPTER TWO
PARENS PATRIAE, THE "HANDS-OFF" DOCTRINE AND 
RIGHT TO TREATMENT: THE ROAD TO MORALES
It is apparent, following an historical view of 
juvenile justice, that the Morales opinion would not have 
become a part of the case law ten years ago. It is current­
ly an accepted fact that conditions in juvenile institutions 
have always been, at best, lacking in standards, and, in 
many instances, extraordinarily inhumane. Judicial inter­
vention did not occur, however, because the issue was simply 
not "ripe" for investigation. The parens patriae theory pre­
vented the application of due process standards and kept the 
process by which juveniles are institutionalized from public 
and appellate court scrutiny. The "hands-off" doctrine pre­
vented judges from mandating standards for the operation of 
penal institutions. Finally, the notion that juveniles were 
institutionalized for the sole purpose of treatment pre­
vented judges in particular, and the public in general, from 
questioning a child's loss of liberty as a constitutional or 
legal issue.
29
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Within the last decade» these stumbling blocks have 
begun to crumble. There has been a thorough réévaluation 
and reinterpretation of the parens patriae theory as it 
applies to juveniles. The "hands-off" doctrine has been suc­
cessfully challenged with respect to a number of penal insti­
tutions, particularly adult facilities. The final break­
through involves instances where persons have been involun­
tarily committed to institutions for mental health reasons. 
The justification of institutionalization in these cases, as 
with juveniles, is the need for treatment. However, courts 
have begun to question that philosophy. They have, at a min­
imum, been saying that if the justification for incarceration 
is treatment, then the state must act on its promise to treat.
This chapter analyzes these legal/philosophical de­
velopments in detail. In general, they comprise the environ­
ment in which Morales occurred. In that sense, this chapter 
is a general discussion of the "cause" phase of the diagram 
developed in the introduction. The specific causes of 
Morales are dealt with in the following chapter.
The Parens Patriae Doctrine
Reinterpretation of the parens patriae theory has 
resulted in a general realization that the doctrine has gone 
far beyond the original intent. It was established in the 
early common law as a legal means for the government to 
assume parental authority over dependent and neglected chil­
dren. It was not originally intended to become a judicial
31
tool for depriving juveniles of liberty because they had 
committed criminal acts.
The doctrine's authority was, of course, extended to 
include juvenile delinquents but with that extension came no 
procedural changes. The legal procedure remained civil in 
nature with no allowance for the protection of traditional 
due process rights. In recent years, this has been the sub­
ject of judicial consideration. The first statement came in 
Kent V .  United States, which altered nothing in the constitu­
tional sense, but provided dicta that had profound future 
implications. The next and major decision was In re Gault 
which began to suggest that juvenile cases, whether civil or 
criminal, must meet constitutional due process standards. 
Gault left a number of questions unanswered partly because 
there were five separate opinions suggesting five different 
formulas for the reinterpretation of parens patriae. Since 
Gault, the courts have proceeded on a case by case basis 
taking due process protections one point at a time. To date, 
the Supreme Court has considered the necessary standards of 
proof for a finding of delinquency in In re Winship; the 
right to a jury trial in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania; and the 
right to protection from double jeopardy in Breed v. Jones. 
Although these five cases provide guidelines for the rein­
terpretation of parens patriae there remain a number of un­
answered questions in terms of both the disagreement among 
the Supreme Court Justices in the above cases as well as
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the procedural rights not yet considered. Furthermore, 
there is some question as to the practical effects of the 
juvenile delinquency cases.
Historical Interpretation of the 
Parens Patriae Doctrine
As discussed in the previous chapter, the parens 
patriae theory has served as the central theory and justifi­
cation underlying the prevailing system for dealing with 
juvenile delinquents, as well as children who are for var­
ious other reasons in need of supervision. Since their in­
ception, juvenile courts have assumed responsibility for 
dealing with and providing care for large numbers of young 
people 18 years old or younger. Although parens patriae has 
been explained on the basis of English common law theory, 
there are historical inconsistencies involved.
First of all, it is questionable whether or not 
this doctrine is contained in the common law as it applies 
to juveniles who have committed what would otherwise be con­
sidered criminal acts. The parens patriae theory was devel­
oped to protect the property interests and the person of a 
child, not to direct the care and training of children who 
had committed criminal acts. These children were subject to 
arrest, trial and punishment in the same manner as adult 
defendants unless they were under seven years of age. Child­
ren under seven were considered to be incapable of criminal 
intent. According to Mr. Justice Fortas, in the Gault
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decision, the parens patriae doctrine as it has been 
practiced in the twentieth century lacks historical valid­
ity. Fortas said,
. . . its meaning is murky and its historic creden­
tials are of dubious relevance. The phrase was 
taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was 
used to describe the power of the state to act in 
loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the 
property interests and the person of the child. But 
there is no trace of the doctrine in the history of 
criminal jurisprudence. At common law, children 
under seven were considered incapable of possessing 
criminal intent. Beyond that age, they were sub­
jected to arrest, trial, and in theory to punishment 
like adult offenders. In these old days, . . . the 
state was not deemed to have authority to accord 
them fewer procedural rights than adults.1
Therefore, it should be noted that the doctrine, as inter­
preted presently, in all probability stands on a shakey foun­
dation.
Furthermore, those instances under English common 
law when a child did come under the government's supervision 
were far less frequent than is evident today. The Chancery 
Court rarely performed in its capacity because English com­
mon law imposed a duty on parents to give proper care to 
their children and the law presumed such was the case. 
Therefore, an incredibly strong case had to be made that a 
child was being neglected or deprived before the Court would 
step in. Also, the Chancery Court lacked the effective 
means to carry out its promise of providing care for most 
children and, therefore, restricted its supervision, in most
^In re Gault, 387 U.S. 16 (1967).
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cases, to wealthy minors. Finally the Court's jurisdiction 
was confined simply to the welfare of the child. Assuming 
the responsibility of a child for the purpose of protecting
2
society was not a legitimate function of the Chancery Court. 
The point is that the use of parens patriae as a justifica­
tion for incarcerating juveniles, who have committed crim­
inal acts, is a rather recent interpretation of the theory 
and does not, in fact, stem from the English common law.
Recent Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
the Parens Patriae Doctrine and Juvenile 
Court Proceedings
More recently, the doctrine of parens patriae has 
undergone what appears to be a thorough réévaluation and 
reinterpretation. Restatement of the doctrine has been the 
responsibility primarily of the federal courts, particularly 
the United States Supreme Court. Prior to March 21, 1966, 
the Supreme Court had refused to intervene in the system of 
juvenile justice in order to mandate standards for dealing 
with errant youths. The initial glance into the system came, 
in all probability, as a result of an increasing willingness 
by courts, lawyers and interested citizens to question the 
reliability of parens patriae in the prevention of crime and 
the rehabilitation of incarcerated juveniles.
2
Edward Eldefonso, Law Enforcement and the Youthful 
Offender; Juvenile Procedures (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 159-60.
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Kent V .  United States
The first opportunity seized by the Court to question
the "civil" nature of juvenile proceedings and the consequent
denial of procedural safeguards came in Morris A. Kent, Jr.
V .  United States.^ According to a juvenile court judge,
David Bazelon,
Since Illinois established the nation's first juve­
nile court at the turn of the century, the Supreme 
Court has never reviewed a case coming from any 
children's court. But the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear Kent's case. For the first time in more than 
60 years of juvenile courts, the Supreme Court of 
the United States decided to look into the record of 
juvenile proceedings. The Justices opened the door 
cautiously, and judging from their opinion, they 
recoiled from what they saw within . . .4
Although this case did not reach the issue of proced­
ural rights for juveniles based on the Constitution, it is 
an instructive forerunner. Justice Fortas, in writing for 
the majority, began by summarizing the juvenile justice sys­
tem in a manner that has since often been quoted. He ex­
plained that.
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds 
for concern that the child receives the worst of both 
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accord­
ed to adults nor the solicitions care and regenera­
tive treatment postulated for children.5
The facts of the case were as follows:
^383 U.S. 541 (1966).
4
David Bazelon, "Justice for Juveniles," The New 
Republic (April 22, 1967), p. 14.
^Kent at 556.
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On September 2, 1961, an intruder entered 
the apartment of a woman in the District of Colum­
bia. He took her wallet. He raped her. The police 
found in the apartment latent fingerprints. They 
were developed and processed. They matched the fin­
gerprints of Morris Kent, taken when he was 14 years 
old and under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. 
At about 3 p.m. on September 4, 1961, Kent was taken 
into custody by the police. Kent was then 16 and 
therefore subject to the 'exclusive jurisdiction' of 
the Juvenile Court. . . .  He was still on probation 
to that court as a result of the 1959 proceedings.®
Kent was taken to police headquarters and questioned. 
Apparently, at that time, he confessed not only to these par­
ticular crimes but to others as well. He was further ques­
tioned on the next day. On that day (September 6) petition­
er's mother retained counsel and together they went to dis­
cuss the matter with the Social Services Director of the 
juvenile court. They learned that the juvenile court was 
considering the possibility of waiving jurisdiction to the 
District Court where Kent would be tried as an adult. Peti­
tioner's counsel, at that time, made known his opposition to 
such a waiver.^
Despite counsel's attempts to prevent the waiver of 
jurisdiction by the juvenile court to the District Court, 
the juvenile court judge claimed that he had made a "full 
investigation," and entered an order waiving jurisdiction to 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia where 
Kent would be tried by regular criminal procedures. The
^Ibid. at 543. 
^Ibid. at 544.
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judge was presumably influenced in his decision by a social 
service file on Morris Kent prepared by the staff of the
Q
juvenile court. Counsel was never given access to the file.
In late September, 1961, Kent was indicted by a
grand jury on eight courts of housebreaking, robbery and
rape. At his trial, Morris Kent was found not guilty by
reason of insanity on the rape charges and found guilty on
the counts of housebreaking and robbery. He was sentenced
to five to 15 years on each count of housebreaking and rob-
0
bery or a total of 30 to 50 years in prison.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on a writ 
of certiorari. It reversed and remanded the case to the 
district court, instructing that court to hold a de novo 
hearing on the issue of w a i v e r . T h e  central question, in 
the Court's opinion, concerned the conditions under which 
the waiver was issued. These conditions included the facts 
that no hearing on the waiver was held, no findings were 
made by the juvenile court, no reasons were stated by the 
juvenile court for the waiver, and that counsel was denied 
access to the social services file which was apparently the 
compelling reason for the judge's d e c i s i o n . T h e  Court
^Ibid. at 546. 
^Ibid. at 550. 
^°Ibid. at 565. 
^^Ibid. at 546.
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affirmed three of counsel's arguments but did not rule on
whether findings must be made. The opinion concluded,
. . . that, as a condition to a valid waiver order, 
petitioner was entitled to a hearing, including 
access by his counsel to the social records and pro­
bation or similar reports which presumably are con­
sidered by the court, and to a statement of reasons 
for the Juvenile Court's d e c i s i o n . ^2
The Court based this decision on statute rather than 
constitutional principles. The opinion relied on The Juven­
ile Court Act. (DC Code Section 11-914 1961, now Section 
11-1553, Supp IV, 1 9 6 5 ) . The Court explained that the 
statute in question lacked specific standards for waiver of 
jurisdiction.^^ However, the Court did say that the juvenile 
court did, in fact, have the power to grant waiver in such 
cases. The point is that such an act must not be committed 
arbitrarily.
The Court ruled that, although waiver of jurisdic­
tion from juvenile court to adult criminal court was a
12
Kent V .  United States at 557.
^^Ibid. at 548, note #6.
14
Ibid. at 547. The opinion stated that, "The pro­
vision of the Juvenile Court Act governing waiver expressly 
provides only for 'full investigation." It states the cir­
cumstances in which jurisdiction may be waived and the child 
held for trial under adult procedures, but it does not state 
standards to govern the juvenile court's decision as to 
waiver.
^^Ibid. at p. 553. For example, the Court said, "The 
statute gives the Juvenile Court a substantial degree of dis­
cretion as to the factual considerations to be evaluated, the 
weight to be given them and the conclusion to be reached. It 
does not confer upon the Juvenile Court a license for abri- 
trary procedure. "
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legitimate act in some cases, it could not be carried out in 
the absence of a full investigation. In order to prevent 
arbitrariness and provide a full investigation into the Kent 
case, the Court said specifically that there should have 
been a hearing; Kent's attorney should have had access to 
the records upon which the judge's decision was based; and 
the judge should have produced a written statement giving 
reasons for his decision.
Although four justices dissented in this case, they 
did not disagree with the result. They simply denounced the 
procedure. They said that the court of appeals had since 
adjusted its construction of the statute in question and 
that it was this court which should be given the chance to 
reconsider the case in light of its subsequent decisions.
The dissenters preferred this route to overruling a decision 
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir­
cuit.
For purposes of this study, the Kent case is more 
interesting for what it implies than what it decides. Coun­
sel for Morris Kent argued other issues on statutory, as 
well as constitutional, grounds. Among these other issues 
were adequate notice, protection from self-incrimination, 
and right to counsel. The Court recognized that the peti­
tioner had raised basic questions concerning the constitu­
tional rights of juveniles. "However," the Court said.
^^Ibid. at 568.
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"because we remand the case on account of procedural error 
with respect to waiver of jurisdiction, we do not pass upon 
these questions.
It appears reasonable to assume that Justice Portas 
might have wanted to add, "but we will consider these ques­
tions on constitutional grounds in the future when given the 
proper opportunity:" Even when announcing the precise judg­
ment of the Court, he could not resist suggesting the consti­
tutional overtones of the opinion. "We believe that this 
result is required by the statute read in the context of
constitutional principles relating to due process and the
18assistance of counsel." [emphasis supplied]
In re Gault
In 1967, the Supreme Court, for the first time, 
decided a juvenile case based on the United States Constitu­
tion, specifically the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The title of the case was In re Gault.
Gault does not say that the state may not assume 
responsibility for the child in certain circumstances, but 
it does question the manner in which the state assumes that 
responsibility.
The majority opinion constitutes a two-pronged attack 
on juvenile court proceedings. In the first place, it
^^Ibid. at 552. 
^®Ibid.
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thoroughly questions the underlying justifications for the 
manner in which juvenile courts proceed. Secondly, after 
having considered and rejected those justifications, the 
Court deals with the procedural requirements of juvenile 
court proceedings. Specifically, the Court considered the 
questions of notice of charges, right to counsel, right to 
confrontation and cross-examination, right to a transcript 
of the proceedings, and right to appellate review.
Jurisdictional Limits
These procedural considerations were limited in 
scope. Although the Gault decision specifically mandated 
that a juvenile has a right to the same procedural require­
ments as an adult with respect to notice, counsel, self­
incrimination, confrontation and cross-examination, there 
were other questions left undecided. In limiting the reach 
of this case. Justice Portas announced, first of all, that 
the case applied only to the adjudication stage of the juve­
nile justice system.
Portas also said that the case pertained only to 
delinquency proceedings and applied only to those cases 
where, if adjudged delinquent, the juvenile could be commit­
ted to an institution. These limitations are repeatedly 
stated and implied throughout the majority opinion.^®
19
In re Gault at 13. 
°^Ibid.
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The reason for this limitation was apparently because
of a recommendation of the President's Crime Commission
Report that full use of preliminary conferences be made prior
to adjudication. The Court chose not to put limits, in the
form of procedural requirements, on any opportunities for
dealing with a child short of adjudication or in the event
21
of institutionalization.
Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings;
General Questions
Recognizing the enormous impact the Gault case would 
have on philosophy as well as procedure. Portas first moved 
to strike down the myths which surround the parens patriae 
justification for adjudication of juveniles in a manner dif­
ferent from adults. The following fundamental ideas are at 
least in part distortions of the truth, according to the 
majority opinion: (1) the juvenile justice system rehabili­
tates errant youths; (2) the system protects the juvenile 
from being labeled a criminal for life; (3) the system pro­
tects the juvenile from disclosure of acts he committed 
while young and irresponsible; and (4) the system creates a 
benevolent trusting relationship between the juvenile and 
the judge which is considered conducive to rehabilitation.
According to Justice Portas, the statistics are 
clear on the issue of rehabilitation. The system is a
^^Ibid. at 31, note #48.
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failure. The percentage of those adjudged delinquent who
22become repeaters or recidivists is apparently enormous.
He dispensed with the myths concerning classification by
saying that if the term delinquent means less than criminal,
2 3it is only slightly less so. The claim of secrecy or pro­
tection from disclosure is also apparently more rhetoric 
than reality.
Finally the opinion denies the existence or the 
benefit of an element of trust created by the informality 
in juvenile proceedings. On the contrary, he pointed out 
that informal surroundings followed by severe discipline
22 In re Gault at 22. In his discussion of youthful 
recidivism, Portas quoted the report of the Stanford 
Research Institute for the President's Commission on Crime 
in the District of Columbia. "This Commission's Report 
states: "Tn fiscal 1966 approximately 66 percent of the 16-
and 17-year-old juveniles referred to the court by the Youth 
Aid Division had been before the court previously. In 1965, 
56 percent of those in the Receiving Home were repeaters.
The SRI study revealed that 61 percent of the sample Juvenile 
Court referrals in 1965 had been previously referred at least 
once and that 42 percent had been referred at least twice 
before.' "
Commenting on these statistics. Portas said, "Cer­
tainly these figures and the high crime rates among juve­
niles. . . could not lead us to conclude that the absence of 
constitutional protections reduces crime, or that the juve­
nile system,. functioning free of constitutional inhibitions 
as it has largely done, is effective to reduce crime or re­
habilitate offenders."
^^Ibid. at 24.
^^Ibid. at 24-25. According to Justice Portas,
"This claim of secrecy, however, is more rhetoric than real­
ity. Disclosure of court records is discretionary with the 
judge in most jurisdictions. Statutory restrictions almost 
invariably apply only to the court records, and even as to
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such as incarceration often leads the juvenile to feel that
25he has been deceived and mistreated.
Along with a frontal attack on the mythical benefits
of the juvenile justice system, Portas reassuringly pointed
out that those real benefits assured the juvenile as a result
of the system would not be disturbed by according juveniles
certain due process rights.
Because of the lengthy discussion of parens patriae
and the myths which surround it, Gault was later claimed to
have created a spirit or a mandate that goes beyond the
actual specific policy statements enumerated in the opin- 
26ion. The Court's majority clearly demonstrated that the 
philosophical underpinnings of parens patriae and the result­
ing lack of due process protections for juveniles is highly 
questionable in terms of theory as well as practice. In
those the evidence is that many courts routinely furnish 
information to the FBI and the military, and on request to 
government agencies and even to private employers. Of most 
importance are police records. . . . Police departments 
receive requests for information from the FBI and other law- 
enforcement agencies, the Armed Forces, and social service 
agencies, and most of them generously comply."
25
Ibid. at 26. Justice Portas took notice of a 
study of Wheeler and Cottrell and concluded, "When the pro­
cedural laxness of the 'parens patriae' attitude is followed 
by stern disciplining, the contrast may have an adverse 
effect upon the child who feels that he has been deceived or 
enticed. They conclude as follows: 'Unless appropriate due
process of law is followed, even the juvenile who has vio­
lated the law may not feel that he is being fairly treated 
and may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court 
personnel.'"
®^Ibid.
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light of'these findings the opinion mandated certain changes 
in the adjudicatory stage of juvenile justice. The opinion 
pronounced that certain due process rights must be made 
available to children as well as adults.
Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings:
Specific Questions
The facts of the Gault case are instructive because
they illuminate the lack of procedural protections afforded
juveniles in delinquency proceedings.
-Facts
On June 15, 1964, Gerald Gault was adjudged a delin­
quent child and committed to the State Industrial School by 
the Juvenile Court of Gila County, Arizona. The background 
of Gault's "delinquent" tendencies was fairly simple. Appar­
ently, the boy first came to the attention of the police in 
July, 1962, when it was alleged that he had stolen a base­
ball glove and lied to the police department about it. How­
ever, there was no hearing held because of a lack of evi- 
27
dence. In February, 1964, Gerald was placed on probation
because he had been with another boy who had stolen a wallet
2 8from a lady's purse. His final involvement with the police 
occurred when he allegedly placed a lewd telephone call to a 
neighbor, a woman. On June 8, 1964, Gerald was picked up by
^^Ibid. at 9.
^®Ibid. at 4.
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the police and taken to the Children's Detention Home. His
parents, who were both working when he was picked up, learned
of his whereabouts from the family of one of Gerald's friends
who had also been taken into custody. "No notice that Gerald
was being taken into custody was left at the home. No other
steps were taken to advise them that their son had, in
29effect, been arrested."
When Mrs. Gault learned where Gerald was, she went to 
the Children's Detention Home and was told by a man. Officer 
Flagg, that there would be a hearing the next day. The same 
officer filed a petition with the court naming Gerald a 
delinquent minor, but the Gault's did not see it until two 
months later. Again, this illustrates lack of proper notice.
The hearing took place without the neighbor, the com­
plainant, being present. Therefore, the Gault's were denied 
the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witness 
against their son. Apparently Mrs. Gault requested that the 
complaining neighbor be present in order to determine which 
boy had done the talking over the phone. "The Juvenile Judge 
said 'she didn't have to be present at the hearing. '
Gault was provided with neither a statement of the 
reasons for a finding of delinquency nor a transcript of 
record of the proceeding. The Court found that, "No
29
Ibid. at 5.
3°Ibid. at 7.
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transcript or recording was made. No memorandum or record 
of the substance of the proceeding was prepared.
On June 15, another hearing was held. This hearing 
resulted in the declaration of Gault as a delinquent child 
and commitment of him to the State Industrial School for six 
years (until age 21) unless sooner discharged by due process 
of law.^^
The consequence of this is that Gerald was committed 
to an institution for a maximum of six years. The situation 
is ironic because if Gerald had been over 18, and thus sub­
ject to regular adult criminal proceedings, the maximum pen­
alty for his alleged behavior, "would have been a fine of $5 
to $50, or imprisonment in jail for not more than two 
months.
Since no appeal is permitted in juvenile cases in
Arizona, counsel for the Gault's filed a writ of habeas
corpus with that state's Supreme Court which referred it to
the Superior Court for a hearing. The Superior Court dis­
missed the writ and appellants asked the Arizona Supreme 
Court for review. This Court also dismissed the writ, where­
upon appellants sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Since no records were kept at the initial hearings, the 
Supreme Court was reliant for information upon the testimony
^^Ibid. at 5.
^^Ibid. at 7-8.
^^Ibid. at 29.
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given at the habeas corpus proceedings. Those present at 
the hearing were the Juvenile Court Judge, Mr. and Mrs.
Gault and Officer Flagg. There was conflicting testimony 
during these proceedings as to what had transpired at the 
previous hearings, particularly as to what degree Gault 
admitted complicity.
-Majority Opinion
As in Kent, Mr. Justice Portas wrote the majority 
opinion. There were four additional opinions; two concur­
ring, one concurring in part and dissenting in part, and one 
dissenting opinion. The majority opinion is a wide-ranging 
discussion of the constitutional rights of juveniles.
-Notice
The first issue considered was notice of charges. 
Notice, in the usual sense, was not afforded juveniles in 
Arizona and other states because it was argued that such a 
procedure would subject the child to the glare of publicity 
and public knowledge of his alleged crime. Portas, of 
course, had already exposed this justification as a myth.
The opinion flatly declares that juveniles have the same 
right to notice as would be proper in any civil or criminal 
proceeding as mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Pro­
cess Clause. The rule as stated is, "Notice, to comply with 
due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in 
advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable
49
opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must 'set
34forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.'"
-Counsel
The second issue was right to counsel. Again the 
Court imposed upon the juvenile system the already recog­
nized understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
right to counsel from cases involving adult criminal proceed­
ings. The opinion, however, falls short of the recommenda­
tion of the National Crime Commission Report which was that, 
"Counsel should be appointed as a matter of course wherever 
coercive action is a possibility, without requiring any 
affirmative choice by child or p a r e n t . T h e  Gault deci­
sion left open the option to waive right to counsel as with 
adult cases. It concluded,
. . . that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to 
determine delinquency which may result in commitment 
to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is 
curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified 
of the child's right to be represented by counsel 
retained by them, or if they are unable to afford 
counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent 
the child.36
- Self-incrimination 
The third issue was self-incrimination. The alleged 
confession made by Gault was the sole basis for his being
^^Ibid. at 33.
^^Ibid. at 40, note #65.
^®Ibid. at 41.
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adjudged a delinquent child. Although he was questioned by
both Officer Flagg and the Judge, there was, as has already
been pointed out, conflict in testimony at the habeas corpus
proceeding before the Superior Court as to what he had said
and not said. At any rate, there was no record kept of any
admission either before or during the initial hearings. In
connection with this specific issue, the Court considered,
. . . whether, in such a proceeding, an admission by 
the juvenile may be used against him in the absence 
of clear and unequivocal evidence that the admission 
was made with the knowledge that he was not obliged 
to speak and would not be penalized for remaining 
silent."37
Furthermore, the Court said, "We must also consider
whether, if the privilege against self-incrimination is
available, it can effectively be waived unless counsel is
38present or the right to counsel has been waived."
The Court argued that any person is entitled to this 
privilege when placed in a situation that may result in the 
curtailment of his liberty, i.e., commitment to an institution. 
Furthermore, the Court recognized the very real possibility, 
as happened in the Kent case, that the child, in most states, 
can end up in adult criminal proceedings where he would (after
the fact) be entitled to the protections against self-
3 9incrimination.
^^Ibid. at 44.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid. at 50.
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Finally, the Court felt compelled to answer the old 
parens patriae idea that confession is good for the child 
and, in effect, constitutes therapy related to rehabilita­
tion;
. . .  it seems probable that where children are 
induced to confess by "parental" urgings on the part 
of officials and the confession is then followed by 
disciplinary action, the child's reaction is likely 
to be hostile and adverse— the child may well feel 
that he has been led or tricked into confession and 
that despite his confession, he is being punished.
The Court went on to say that often times the confes­
sions of children are neither reliable nor trustworthy.^^ In 
other words, there is evidence to indicate that children will 
confess to acts they have not committed for a variety of 
reasons. According to Judge Ketcham, who had served four 
years on the bench of the Juvenile Court of the District of 
Columbia, when he made the statement, "the statement of adoles­
cents under 18 years of age who are arrested and charged with 
violations of law are frequently untrustworthy and often dis­
tort the truth.
The Court concluded that the privilege against self­
incrimination applies to juveniles as it does to adults. It 
recognized that there could be special problems for children 
with regard to waiving the privilege. However, if there are
^°Ibid. at 51-52.
^4 b i d . at 52.
^^Ibid. at 55.
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differences, they must rest on technique and not on principle. 
Furthermore, if confessions are made in the absence of coun­
sel,
. . . the greatest care must be taken to assure that 
the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only 
that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that 
it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of 
adolescent fantasy, fright, or d e s p a i r . 43
-Confrontation and Cross-examination 
The fourth question confronted in Gault concerns con­
frontation and cross-examination. Of course, the complainant 
in Gault was not present at either of the two hearings so 
Gerald Gault was never given the opportunity to confront,or 
have his counsel confront, or question the witness against 
him.
Again on this issue the Court held that the Fourteen­
th Amendment Due Process Clause requires the protection of 
these rights in the case of juveniles as well as adults.
The mandate was that:
. . . absent a valid confession, a determination of 
delinquency and an order to commitment to a state 
institution cannot be sustained in the absence of 
sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for 
cross-examination in accordance with our law and
constitutional requirements.45
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid. at 535.
^^Ibid. at 57.
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-Transcript and Appellate Review
The final issues argued by appellants were the right 
to a transcript of the proceedings and the right to appellate 
review. By way of dicta, the Court included here a discus­
sion of the juvenile's right to a judge's statement of rea­
sons for the conclusion. The opinion recalled that in the 
Kent decision, this was declared a necessary condition for 
waiver of a case from juvenile court to adult icriminal court.
In the Gault case, the majority opinion chose not to 
pronounce on these issues as there were other grounds for 
reversing the Arizona Supreme Court. However the opinion 
warned:
. . . the consequences of failure to provide an 
appeal, to record the proceedings, or to make find­
ings or state the grounds for the juvenile court's 
conclusion may be to throw a burden upon the machin­
ery of habeas corpus, to saddle the reviewing pro­
cess with the burden of attempting to reconstruct a 
record, and to impose upon the Juvenile Judge the 
unseemly duty of testifying under cross-examination 
as to the events that transpired in the hearings 
before him.46
It is obvious, although the Court refused to decide 
on these issues, the majority believed the rights in question 
to be, in all probability, mandatory. Perhaps more pointed­
ly, Mr. Justice Harlan disagreed in his opinion which con­
curred in part and dissented in part. He thought that the 
right to a written record of some sort and appeal were 
obvious and essential ingredients of a fair hearing.
^®Ibid. at 58.
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Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
-Harlan
Harlan's opinion rests on a lengthy examination of
the overall meaning of due process and, "the method by which
47the procedural requirements should be measured." His chief 
concern apparently was with the concept of "compelling public 
interest." Justice Harlan felt that when legislatures can 
show such an interest in denying a procedural or substantive 
right, their position should remain untouched. He assumed 
that, "Such interests would never warrant arbitrariness or 
the diminution of any specifically assured constitutional 
right.
The essential difference between the majority opinion
and Justice Harlan's opinion is that the first uses the
"essentials of due process and fair treatment" Fourteenth
Amendment standard relying upon specific provisions of the
Bill of Rights as a reference point for determining the
requirements of due process. Harlan used an underlying
theoretical view of due process which cautions against judi-
49
cial intervention and urges self-restraint. Consequently,
^^Ibid. at 68.
^^Ibid. at 69.
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Ibid. at 72. Following a rather thorough judicial
history concerning the meaning of due process, Harlan con­
cluded that proper measurement of procedural requirements 
depends upon three essential criteria; "first, no more 
restrictions should be imposed than are imperative to assure 
the proceedings' fundamental fairness; second, the restric­
tions which are imposed should be those which preserve, so
55
he felt that the states should be left to pursue their 
purposes as freely as possible. He not only used legal argu­
ment to support his view but mentioned surrounding conditions 
and circumstances as w e l l . H e  pointed out that, in the 
first place, a substantial number of those children brought 
before juvenile courts are not even being accused of criminal 
c o n d u c t , s u c h  as truants, runaways, incorrigibles and/or 
children who are for some other reason in need of supervision. 
He implied that due process requirements for criminals are 
not applicable here. However, these children are still sub­
ject to commitment to an institution, which Harlan did not
mention. Furthermore, this decision pointedly did not deal
52
with such children.
Therefore, according to the Harlan opinion, only 
notice, counsel, and written record are the essential require­
ments. Although he does not pronounce on right to appeal, he 
implied that it is also a necessity.Protections for the
far as possible, the essential elements of the State's pur­
pose, and finally, restrictions should be chosen which will 
later permit the orderly selection of any additional protec­
tions which may ultimately prove necessary.
^^Ibid. at 70. He said, "it should not be forgotten 
that juvenile crime and juvenile courts are both now under 
earnest study throughout the country." and that, "imposing 
these rigid procedural requirements, may inadvertently have 
served to discourage these efforts to find more satisfactory 
solutions for the problems of juvenile crime, . . . "
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid. at 13.
^^Ibid. at 72.
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privilege of self-incrimination, confrontation and cross- 
examination, he felt, would impose unnecessarily rigid re­
strictions on the state's ability to devise innovative means 
for dealing with juvenile crime.
-Black
Mr. Justice Black also wrote a separate opinion in 
this case. He concurred with the conclusions of the Court 
but offered a different view as to the constitutional basis 
for the ruling. Rather than basing his decision on the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, he claimed the pro­
cedural requirements were mandatory, "because they are spe­
cifically and unequivocally granted by provisions of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments which the Fourteenth Amendment
54
makes applicable to the States." Black felt that the only 
relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment was that it makes the 
particular provisions of the Bill of Rights mandatory upon 
the states. Justice Black's concern with the tendency of the 
Court to make the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause a 
discretionary judicial tool was that he did not believe that 
the Clause gave courts the power to fashion new laws. Pre­
sumably his fear was for what such an interpretation of the 
Clause could take away from the people's liberties.
^^Ibid. at 61.
^^Ibid. at 62-63. Black said, "Freedom in this Nation 
will be far less secure the very moment that it is decided 
that judges can determine which of these safeguards 'should' 
or 'should not be imposed.' According to their notions of 
what constitutional provisions are consistent with the
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-White
Mr. Justice White also wrote a concurring opinion in 
this case. However, his only disagreement was with the facts. 
He did not agree that there were adequate grounds for deter­
mining the question on self-incrimination, confrontation and
. _. 56cross-examination.
-Stewart
The only purely dissenting opinion was presented by 
Mr. Justice Stewart. Since juvenile proceedings are not 
criminal trials, Stewart said the procedural requirements 
are not only unnecessary but also could prove detrimental.
He explained that mandating such requirements would eventu­
ally result in creating a reactionary situation where child-
57
ren would be treated like adults.
He hedged the opinion by "supposing" some requirements 
may be necessary but not in this case. He saw no reason,
58according to the facts, for deciding the issues at question.
'traditions and conscience of our people.' Judges with such 
power will be above the Constitution . . . "
^^Ibid. at 64-65.
^^Ibid. at 79.
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Ibid. at 81. Stewart said, "The Supreme Court of 
Arizona found that the parents of Gerald Gault 'knew of their 
right to counsel, to subpoena and cross-examine witnesses, of 
the right to confront the witnesses against Gerald and the 
possible consequences of a finding of delinquency!' It fur­
ther found that 'Mrs. Gault knew the exact nature of the 
charge against Gerald from the day he was taken to the deten­
tion home.'"
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Remaining Questions
The Gault decision does not resolve several questions. 
What procedural protections do juveniles have with respect to 
the police and various social agencies which are involved 
with preventive delinquency practices or, once adjudged 
delinquent, after institutionalization? What rights do juve­
niles possess which are before a court on charges not crim­
inal in nature such as truancy, incorrigibility or in need 
of supervision? And, finally, does the child have any pro­
tections when faced with circumstances in which he could be 
fined or placed on probation?
With respect to right to counsel, the case leaves
59broad questions unanswered. Questions also remain with 
regard to the privilege against self-incrimination.^^
Although a careful reading of the Gault decision 
suggests answers to three more questions, there is no
59
0. W. Ketcham, "Guidelines from Gault: Revolution­
ary Requirements and Reappraisal," 53 Virginia Law Review 
(1967): 1703. Includes among these questions, according to 
Judge Ketcham, are, "Who must notify the child and parent of 
the right to counsel, and how should they be apprised of this 
right? Should the right be explained at the time of arrest 
or apprehension, according to an agreed formula of words, or 
can it be done more thoughtfully and with greater significance 
at a later time by intake personnel or the judge? . . . Can 
the right to counsel be waived? If so, by whom and upon what 
conditions? . . . Where will the courts find knowledgeable 
attorneys for juveniles, and how will they be compensated?"
^^Ibid. at 1705. Ketcham said the fundamental ques­
tions in this matter are, "Who is responsible for advising the 
juvenile of his right to remain silent, and when is this ad­
vice to be given. . . . Should this responsibility fall to the 
police (as in adult proceedings), to the court's intake work­
er, or to the juvenile court judge at the time of hearing?"
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specific pronouncement. These are whether or not a juvenile 
has a right to: "(a) a written record of the proceedings
for review, (b) a written statement by the judge of the 
grounds for finding of delinquency, and (c) an orderly pro­
cedure for appealing juvenile court judgments.
In summary then, although much is decided about the 
juvenile justice system by In re Gault, the decision opens 
up many other areas of prevailing law and practice as it 
applies to young people.
The possible impact of the Gault decision is enor­
mous. There are many questions left unanswered by the deci­
sion, but subsequent cases provide some clues to the future 
trend established by In re Gault.
IiL_re_Wirish^: Majority Opinion
The next important case dealing with juvenile rights 
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was In re Winship. In this case the Supreme Court declared 
that juveniles have a constitutional right to the requirement 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in cases where a juvenile 
is charged with an act that would be a crime if committed by 
an adult. Prior to this case, courts used the "preponderance 
of evidence" standard which required less certainty in finding 
of delinquency than in a finding of guilt in adult criminal 
cases.
^^Ibid. at 1717.
^^497 U.S. 358 (1970).
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Winship, a 12-year old boy, was accused of entering 
a locker room and stealing $112 from a woman's purse. He 
was charged with an act of delinquency and found "guilty."
The judge used the "preponderance of evidence" standard in 
his determination. He acknowledged that the evidence possi­
bly did not measure up to a standard of proof "beyond a rea­
sonable doubt." But he said such a standard of proof was not 
necessary according to the New York statutes.
As a result of being found delinquent, Winship was
sentenced to a training school for 18 months, "subject to
annual extensions of his commitment until his 18th birthday
64— six years in appellant's case."
The decision, written by Mr. Justice Brennan, ini­
tially traced the historical foundations of the "proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt s t a n d a r d . I t  then turned to the matter 
of juveniles in order to determine whether or not they too 
were entitled to the protection of this standard according 
to due process of law.
The Court pointed out that the reasonable doubt stan­
dard served a two-fold purpose: (1) it protects the individ­
ual against loss of liberty and (2) it protects him from the 
social stigmatization and loss of civil rights that are a 
consequence of conviction.
G^ibid. at 359. 
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid. at 361-385. 
®®Ibid. at 363.
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In the case of juveniles, the state pointed out 
that there could be no stigma since the "conviction" is civil 
not criminal; the proceedings are cloaked in confidentiality; 
and there is no loss of rights issue i n v o l v e d . T h e  Supreme 
Court rejected the arguments on the basis of In re Gault 
and further pointed out that, whatever was or was not in­
volved, the case still involved a serious loss of liberty.
Such a loss, the Court said, "is comparable in seriousness
68
to a felony prosecution."
The majority opinion also pointed out that adoption 
of the reasonable doubt standard would in no way upset the 
operation of the juvenile justice system nor disturb any of 
its benefits. The Court said, "In sum, the constitutional 
safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as much 
required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency pro­
ceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in 
Gault. . ."G9
Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Stewart dissented 
in Winship believing that including another due process stan­
dard with those already applied by Gault was simply another 
step toward that transformation of juvenile courts into
^^Ibid. at 365.
^^Ibid. at 366.
®^Ibid. at 368.
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criminal courts. In their view the real problems are 
inadequate staffs and facilities, and those problems will not 
be relieved by reducing the flexibility of juvenile courts 
by imposing due process standards on them.^^
Mr. Justice Black also dissented in the case. His 
complaint with the majority's opinion was that the reason­
able doubt standard, in his opinion, is not to be found in 
the Constitution. As he had said in other previous cases, 
the actual words of the Constitution should determine the 
meaning of due process and the Court should not "rely on the 
shifting day-to-day standards of fairness of individual 
judges.
The decision in Winship represents a return to the 
broader interpretation of due process contained in Justice 
Harlan's concurring opinion in the Gault case. Since the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not found 
in the Bill of Rights, the formula established by the major­
ity opinion for determining which rights are obligatory for 
juveniles was not appropriate in this case.
McKeiver v. Pennsvlvania: Majority Opinion
Another major step in determining what due process 
rights are mandatory in juvenile proceedings came in the
^°Ibid. at 376.
^^Ibid. at 378.
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case of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. In this case, the
Supreme Court determined that juveniles do not have a right
to a jury trial. The general thrust of the majority opinion
in McKeiver was the Court's concern that the imposition of
trial by jury on the juvenile system would be detrimental to
73
the informal, nonadversary setting in the juvenile court.
The Court expressed the concern that implementation 
of a juvenile right to trial by jury "would bring with it 
into that system the traditional delay, the formality and 
the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the public 
trial.
McKeiver presented, in reality, as many questions as 
answers about the meaning of due process in juvenile cases 
because the opinion was far from unanimous. Only the Chief 
Justice and Justices White and Stewart concurred with Mr. 
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion.
The case involved juveniles from two different states 
with different sets of facts. The parties included the State 
of Pennsylvania; two juveniles from that state accused of 
acts of delinquency such as larceny, robbery, receiving 
stolen goods, conspiracy, and an assault on a police officer; 
the State of North Carolina; and juveniles from that state
72
73
74
403 U.S. 528 (1971) . 
Ibid. at 545-51. 
Ibid. at 550.
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accused of acts of delinquency including disorderly conduct 
and "obstructing the flow of traffic on a highway or 
s t r e e t . T h e  fundamental factual differences were that 
the Pennsylvania juveniles were accused simply of acts of 
delinquency, while the North Carolina juveniles were accused 
of delinquency acts as a result of participation in demon­
strations concerning school desegregation; and, the proceed­
ings in the Pennsylvania cases were open to the public and 
members of the press while the North Carolina proceedings 
were closed to all but the involved parties.
The Court combined the cases in order to squarely 
face the narrow issue of whether or not "the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment assures the right to trial 
by jury in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court 
delinquency proceeding.
The majority opinion claimed the right does not 
exist. It referred to Gault, Winship and other cases where 
the dicta clearly indicated that not all procedural restric­
tions applied in adult criminal proceedings were applicable
77to juvenile proceedings. Justice Blackmun pointed out 
that "fundamental fairness" was the standard to be used in 
determining what due process guarantees were necessary for
^^McKeiver at 558.
^^Ibid. at 530.
^^Ibid. at 531-4.
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juvenile proceedings. He said that the emphasis in Gault
and Winship was on factfinding procedures. The majority
opinion did not find trial by jury to be "a necessary com-
78
ponent of accurate factfinding." The opinion reminded the
reader that there were a variety of circumstances, such as
workmen's compensation cases, where the Court had decided
79trial by jury was unnecessary.
The Court agreed that the juvenile justice system, 
as originally envisioned, was not particularly successful.
It was unwilling, however, to agree that the situation was 
hopeless and refused to take another step in the direction 
of returning juveniles to "the traditional delay, the for­
mality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly.
the public trial. ..80
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Mr. Justice White wrote a concurring opinion in 
which he emphasized the differences between criminal trials 
and delinquency proceedings both in theory and practice. He 
said that the elements of condemnation, punishment and deter­
rence, while part of the theory embracing criminal trials, are 
not a part of the juvenile justice system. That system rests 
on ideas of benevolence and rehabilitation. The theoretical
78
79
Ibid. at 543. 
Ibid.
80
Ibid. at 550.
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elements of criminal trials, whether or not embraced in the
individual states' juvenile courts, are not required by due 
81process.
Both the majority opinion and White's concurring
opinion emphasized that the states are free to use jury
trials in juvenile proceedings if they so choose but they
82are not required to do so by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Justice Brennan wrote an opinion in which he con­
curred with the majority opinion in the cases involving the 
Pennsylvania youths but disagreed with the conclusions as 
applied to the North Carolina juveniles. The difference, in 
his opinion, was the element of allowing or not allowing the 
public to be present at the proceedings. He said that juve­
niles must be able to focus "community attention upon the
trial of their cases" in order to alleviate the fear of
83judicial oppression. Where the community is not allowed
to view the proceedings, a jury trial is necessary in order
to assure that the court is not being used for political or
84other nonjudicial purposes.
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred with the majority opin­
ion for an entirely different reason. In his opinion.
G^Ibid. at 551-3.
on
Ibid. at 547 and 553.
G^ibid. at 555.
84
° Ibid. at 556-7.
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"criminal jury trials are not constitutionally required of
the States, either as a matter of Sixth Amendment law or due 
85
process." He said, however, that if jury trials were man­
datory for adults then they would also be mandatory for juve­
niles.^^
Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in
which he was joined by Justices Black and Marshall. Douglas
said simply that where juvenile court proceedings are used
"to prosecute a juvenile for a criminal act and to order
'confinement,'" the juvenile "is entitled to the same proce-
87durai proections as an adult." The opinion emphasized
that juveniles can be, and in fact often are, incarcerated
88under prisonlike conditions for long periods of time.
Jury trials protect a juvenile from a judge who has been
89
prejudiced by information provided by court personnel.
Finally, jury trials may convince a child that he has
received fair and unbiased treatment. Only then, in some
90cases, can the rehabilitative process begin.
McKeiver does not necessarily mean a return to pre- 
Gaul^ days. It is, in reality, again an extension of the
B^ibid. at 557. 
G^Ibid.
G^Ibid. at 559. 
B^ibid. at 560.
Ibid. at 563. 
9°Ibid. at 562.
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Gault formula. The Court said in both Kent and Gault that 
all procedural protections afforded adults were not neces­
sarily obligatory in the juvenile adjudication process. 
McKeiver is an example of the case by case formula set forth 
in Gault where "each claimed right in turn would have to be 
subjected to the constitutional standards of due process and 
fair treatment, and an independent determination made in
each case whether those standards demanded application of
91the right to the juvenile process."
Breed v. Jones
The most recent Supreme Court announcement with
respect to juvenile rights during the adjudicatory stage of
92the juvenile justice system is Breed v. Jones. In May of 
1975, the Court decided that juveniles have the right to the 
Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy, appli­
cable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment. Juveniles may no longer be prosecuted in 
a criminal court for the same act already proceeded upon in 
a juvenile court.
The Breed case concerned a 17-year old boy who had 
committed acts that would have amounted to robbery if he had 
been an adult. Since he was not an adult, according to
91Samuel M. Davis, Rights of Juveniles ; The Juvenile 
Justice System (New York: Clark Broadman Company, Ltd.,
1974), p."185.
9^421 U.S. 519 (1975).
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California law, he was dealt with in juvenile court. In 
considering the petition claiming Jones had committed acts 
of delinquency, the juvenile court judge found the allega­
tions to be true after hearing the testimony of two prosecu­
tion witnesses and the defendant. Jones was held in custody 
while awaiting a dispositional hearing. At the disposition­
al hearing, the judge, taking notice of a probation officer's 
testimony, decided that Jones was "'not . . . amenable to 
the care, treatment and training program available through
the facilities of the juvenile court,'" and ordered that he
93be prosecuted in an adult criminal court.
Jones contended that an adjudicatory hearing in 
juvenile court followed by a trial in adult court consti­
tuted double jeopardy and claimed that this practice was in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment as applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Breed contended that the 
defendant "'never faced the risk of more than one punish­
ment,'" and, furthermore, imposition of the double jeopardy
prohibition on the juvenile process would only serve to
94diminish the unique flexibility of the juvenile court.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, 
explained double jeopardy in terms of "risk" as opposed to 
punishment. "Risk," in the constitutional sense, is the
93
Breed v. Jones, 43 The United States Law Week 
4645 (1975).
^^Ibid. at 4648.
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burden imposed on the individual by the state in essentially 
criminal cases. The intent of the burden is "to authorize 
criminal punishment to vindicate public justice." Because 
of this intent, the possible consequences, and the overwhelm­
ing power of the state, the burden of a criminal trial im­
poses severe hardship on the individual in terms of psycho­
logical and physical well-being and financial resources.
The Court found that Jones had been subjected to 
this burden and the risk involved in the adjudicatory hear­
ing, and it would be in violation of the double jeopardy pro­
hibition to impose upon him a further trial. The Court 
recognized that not all youthful offenders are amenable to 
rehabilitation through the juvenile justice system but said 
the decision to transfer a case to adult criminal court must 
be made prior to a juvenile adjudicatory hearing.^®
In response to the argument that such a determination 
would affect the uniqueness of the juvenile court, the Su­
preme Court said that the risk of transfer, another trial, 
and conviction following an adjudicatory hearing forces an 
attorney into a totally adversary position in order to pro­
tect his client. This destroys the notion that juvenile 
hearings should be informal and flexible with only the best 
interests of the juvenile in question. Chief Justice Burger
^^Ibid. at 4647.
^^Ibid. at 4649.
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explained, "Knowledge of the risk of transfer after an
adjudicatory hearing can only undermine the potential for
informality and cooperation which was intended to be the
97hallmark of the juvenile court system.
General Effects of Judicial Intervention 
in Juvenile Delinquency Cases
Although the number of cases involving juvenile due
process rights is obviously limited, the state courts have
apparently been very responsive. Subsequent to the Court's
decision in Gault, "there was a tremendous constitutional
mandate, expanding its scope to embrace other rights not
included in its mandate, and extending its applicability to
98other stages of the process."
There appears to be disagreement as to the effects
of Gault and other such decisions. Judge Orman W. Ketcham,
Juvenile Court Judge of the District of Columbia, believes
that the decision is profound and calls for revolutionary
change in proceedings against juveniles. He has pointed out
that the case requires a change in the emphasis of the juve-
99nile court procedure. He also sees a change in discipline
*7ibid. at 4650.
o p
=°Davis at 186 (1974).
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Ketcham at 1701. For example, he said, "No longer 
is the hearing to be simply a friendly conference, marked 
chiefly by its informality. Hereafter it should be a legal 
proceeding at which evidence is taken and an adjudication 
made upon the facts found . . . "
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emphasis from social and behavioral science to law.^^® 
Finally, he believes that Gault will result in a narrowing 
of the juvenile court's jurisdiction, whether by law or in 
practice. The courts will no longer be expected by the pub­
lic to concern themselves with all aspects of errant behav­
ior but only those aspects which involve criminal behav-
ior.lOl
Judge Ketcham'é conclusion is an exemplary state­
ment of one who greeted Gault with optimism and excitement;
There is no doubt that the decision of In re 
Gault revolutionizes the law relating to juveniles. 
Provided its guidelines are sincerely followed and 
implemented at the state and local level, Gault will 
change for the better the operation of the Nation's 
juvenile court system. Instead of appearing before 
quasi-social agencies, which often have been inef­
fective, juveniles charged with law violations will 
face courts of law which provide orderly protection 
and individual justice. Compassion and goodwill for 
the juvenile will be balanced by due concern for the 
safety of the public. As practice and procedure 
develop, the intellectual foundations of juvenile 
court philosophy, especially the doctrine of "parens 
patriae," will undergo a rigorous reappraisal. In
Ibid. Ketcham said, "Whereas social work and the 
concepts of behavioral science have been in the forefront of 
juvenile court proceedings, with lawyers and the legal 
aspects recognized only grudgingly, the Gault decision will 
reverse this order. Hereafter the juvenile court will be 
first and foremost a court of law."
^^^Ibid. Ketcham explained that "the public must 
divest itself of any notion that these courts are concerned 
with unpleasant children who hitch rides on streetcars and 
sass their teachers. The knowledge that urban juvenile 
courts are dealing with large numbers of serious and ugly 
crimes should set a more accurate perspective. Making it 
clear that the juvenile court's primary responsibility is 
law enforcement, not teaching manners, will also help to 
focus attention on its new role."
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prospect is a new, fairer and more effective form of 
juvenile court proceeding, based upon traditional 
American legal principles; it should both protect 
the public and preserve the foremost goals of the 
juvenile court s y s t e m . ^02
The optimistic appraisal accorded the Gault decision 
by Judge Ketcham is not universally shared. Sanford J. Fox, 
Professor of Law at Boston College, concludes that Gault and 
its effects are, at best, a mixed b l e s s i n g . P r o f e s s o r  
Fox's observations stem from a seminar he taught for at 
least five years, together with a practicing lawyer and a 
social psychologist, on juvenile court practice. The stu­
dents in the seminar were "assigned to defend and prosecute 
juvenile delinquency cases in the Boston Juvenile Court, as 
well as to represent children, parents or the Commonwealth 
in neglect cases.
Based on this experience. Professor Fox has found 
reason to believe that Gault and its effect stopped short of 
being revolutionary. In the first place, procedural require­
ments in juvenile courts mark a restoration of practices ad­
hered to before the establishment of juvenile courts, not a 
new, revolutionary change. Furthermore, he found it diffi­
cult to believe that the public will be willing to bear the
102
" ibid. at 1718.
^^^Sanford J. Fox, "Juvenile Justice Reform: An
Historical Perspective, 22 Stanford Law Review (1970): 1235-
9.
104
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costs of implementing Gault in an effective manner. He 
points out that in order to give valid meaning to the Gault 
decision, lawyers would have to be hired for indigent child­
ren, courtroom staffs would have to be increased, more court­
rooms would have to be constructed, and training programs
1 oc ...
for the lawyers would have to be established.
Based on his observations. Professor Fox found ques­
tionable or negative attitudes in both the lawyers and their 
youthful clients. He said that the lawyers have reserva­
tions when it comes to vigorously protecting the procedural 
rights of children who are probably guilty. When it is 
obvious that a juvenile's friends, family and general envi­
ronment are conducive to a life of crime, an adult has 
reservations toward carrying out the expected role of help­
ing the child "beat the rap" and return to that environment.
Also Fox found that, because the lawyers are of a 
different social, economic, or racial background, the child 
tends to see the attorney as part of the establishment and 
rejects his help in one way or a n o t h e r . T h e  lawyer is
lO^ibid. at 1238.
^^^Ibid. at 1236. Fox explained, "Not only does the 
child identify the lawyer as part of the organization that 
is after him, but the recognition is fused with elements of 
hostility and resentment based on perceptions of a more 
broadly based attempt to impose one culture on another. With 
the uninhibited candor of childhood, the client manages to 
communicate his alienation and hostility— he fails to keep 
appointments, he lies, in a hundred different ways he shows 
that he does not believe the lawyer is on his side."
n
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human. It is difficult for any human to understand and 
accept behavior which is personally hostile.
Professor Fox also observed that generally the law­
yers who are appointed to represent juveniles are unskilled 
and untrained, but even if the attorney is adequate, there 
are institutional pressures on him to cooperate with the 
court officials. Because the system has, for a long time, 
assumed that the juvenile court carries with it an aura of 
expertise, the attorney is expected to help institutionalize 
"bad" children and only "get off" the "good" ones. The most 
damaging circumstances about having an attorney present who 
is either unskilled or subject to institutional pressure is 
that the judge is also effected. When there is no counsel 
present to represent a juvenile, the judge is inclined to 
assume the role of protecting the child against kangaroo 
court tactics. But when a lawyer is present, whether compe­
tent or not, the judge is likely to assume a passive role.
Despite the pessimistic appraisal of Professor Fox, 
the previously mentioned study and survey undertaken by the 
National Council of Jewish Women found encouraging results 
with respect to right to counsel. They announced that
Ibid. Fox further explained, "It is difficult to 
be despised and not to do a little despising back, or to be 
rejected and not reject back. There is much, in short, that 
gives the lawyer cause to be angry, although he rarely recog­
nizes himself to be in that state. Suppressed anger against 
the one to be helped necessarily detracts from the effect­
iveness of the helper."
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"almost 70 percent found that children were provided with
counsel. Of the remainder, half found that counsel was pro-
108
vi.id when requested."
The NCJW also announced, however, that the findings 
were not totally positive. The implementation of right to 
counsel apparently varies greatly from jurisdiction to juris­
diction. The survey showed that it varied "from those courts 
where counsel was 'automatic' to those where it is 'offered
but not often used' to those where it is 'not provided' at 
109all. The survey also found caseloads and the competency 
of counsel to be problems.
The State of Texas; Specific Effects of 
Judicial Intervention in Juvenile Delin­
quency Cases
Since the subject of this dissertation. Morales v. 
Turman, is a study of Texas juvenile justice, the effects of 
the Gault decision on that state are instructive. The Texas 
system of juvenile justice provides an example of change as 
mandated by Gault. With regard to notice, it was found that
108
Edward Wakin, Children Without Justice (New York: 
National Council of Jewish Women, 1975), p. 63.
l°*Ibid.
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Ibid. The study found for example that "in one 
major city a lack of funds for lawyers coupled with the 
requirement that lawyers be assigned in court led to a back­
log of more than 4,000 cases. This situation creates two 
serious problems: large numbers of children are warehoused
in detention facilities awaiting trial, and lawyers have 
inadequate time to meet with their clients to prepare for 
court."
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two standards must be met in order to comply with the 
Supreme Court's mandate— particularity and timeliness. Al­
though a study of Texas statutes and case law reveals that 
the requirement of particularity is met in Texas, neither 
met the requirement of t i m e l i n e s s . T e x a s  law allowed the 
child and his parents or guardian to appear voluntarily 
before the court without issuing of a summons. (art. 2338- 
1, Sec. 8, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 1925) Therefore, Texas law 
had to be changed and the provision for voluntary appearance, 
without first having been informed of the accusations, had 
to be eliminated.
The Texas Juvenile Delinquency Act, as amended, pro­
vides counsel for juveniles in cases of waiver to a state 
district court. The waiver is limited to cases where the
juvenile is at least fifteen years of age and has been
112accused of committing a felony. However, there was no 
provision in the Texas statutes nor in the case law for ap­
pointing counsel to represent indigent juveniles before the 
juvenile court in a delinquency proceeding. Neither was 
there any provision which mandated that the child and his 
parents had to be expressly informed that they had a right 
to counsel and, if without funds, counsel would be appointed 
for them. These provisions had to be accepted into Texas law.
William K. Kimble, "Application of Gault: Its 
Effect in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings in Texas," 20 
Baylor Law Review (1968): 114.
ll^ibid.
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Although Texas statutory law does not mention the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the case law has held 
that a juvenile cannot be compelled to testify against him­
self. However, prior to Gault, there was no provision for 
assuring that a juvenile must be informed, prior to the 
admission of any wrongdoing, that he has a right to counsel. 
Presumably the Gault decision makes mandatory this procedure 
in present and future cases.
There is no apparent discrepancy between the Gault 
decision and Texas case law on the issues of confrontation 
and cross-examination, although Texas statutory law is 
silent on these questions.
Even though the Court in Gault did not reach a con­
clusion on the questions of right to a transcript or appeal, 
it was suggested earlier that they would rule in favor of 
these procedures when the proper opportunity is presented. 
This will not be a problem in Texas, as juvenile courts in 
that state are courts of record, and juveniles have a right 
to appeal to the Courts of Civil Appeals and the Texas 
Supreme Court.
ll^ibid. at 118-9.
114
Ibid. at 119-20. According to Kimble, "The only 
Texas case in this area which involves a juvenile delinquency 
proceeding is in accord with the Gault case. In Ballard v. 
State the court held that the accused in a juvenile delin­
quency case should be faced by the witnesses who give evidence 
against him and should be permitted to hear such evidence and 
have an opportunity to cross-examine the witness."
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Summary; Parens Patriae
In summary, the adjudication stage of the juvenile 
justice system has received scrutiny at all levels of the 
judiciary, and revolutionary change in the law has been the 
result. The Supreme Court has not yet, however, granted 
certiorari in a case involving the rights of juveniles in a 
posthearing setting. (The major concern of this study is the 
rights of juveniles who have been adjudged delinquent and 
incarcerated in an institution.) As noted in the previous 
chapter, the parens patriae doctrine does not constitute the 
sole stumbling block in such cases. Besides being generally 
reluctant to interfere with the juvenile justice system, the 
courts have been historically particularly apprehensive 
about intervening in the treatment of institutionalized per­
sons, whatever their age.
The "Hands-Off" Doctrine 
The "hands-off" philosophy remains the same with 
respect to Supreme Court cases involving incarcerated juve­
niles. However, imprisoned adults have, in recent years, 
received Supreme Court attention. Dispelling with the 
notion that the courts should not, under any circumstances, 
interfere in the day-to-day operation of facilities designed 
to house convicted criminals may or may not result in a 
Supreme Court case involving the rights of incarcerated juve­
niles. If this is to happen, in all probability, the "hands- 
off" doctrine had to be dealt with first. As noted in the
80
previous chapter, the judiciary refused to become involved 
in the administration of prisons for a variety of reasons. 
The central theme of nonintervention has been, in all cases, 
lack of jurisdiction.
Historical Basis for "Hands-Off" Doctrine
Until recently, prisoners were deemed civilly dead 
and without constitutional rights. The often quoted rule 
of law governing this principle is that "every person con­
victed of the crime of larceny, etc., shall be deemed infa­
mous and shall forever thereafter be rendered incapable of 
holding office, voting, serving as a juror, e t c . T h e  
prisoner was considered "an alien in his own country, and 
worse, for he can be restored only as a matter of grace, 
while an alien may acquire citizenship as a matter of 
right.
Reinterpretation of the "Hands-Off" Doctrine
The notion that a convicted and incarcerated crim­
inal has no rights remained good law until 1944 when, in 
Coffin V .  Reichard, a federal appellate court suggested that
^^^People V .  Russell, 245 111. 268, 91 N.E. (1910),
at 1075.
^^^Ibid. at 1076. See also Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 
62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). This case held that the 
prisoner "has, as a consequence of his crime, not only fore- 
feited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those 
which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the 
time being the slave of the State. He is civiliter mortuus; 
and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that of 
a dead man."
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this was not entirely the case. The Sixth Circuit Court 
established the writ of habeas corpus as a legitimate instru­
ment available to prisoners whose rights had been denied.
In speaking of these rights, the Court said,
"A prisoner retains all rights of an ordinary citi­
zen except those expressly, or by necessary implica­
tion, taken from him by law. While the law does 
take his liberty and imposes a duty of servitude and 
observance of discipline for his regulation and that 
of other prisoners, it does not deny his right to 
personal security against unlawful invasion.
Although in 1944 it was suggested that prisoners
retain some rights, it was not until the mid-1960's that a
118series of cases began to deal with the matter. The 
"hands-off" doctrine cannot be proclaimed dead by any means 
because the judiciary at all levels is still reluctant to 
interfere. It is apparent, however, that when denial of a 
fundamental constitutional or statutory right is claimed, 
the federal courts will shed the doctrine and hear the com­
plaint.
The federal courts have apparently recognized that 
protection of fundamental rights, and the consequent recogni­
tion on the part of the prisoner of applied fairness, is a 
necessary ingredient in the rehabilitation
^^^John W. Palmer, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners 
(Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson Company, 1973), p. 536.
118
Norman Dorson, ed., The Rights of Americans: What
They Are— What They Should Be (New York: Random House, Inc.,
1970), p. 456.
iig
Palmer at 137.
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p r o c e s s . I t  is, of course, to be recognized that prison
reform is primarily the job of the executive and legislative
branches. When these branches refuse to act, however, the
judiciary must intervene or it runs the risk of legitimizing
121
executive and legislative inaction.
The Right to Treatment 
Along with the rethinking and reinterpretation of 
parens patriae and the decline in the rigid application of 
the "hands-off" doctrine, the Morales case was preceded by 
the development of a unique constitutional doctrine— the 
right to treatment. Generally stated, this newly estab­
lished constitutional right proclaims that when the
See Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F. 2d 995, 1002 (D.C. 
Cir. 1969). "That penal as well as judicial authorities 
respond to constitutional duties is vastly important to 
society as well as the prisoner. Treatment that degrades 
the inmate, invades his privacy, and frustrates the ability 
to choose pursuits through which he can manifest himself and 
gain self-respect erodes the very foundations upon which he 
can prepare for a socially useful life."
121
Phillip J. Hirschkop and Mike Millemann, "The 
Unconstitutionality of Prison Life," 55 Virginia Law Review 
(1969): 836. "A most persuasive argument in favor of judi­
cial intervention into penal institutions is given by penal 
law experts Hirschkop and Millemann. "No organ of government 
is better suited than the legislature to consider the peno­
logical developments of the last few decades in order to 
determine the extent to which restrictive practices are war­
ranted. But after legislative command or in its absence, 
the courts must decide whether the balance of competing 
interests effected by legislative compromise or executive 
fiat comports with specific constitutional guarantees and 
traditional notions of due process. In this context the 
'hands-off doctrine has no place. The judiciary functions 
as more than a final arbiter; it has a responsibility for 
educating the public and where it fails to act, it functions 
to legitimize the status quo."
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government incarcerates or institutionalizes an individual 
for the purpose of treatment, it is obligated to provide 
that treatment. In other words, if an individual is insti­
tutionalized, against his will, for the purpose of treat­
ment, then he has a constitutional right to receive that 
treatment.
This concept does not originate, as before, from the 
law of criminal procedures and corrections as applied to 
adults. It is found in the law as it is applied to the men­
tally ill. In 1966, the right to treatment was first recog­
nized in the case of Rouse v. Cameron 122 Rouse concluded
that when one is acquitted of a criminal offense by reason 
of insanity, and involuntarily committed to a mental hos­
pital, he has a right to treatment. This case was not based 
on the Constitution. It relied on a federal statute regu­
lating mental hospitals. However, the dicta provided a clue 
as to future possibilities. It suggested that denial of 
treatment could raise a question of due process of law. The 
Court said;
Had appellant been found criminally responsible he 
could have been confined a year, at most, however 
dangerous he might have been. He has been confined 
four years and the end is not in sight. Since this 
difference rests only on a need for treatment, a 
failure to supply treatment may raise a question of 
due process of law.123
122
373 F. 2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
123
Rouse at 453.
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The statutory right guaranteed in Rouse was expanded into a
124
constitutional right in Wyatt v. Stickney in 1971. The 
Court said,
To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon 
the altruistic theory that the confinement is for 
humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide 
adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of
due process.125
This was the first federal case endorsing the notion of a
constitutional right to treatment using Fourteenth Amendment
due process as the source of the right. The Court cited
cases such as Rouse as precedent. But it must be remembered
that previous such cases were based on statute rather than
the Constitution. The Supreme Court has never ruled on this
126question, having denied certiorari in several such cases.
It should be noted that the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause or the notion of "fundamental fairness" is 
not the only available constitutional basis for the estab­
lishment of a right to treatment. It has been suggested 
that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection 
might also provide an avenue of redress. Although parens 
patriae is invoked to relieve errant youths, drug addicts, 
mental patients and others from the criminal process, they
^^^344 F. supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
125
^ Wyatt at 781.
126
Douglas W. Skemp, "Establishment of a Constitu­
tional Right to Treatment for Delinquent Children," 26 Baylor 
Law Review (1974): 368, Note #15.
85
are still subject to confinement and loss of liberty. This 
deprivation often extends far beyond what it would have been 
if the individual had been subjected to the regular criminal 
process.
This disparity between penal and nonpenal sanctions 
is predicated on the individual's need for treatment: 
failure to supply such treatment would therefore ren­
der the confinement violative of equal protec­
tion. 127
The Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unus-
usal punishment might also be the basis of a constitutional
right to treatment. In the Rouse decision Judge Bazelon said,
"indefinite confinement without treatment of one who has been
found not criminally responsible may be so inhumane as to be
' cruel and unusual
A corollary case to the mental health cases was 
129
Nelson V .  Heyne decided in 1972 and affirmed by a U.S. 
Court of Appeals in 1974. The decision granted declarative 
and injunctive relief to juveniles incarcerated in an Indian 
boys' reformatory. The court used for the basis of its deci­
sion the assumption stated in cases dealing with procedural 
rights such as Kent and Gault: the assumption being that
states will provide programs of treatment and rehabilitation
127
Nicholas N. Kittrie, "Can the Right to Treatment 
Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?" 57 Georgetown 
Law Journal (1969): 864.
128
Rouse at 453.
129
491 F. 2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
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for juveniles declared delinquent and institutionalized.
"In basing its decision on this assumption the court has 
implied that the juvenile offender is entitled to rehabili­
tative efforts.
The standard suggested by the juvenile cases con­
cerning procedural rights is that a procedural right will 
only be denied when it is thought to infringe upon or inter­
fere with the benefits of the juvenile system or the protec­
tive nature of the juvenile court. It has been suggested 
that the converse of this idea is also true. "The juvenile 
court may deny those procedural rights only if a program of 
care and treatment is being p r o v i d e d . J u d g e  Orman 
Ketcham calls this a
. . . mutual compact theory of 'parens patriae.' 
Under Judge Ketcham's theory the state is bound by 
compact to rehabilitate the delinquent child, based 
on the premise that the child has bargained away 
some of his constitutional rights in consideration 
of the state's promise of rehabilitative treatment. 
Unless the state satisfactorily performs its obliga­
tion under the compact, the juvenile and his parents 
should have the right to consider the agreement bro­
ken and insist upon full restoration of the child's 
full constitutional rights.
Thus, although a constitutional right to treatment 
has never been established by the Supreme Court, there was 
precedent prior to Morales for suggesting the possibility.
l^Oskemp at 368.
^^^Ibid. at 369.
132
■"■’^ Davis at 168.
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133The recent O'Conner v. Donaldson case could provide a 
clue as to future Supreme Court action on this question. 
Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion directly ad­
dressed the issue of right to treatment. He denied the exis­
tence of such a right and claimed that "there is no histori­
cal basis for imposing such a limitation on state power."
His argument was that there are situations when the state 
may confine a person against his will without promise of 
rehabilitation and treatment, so as to protect society
against antisocial acts and communicable diseases and "per-
134sons under legal disabilities to act for themselves."
Basically Chief Justice Burger does not feel it is 
the responsibility of the courts to supervise institutions 
and determine whether or not rehabilitative treatment is 
adequate. He explained that "courts may not substitute for 
the judgments of legislators their own understanding of the 
public welfare, but must instead concern themselves with the 
validity of the methods which the legislature has select­
ed.
The majority opinion in 0 * Conner skipped the issue 
of right to treatment altogether, even though the Fifth 
Circuit, from which the case arose, broadly approved a right
133
^422 U.S. 563 (1975).
134
O'Connor at 583.
135
Ibid.
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to treatment concept in its opinion. That court even 
awarded monetary damages to an involuntarily committed men­
tal patient who had been denied treatment.
The Supreme Court upheld the notion that the indi­
vidual could not be confined under such circumstances but 
maintained that the constitutional right involved was free­
dom, not treatment. The Court decided the case
. . .  on the very narrow ground of whether a state 
may confine, against his will, an individual who is 
neither dangerous to himself nor to others. . . .
The Court concluded that a state may not lawfully 
confine such a person, but held that the award of 
monetary damages against defendant was 
improper . . ."136
In spite of the Chief Justice's concurring opinion 
in the 0'Connor case, it should be remembered that only one 
justice in that case denied the establishment of a constitu­
tional right to treatment. As previously stated, the Court, 
as a whole, refused to consider the right to treatment. In 
concluding that freedom, not treatment, was the issue, the 
Court narrowed the thrust of the case by applying its philos­
ophy to those individuals who are neither harmful to them­
selves nor to others. This narrow interpretation leaves the 
Morales case relatively untouched because it can be argued 
that some of the juveniles "convicted" of delinquency are, 
in fact, dangerous to themselves and/or to others. Morales
Samuel M. Davis, 1976 Supplement to Rights of 
Juveniles; The Juvenile Justice System (New York: dark
Broadman Company, Ltd., 1976), p. 74.
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daims that even though this may be true, the children still 
have a constitutional right to treatment.
The right to treatment and the cases preceding 
Morales on that issue will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Four. That chapter discusses the policies that were 
established by Morales. In terms of the right to treatment, 
policy was announced through a series of standards estab­
lished to guarantee the fulfillment of that right. Some of 
these standards were mentioned in the preceding cases but, 
as will be seen, many of them create new law.
Before approaching the subject of policy, it is nec­
essary to deal with the immediate and specific causes which 
led to the Morales decision. That subject is treated in the 
following chapter.
CHAPTER THREE
THE NEED FOR CHANGE: CONDITIONS AND PRACTICES
IN THE TEXAS JUVENILE INSTITUTIONS
This chapter is an examination of the specific 
causes or circumstances which brought the Texas juvenile 
justice system to the district court's attention. It can 
readily be understood from the previous chapters that judi­
cial intervention in a case such as this one is indeed rare. 
Morales is especially unique because the judge saw fit, not 
only to intervene, but also to establish a set of standards 
with which the state was ordered to comply. The case exam­
ines a number of causes or conditions which brought about the 
decision. These include the decision-making procedures of 
the Texas Youth Council; the quality of life both in general 
and in particular in Texas juvenile institutions; physical, 
mental, and emotional brutality; disciplinary procedures ; the 
methods used for making assessment and placement decisions; 
academic and vocational education programs; the quality of 
personnel hired to care for the youths; and the medical and 
psychiatric care afforded the juveniles. The prevailing cir­
cumstances and practices in each of these categories created
90
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an overall environment that was conducive to judicial 
intervention.
Structure and Responsibilities of 
the Texas Youth Council
Institutionalized juvenile delinquents in the State 
of Texas are the responsibility of the Texas Youth Council. 
This council was established by a unanimous vote of both 
Houses of the Texas Legislature in 1957. The policy deci­
sions are made by a six-member Board of Directors who are 
appointed by the governor with the approval of the state 
senate. These members are not paid for their services, and 
there are no specific qualifications which must be met in 
order to receive an appointment. However, they are expected 
to be "influential citizens in their respective communities 
who are recognized for their interest in children and youth 
The day-to-day operating decisions are the responsibility of
an Executive Director who serves at the pleasure of the 
2
Board.
The TYC is charged with four essential responsibili­
ties. One is to administer and operate the state's homes 
for dependent and neglected children. The situation with 
respect to these children has been confused because of ques­
tions that remain with regard to status offenders. Status
^Institute on Juvenile Delinquency (Springfield, 111.: 
Charles C. Thomas, 1962), p. 55.
2
Texas Youth Council: An Overview (Austin: The
Texas Youth Council, December, 1976), p. 1.
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offenders are those children who have committed acts which 
bring them to the juvenile court's attention but which are 
not violations of the criminal law. Such acts include tru­
ancy and running away from home. These acts are adjudicable 
only in the case of minor children.
Status offenders were initially dealt with by the 
Texas Youth Council much in the same manner as delinquents.
By the time the 1974 Morales decision was handed down, status 
offenders were being treated separately as dependent or neg­
lected children, rather than as delinquents.
Recently, the TYC has supported legislation intro­
duced in both the Texas House of Representatives and the 
Texas Senate that would remove the status offenders from TYC 
jurisdiction. The Council finds it difficult to deal with 
these children in a manner that satisfies anyone. In the 
first place, public opinion objects to the placement of run­
aways in institutions housing juveniles who have committed 
criminal acts. In addition, the status offenders tend to be 
disruptive in the homes designed for dependent and neglected 
children.
In the TYC's opinion the majority of the status 
offenders are, in fact, hard core delinquents. In many 
instances, the affluence of their families have enabled these 
youths to plea-bargain for a less offensive designation. The 
TYC believes that elimination of these offenders from TYC
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responsibility would force juvenile court judges to bring a 
halt to such plea-bargaining tactics.^
This study does not attempt to elaborate further on 
the question of status offenders. The situation is obviously 
in a state of flux as of this date (March 1, 1977), and 
definitive statements are impossible until the results of 
the current legislative session are known.
The three remaining duties of the TYC constitute an 
obligation to delinquent children. One is to administer the 
correctional facilities where these children are housed.
There were six such institutions in Texas. They included 
Giddings State Home and School for Boys, Gatesville State 
School for Boys, Mountain View State School for Boys, 
Brownwood State Homes and School for Girls, Crockett State 
School for Girls, and Gainesville State School for Girls.
A second responsibility is to provide "programs of 
constructive care, treatment, education, training, and reha­
bilitation" for delinquent children.^ Finally, the TYC is 
charged with the duty of "providing active parole supervi­
sion of all delinquent children released from the state train­
ing schools."^
^Mary Elson, "The Muddled Question of Status Offend­
ers," The Dallas Morning News, February 13, 1977, p. 6G.
4
Overview at 4.
^Ibid. at 5.
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In the late 50's, the TYC conducted a complete study 
of the Texas facilities and programs and found them to be 
inadequate. The members consulted with a variety of experts 
and presented plans to the legislature. The result was a 
500% increase in appropriations to the TYC from 1957 to 1963. 
The environment which resulted from this early study remained 
essentially unchanged until the Morales investigation began 
in 1972.
The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel 
The Morales investigation was initiated by Steven 
Bercu, an El Paso attorney. His concern, in the beginning, 
was more specific than it eventually became. The questions 
that he first brought to the court included right to counsel, 
access to the courts, and First Amendment liberties.
Right to Counsel and Access 
to the Courts
Initial action in the case of Morales v. Turman began 
when Bercu discovered significant reason to believe that 
minor children had been committed to TYC institutions without 
benefit of a court hearing or other regular due process pro­
tections. Bercu had been retained as counsel on behalf of a 
TYC inmate, Johnny W. Brown. He filed a habeas corpus peti­
tion on behalf of Brown with the Juvenile Court in El Paso 
County. At the same time, he obtained a discovery order 
enabling him to interview other TYC inmates in order to
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ascertain whether they had been denied due process protections 
to which they were entitled.^
Bercu and his associate, Peter Sandmann, of the Youth 
Law Center in San Francisco, attempted to interview inmates 
at the Gainsville State School for Girls, the Gatesville 
State School for Boys and the Brownwood State Home and 
School for Girls. They were allowed to interview inmates in 
each of the institutions, but they were required to do so in 
the presence of supervisory personnel.  ^ Bercu objected to 
the presence of the administrators and maintained that he 
and his clients had the right to confer privately. The super­
visors remained adamant following the legal advice of Roland 
Daniel Green, III, Esq., who was at that time an Assistant 
Attorney General for the State of Texas. "One of his duties 
was to give legal advice to the TYC and its employees and to
p
represent that agency in court."
Green discussed his position with Dr. James Turman, 
Executive Director of TYC, and found him in agreement on the 
policy. Turman justified the policy of having institutional 
personnel present during attorney-inmate interviews for the 
following reasons:
M^orales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 64 (1974). 
^Ibid. at 64-5.
®Ibid. at 64.
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. . . concern about solicitation of clients, concern 
that the children's families knew of no relationship 
between their children and an attorney, the possibil­
ity that NBC television might be involved, concern 
that the children might be obtaining drugs, and a 
general concern for the welfare of the children.^
Following the conversation with Dr. Turman, Green 
sought and received support for his position from Robert 
Flowers, Esq., the Chief of the Enforcement Division of the 
Office of the Attorney General of the State of Texas.
Bercu then turned for help to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman 
of the Youth Affairs Committee of the Texas Senate. This 
tactic was not successful.
Along with the problem of not being allowed to confer 
privately with his clients, Bercu objected to mail censor­
ship. All incoming and outgoing mail to and from TYC insti­
tutions was censored, including communications between the 
inmates and their attorneys or judges. Furthermore, it was 
found that sometimes mail was withheld altogether and that
the inmates were limited as to whom they could correspond
12
with, as well as the number of letters they could write.
The students were allowed to write letters only on certain
^Ibid. at 65.
^°Ibid.
^^Ibid.
12
Amici Curiae, unpublished pre-trial brief (pre­
sented to the U.S. District Court, E.D. Tex., 1973), p. 27.
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designated days and they were not provided with sufficient
writing paper and postage.
As a result of these practices, Bercu filed a civil
action in the United States District Court of Judge William
Wayne Justice in the Eastern District of Texas.
On February 16, 1971, plaintiffs filed a motion for 
preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the TYC 
and their agents from interfering with the children's 
right to confer privately with counsel and from im­
peding in any manner their correspondence with coun­
sel through the m a i l . 14
Attorneys for the plaintiffs complained that mail censorship 
or the denial of cuiy important constitutional right could be 
practiced only if the state could show a compelling interest. 
Bercu pointed out that there was no "compelling" state inter­
est involved here. In fact, the censorship practice was con­
sidered so trivial that a number of TYC institutions had 
voluntarily abandoned the practice prior to the trial.
Deprivation of Other Civil Liberties
It was found that the practice of speaking Spanish 
was discouraged and, in some cases, p r o h i b i t e d . L i m i t a ­
tions on the use of Spanish, whether in speaking or in writ­
ing, was sometimes enforced even though a student's English
Peter B. Sandmann and Steven Bercu, unpublished 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law (presented to the U:.S. District 
Court, E.D. Tex., 1974), p. 24.
^^Ibid.
^^Sandmann at 24.
^®Amici at 27-28.
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speaking capacity was limited or non-existent.^^ In possible
further violation of free expression were TYC policies that
did not "permit the boy or girl to wear his or her hair or
18
to dress as they please within limits of decency." Fin­
ally, there was a policy of enforced silence practiced at
Mountain View. The boys were not allowed to "speak for days
19
on end unless spoken to by their custodians."
Another questionable practice in the TYC institutions
with regard to civil liberties was infringement of religious
freedom. It was found that, with the exception of Mountain
View, all TYC institutions practiced a policy of forced
attendance at religious services regardless of the desires or
the religious preferences of the children or their parents.
The students at these TYC institutions were subject
to disciplinary measures or punishment for failure to attend 
20church services. Enforced heresy could also have been a
practice. One witness pointed out that a Jewish girl was
"required to attend Protestant services because her behavior
was not considered meritorious enough to warrant being
21
allowed to go to Dallas to attend Jewish services."
^^Sandmann at 32.
Amici at 28. 
^^Ibid. at 28-29. 
^°Ibid. at 36-39. 
^^Ibid. at 37.
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The Role of Amicus Curiae
"Groups can and often do use amicus curiae techniques
22
to gain access to courts." The role of amicus curiae orig­
inally involved neutral parties participating in a case as a 
"friend of the court," in order to simply provide informa­
tion. These parties ordinarily had no special interest in 
the cause. By the twentieth century, it has been argued, the 
neutral friendship role had changed to that of an active advo­
cate. Today "the amicus is no longer a neutral amorphous
23embodiment of justice but an active participant. . . . "
Counsel for the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting 
that the United States be joined in the case as amicus curiae. 
The Court granted the motion because of the "size and complex­
ity of this case, along with the gravity of plaintiffs' alle­
gations regarding the deprivations of their constitutional 
24
rights . . . "  Other parties who were joined as amicus 
curiae included : the American Orthopsychiatric Association,
the American Psychological Association, the American Associa­
tion on Mental Deficiency, the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency and the Child Welfare League.
22
Charles H. Sheldon, The American Judicial Process: 
Models and Approaches (New York; Dodd, Mead & Company; 1974), 
p. 115.
23
Samuel Krislov, "The Amicus Curiae Brief : From
Friendship to Advocacy," 72 Yale Law Journal (March, 1963): 
694.
^^Amici at 1.
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The case was filed in May, 1972, and participation
of the various representatives began in August of that year.
The "representatives toured five of the six TYC facilities
. . . attended and participated in depositions of witnesses
and in discovery and pretrial proceedings," and presented
25
"six witnesses at the trial." These witnesses included 
Harold Gohen, Institute for Behavioral Research; Ms. Guada­
lupe Gibson, M.S.W., San Antonio; Dr. Leonard Lawrence, San 
Antonio Children's Center; Dr. Gisela Konopka, D.S.W., Direc­
tor, Center for Youth Development and Research; Dr. Cervando
Martinez, San Antonio; and Mr. Bill Ryan, Deputy Commission-
26
er, Kentucky Department of Child Welfare.
Because of the participation of the various parties 
as amicus curiae, the Court was able to rely on the expert 
witness testimony. This added a somewhat unique dimension 
to the Morales trial. Judge Justice was not limited to evi­
dence presented by the opposing attorneys and, thus, was able 
to greatly expand the amount of evidence introduced. It is 
highly unlikely that the Court would have been able to exam­
ine the circumstances and practices with such specificity 
without the investigations and testimony of the expert 
witnesses.
25Ibid. at 2.
26
Ibid.
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The TYC Institutional Environment
Quality of Life
The expert witnesses found life inside the TYC 
institutions to be rigid and inflexible with little allow­
ance for individualism. In their opinion the goal of the
treatment afforded juveniles by the TYC "is to enable him to
27
function in the community without breaking the law." Such
a goal cannot be achieved without allowing the juvenile the 
maximum possible opportunity to be independent, self- 
sufficient and a good decision-maker for himself. They 
found at the institutions that the children "rise, toilet,
go to school, eat, vegetate, and go to bed at the same time.
28
. . . Even their haircuts and clothes are the same." They
found in all institutions, with the exceptions of Brownwood
and Giddings, that behavior deviant from the group in any
form was completely and inhumanely repressed and concluded
that this anti-individual philosophy "permeates TYC and makes
individual sensitivity to the problems and needs of particular
29
children well nigh impossible."
The environment in which the children existed was 
void of stimuli. All of the childen were segregated accord­
ing to sex, which led to an abnormal preoccupation with the
^^Ibid. at 47.
^^Ibid. at 10.
^^Ibid. at 11.
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subject. The regimentation of daily routine precluded any 
opportunity for personal decision-making and halted the 
maturation process. The expert witnesses explained that 
. .no amount of professional skill can compensate for 
the arid environment that denies adolescents their most basic 
socialization and growth needs.
The environment was further hampered by its isola­
tion from communities and the normal stimuli stemming from 
them, such as friends and families. There were few alterna­
tives available in Texas to institutionalization. The TYC 
has authority to create community-based alternatives to 
incarceration but, prior to the Morales trial, had an 
extremely poor record in doing so. The meager facilities 
available were reserved for p a r o l e s . W h e n  a Texas judge 
determined that a child should be removed from the home, the 
youth was generally sent to one of the institutions located 
in a remote area of the state. The child's chances of 
receiving alternative treatment were dependent on the crea­
tive talents of individual judges. In this regard, expert 
witnesses testified that a mere five to twenty percent of 
the children were truly in need of the type of secure insti­
tutional setting to which the TYC assigned all of the chil-
32dren in its custody.
^°Ibid. at 13.
^^Ibid.
32
Sandmann at 69.
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This remoteness from the community worked a special
hardship on Mexican American children. One of the witnesses,
Ms. Gibson, testified that many of the Mexican American girls
were in the institution basically because of "cultural inte-
33
grational conflicts between the old ways and the new ways." 
She said that because the institutions were operated on an 
Anglo-Protestant ethic and the girls were "afforded no bi­
lingual or bicultural links to their past," they were "con­
fused, resentful, psychologically isolated and not amenable
34
to treatment of any kind."
The expert witnesses testified that generally the 
younger children received better treatment. They found this 
practice to be arbitrary and irrational. The age of a juve­
nile apparently is not a relevant factor when determining 
the treatment he or she needs. In the case of those inmates 
diagnosed as emotionally ill, for example, it was found that 
Mountain View housed the greatest number of boys diagnosed 
as such. Mountain View was the maximum security facility 
for older boys adjudged delinquent. It contained 158 diag­
nosed as emotionally ill while Gatesville, a medium security 
facility, had 117 such boys. Yet, the situation in 1973 was 
that "Mountain View with the greatest number of disturbed 
boys" received "less than a third of the psychiatric time
^^Amici at 14.
^^Ibid.
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spent at G a t e s v i l l e . T h i s  was found to be true throughout 
the system even though, as Dr. Knopka testified, the older 
children were in greater need of treatment than the younger 
ones. As she said, "the greater the past deprivation, the 
greater the present need for supplementary nourishment."^^
The experts concluded that, "The contrast between the philos­
ophy and spirit in the newer TYC facilities as compared to
their older stepsisters and brothers institutions" was "truly
37
a Cinderella story in reverse . . . "
In summary, the quality of life in TYC institutions 
was found to be the antithesis of an environment insuring 
that an individual becomes an independent, self-sufficient 
citizen in society. The environment in which these children 
were compelled to live was abnormal, without benefit of the 
social stimuli non-institutionalized juveniles receive from 
the community, the home, intersexual relations, family and 
friends. Perhaps the prevailing quality of life in the TYC 
institutions would have been reason enough for judicial inter­
vention but the district court took notice as well of a wide 
variety of specific findings of fact regarding juveniles 
incarcerated in Texas institutions.
^^Ibid. at 46.
^^Ibid. at 45.
^’ibid.
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Physical Brutality
A major area of contention in this case involved 
physical brutality or violations of cruel and unusual punish­
ment. In testifying about staff treatment of the TYC 
inmates, witnesses presented evidence concerning a number of 
instances where the staff had exerted excessive force in 
disciplining the juveniles. Mention of a few of these wide­
spread practices is sufficient to prove the point.
The Court found the practice of striking and slapping 
the inmates to be widespread. The worst infractions appar­
ently took place at Mountain View. At that school, "evidence
of physical brutality inflicted by staff members on virtually
38every student was overwhelming." One example involved a
school principal instructing a new physical education teacher
39to "slap any student who did not follow instructions." In
one document, a staff member reported "that a correctional
officer had struck R.C. (an inmate) several times without 
40justification." Although not as frequently, instances of
41
physical abuse were also found at the girls' institutions.
Many of the brutal practices were so prevalent that 
they acquired nicknames. "Fresh fish" was the name applied
38
Sandmann at 9.
^^Morales at 74-75. 
40
"ibid. at 75. 
^^Ibid. at 76.
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to new boys placed at Mountain View. They were apparently 
"initiated" or "'tested' by various forms of physical abuse, 
applied by staff or other boys with the encouragement of 
s t a f f . " R a c k i n g "  was another practice so commonly used 
that it became a part of the vocabulary at Mountain View.
This was the practice of lining a boy up against the wall 
with his hands in his pockets. The correctional officer then 
administered punishment or "racked" him by punching him in 
the s t o m a c h . A n o t h e r  word, contained in the jargon at 
Gatesville, was "peel." This practice was "administered by 
forcing a boy to bend over, then striking him hard on the 
back with a fist or open h a n d . O t h e r  vocabulary words 
peculiar to Gatesville included "tight" and "brogueing." A 
"tight" involved ordering a boy to grab his ankles and beat­
ing him on the buttocks, while "brogueing" was accomplished 
by kicking the boy in the s h i n s . A n o t h e r  practice was 
called "crumb. " When assigned this punishment, ci boy was 
"required to sit on a chair in the dormitory day room all
Ibid. at 73. An example of this given in testi­
mony explained, "For example, one entering boy, identified 
as C.W., was initially beaten by the other boys in his cot­
tage with the tacit approval of Correctional Officer Flores. 
. . .  On the following day C.W. was hit and kicked by seven 
or eight boys in the corner of the cottage day room for more 
than an hour. After C.W. was knocked unconscious, Stovall," 
another correctional officer, "stopped further abuse, announc­
ing that he did not want any 'dead fish' on his hands."
^^Ibid.
44
Ibid. at 76.
^^Ibid.
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day long, facing the wall, unable to talk or participate in 
any activities.
Tear gassing was another commonly used means of con­
trol or punishment and a number of incidents were reported 
concerning the practice. It was so widespread that it was 
the subject, in a number of cases, of "'incident reports,'
which are designed to record instances of the use of physi-
47
cal force by both inmates and staff of TYC." For example,
a casework supervisor, Clarence Stephens, filed two such
reports on consecutive days stating that a boy had been sub-
48jected to tear gassing for refusal to work. Counsel for
the plaintiffs said that in many instances at Mountain View,
tear gas was "sprayed in the faces of students, and . . .
thrown into the cells of students who were not and could not
49have been threatening physical injury to other persons."
Another instance of "brutal" treatment concerns the 
homosexual or "punk" dormitories at Mountain View. Dormi­
tory One was reserved for black students who were allegedly 
homosexual. Dormitory Nine housed "homosexual" Anglos and 
Mexican Americans. Reasons for placement in these dormitor­
ies included having homosexual tendencies, being under "pres­
sure" from other boys and causing friction or not getting
^^Sandmann at 11.
^^Morales at 74.
^^Ibid.
49
Sandmann at 9.
108
along in the other dorms. The decision to place the 
juveniles in homosexual dormitories was made by "correctional 
officers, who are the least qualified and least educated of 
the staff and who have no special training in this regard.
The Court found that certain "make work" tasks also 
constituted physical brutality, when the work was performed 
solely for punishment reasons and was "repetitive, nonfunc­
tional, degrading and unnecessary."^^ Such tasks practiced 
in the TYC institutions included :
. . . requiring the juvenile to pull grass without 
bending his knees on a large tract of ground not 
intended for cultivation or any other purpose; 
forcing him to move dirt with a shovel from one place 
on the ground to another and then back again many 
times; and making him buff a small area of the floor 
for a period of time exceeding that in which any 
reasonable person would conclude that the floor was 
sufficiently b u f f e d .
These various practices and others continued for 
several reasons, despite changes in case law, Texas statutes 
and correctional philosophy. Although there were procedures 
available for voicing complaints against the use of physical 
brutality, inmates seldom took advantage of them. In many 
cases, the boys and girls were unaware of the procedures.
In others, they withheld complaints for fear of retaliation. 
In Gatesville, "Retaliation for filing a report has included
^^Morales at 75.
^^Ibid. at 77.
^^Ibid.
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the assignment of extra duty to the complainant or his 
transfer to Mountain View for an eighteen month stay. 
Transfer to Mountain View was possibly the most brutal form 
of treatment available to the correctional officers at 
Gatesville.
Even though there was an established procedure 
instructing the staff personnel to report any incidents of 
physical abuse, the reports were routinely ignored or falsi­
fied. The Court saic that the reports were deliberately 
falsified in order to protect the correctional officers and 
that "witnesses do not file incident reports of staff bru­
tality for fear of retaliation. Even boys who testified
about Mountain View" during the Morales trial "feared for
54their physical safety upon returning." Not only the
correctional officers were involved in this deception, but
also certain of the inmates known as "office boys." In
return for special favors or out of fear, these boys acted
as enforcers for the officers. Testimony on the part of
some of the inmates revealed that office boys would "falsify
reports to protect an officer, and . . . provoke an incident
with a boy who has 'snitched' to injure him or prejudice his
55changes for release."
^^Morales at 76.
^^Ibid. at 74.
^^Ibid.
110
Another regular practice at the TYC institutions 
considered inhumane by plaintiffs' counsel and the expert 
witnesses was locking girls in the rooms at Gainesville and 
Crockett. "During the approximately sixteen hours these 
girls" were confined to "their cottages each weekday, and 
the almost twenty-four hours (per day) each weekend," the 
vast majority of the time they were "locked or chained in 
their rooms.
It was found that all children at TYC institutions
were denied sufficient exercise and recreation. Counsel
suggested that this practice constituted brutal and harmful 
57treatment.
Not only were certain forms of punishment physically 
brutal, they also often left the child so confused and frus­
trated as to constitute emotional and mental brutality. The 
students existed in a constant state of uncertainty because 
of a lack of clearly defined rules governing behavior. Stu­
dents often learned of rules only after they had violated 
them and were facing punishment. Counsel for the plaintiffs 
pointed out that the students were "often subjected to harsh
punishments, including beatings, for actions which were not
58known to be violative of any rules."
^^Sandmann at 19.
^^Ibid. at 15.
^®Ibid.
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Maximum Security Confinement
In some instances, the use of solitary confinement
was claimed to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The
expert witnesses testified that "lengthyperiods of sensory-
depriving isolation" is a brutal form of punishment particu-
59
larly for those young people who are emotionally disturbed.
In one interrogatory it was discovered that 44 of the inmates 
attempted suicide at TYC institutions from January 1, 1972 
until the time that witnesses' testimony was taken, and that 
"Several of these suicide attempts were made while the young 
people were in isolation c e l l s . D r .  Konopka testified 
that isolation for the emotionally disturbed has a particu­
larly destructive effect because they possess a "terrible 
need for human contact, the sound of other human voices and 
the sense of touch . . .
The use of solitary confinement at Mountain View was 
found to be especially brutal. Counsel for the plaintiffs 
pointed out that, for relatively minor rule infractions such 
as "gambling for candy," inmates were locked in their cells 
for many hours each day and released only to work at hard 
labor in the morning. They were totally deprived of any 
social interaction, such as eating with other inmates or
Amici at 22.
^°Ibid.
®^Ibid.
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speaking to staff members unless required to do so. Although 
placed in a situation of enforced boredom, the inmates were 
not allowed to sleep before 10:00 p.m. even though some of 
them had previously been placed on sleep-inducing medication. 
If they refused to work, the supervisors in the solitary con­
finement section beat or tear gassed them and, occasionally,
beat them for no other reason than their own personal amuse- 
62
ment.
In summary, the practices at TYC institutions which
constituted brutal or cruel and unusual punishment included :
. . . the arbitrary use of solitary confinement and 
its attendant deprivations for punitive purposes with 
no prior procedural safeguards, the physical beatings 
and physically destructive punishment to which chil­
dren have been subjected, the denial of necessary per­
iods of recreation, the intentional denial of needed 
medical care, the use of tear gas, the lack of clear 
and known rules, and the practice of using night 
chains to lock girls into their rooms during much of 
the day. . .63
Disciplinary Procedures
The Court found that disciplinary practices and pro­
cedures at TYC institutions took place in an atmosphere void 
of regular procedural protections. In most instances the 
inmates were not even made aware of what specific actions 
would be considered in violation of the institutional rules.
62
Sandmann at 10.
®^Ibid. at 22.
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These "rules" varied from one facility to the next as did
64
the punishment meted out for rule infractions.
Mountain View
At Mountain View, there was a security wing (STC) 
where the boys were sent for disciplinary reasons. Ordinar­
ily boys were not confined there for longer than seventeen 
days but some were sent for as long as thirty days. The 
boys at Mountain View were not made aware of the conduct 
that would result in a transfer to the security wing, and 
the decision to send a boy there was usually left to the dis­
cretion of a correctional o f f i c e r . I n s t a n c e s  were found 
in the institutional records where the boys had received 
from twelve to twenty-five days in the security wing for 
infractions such as "not doing exercises," "trying to slip 
letters out," "writing love notes to another boy," "writing 
love letters to a lady academic teacher," "refusing to work," 
"throwing a bar of soap at a boy," and "masturbation.
64Ibid. at 37. According to counsel for the plain­
tiff, "The record in this case established that TYC students 
are not informed of the rules of the institutions, that those 
rules which do exist are sometimes enforced and sometimes 
ignored, and that the punishment for unacceptable behavior 
or infractions of the rules is not dispensed evenly but 
instead varies from one staff member to another."
^^Morales at 78.
G*ibid.
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Conditions in the security wing, at the time of the
Morales trial, were as follows:
Each cell in the STC is a six-by-twelve foot locked 
room with a solid door. The door has a small win­
dow which is painted over, and a narrow slit for 
food trays. The cell's only artificial light resem­
bles the headlamp on a car and is located in a wall 
near the door. The light is never turned off and is 
presumably intended to keep the room's occupant 
awake. Moreover, the cell is poorly ventilated; it 
is hot in summer and cold in winter. On weekends 
and after 3:30 o'clock, p.m., the guard does not 
have a key to the locked security cells. In an 
emergency, he must call out to a supervisor outside 
the unit to come and open a door.6?
Treatment of the juveniles while confined in the
security wing was especially brutal and degrading, and any
rule infraction taking place, while so confined, resulted in
go
extreme punishment. A work detail practiced in the secur­
ity wing involved "picking," where the boys were lined up 
and required to swing a heavy pick over their heads and then 
strike the ground, moving forward after each "pick." This
work detail lasted five hours with a fifteen minute break
6 9
every hour and a half.
Placement in the security wing was reviewed by a com­
mittee of supervisors twice a week. The boys appeared before
^^Ibid. at 79.
G^ lbid.
^^Ibid. "For the less than heinous offense of talk­
ing while picking, one boy was punched in the chest by a 
correctional officer until he doubled over, and was then 
hit in the mouth. Others were beaten because they dropped 
their picks or became ill."
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the committee, often after violent treatment. "A boy under 
review by the discipline committee was required to run in 
his bare feet— at top speed— from the security wing to the 
committee meeting room. If the boy didn't run fast enough, 
he was 'racked' or beaten by a correctional o f f i c e r . T h e  
boys appeared before the committee without the advantage of 
an advocate. After the committee meeting, they were either 
sent back to the STC or released with no explanation of the 
decision by the committee.
Boys at Mountain View who were punished for disci­
plinary infractions but not sent to the security treatment 
wing were ordinarily given "extra duty." These duties in­
volved senseless, make-work tasks such as pulling grass. 
Dispositions taken from inmates and testimony of witnesses 
showed that the boys were brutally punished for any infrac­
tion taking place during work duty.^^ Another frequently 
used punishment was being placed "on shovel." The boys were 
made to run around in a circle carrying a shovelful of dirt, 
shifting the dirt from one pile to another. The duty lasted
70Ibid.
Ibid. Judge Justice pointed out an example of this 
in the body of his opinion. One boy, R.J., grew fatigued
after three hours of pulling and bent his knees. For this he
was "kicked in the back and punched in the mouth." When he 
tried to stand up he was kicked in the head by a correctional 
officer who had boots on. Later, after complaining of a side-
ache, he was kicked twice more. Finally, he ran from the
work detail but was apprehended by another officer who struck 
him many times in the mouth and stomach and kicked him when 
he fell to the floor.
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72as long as six hours per day. Typical offenses for drawing
extra duty included "talking back, talking in the 'chow line,'
'not finishing all the food on their plate,' 'wearing shoes
in the dormitory,' 'not changing their pants,' 'just irritat- 
73ing an officer."
Gatesville
At Gatesville, as at Mountain View, there was no
published set of rules or procedures for instructing a boy
as to the institutional rules. A typical punishment for
infraction of the nonexistent rules was placing a boy "on
crumb." This practice was previously described. Failure to
follow the required procedure again resulted in brutal beat- 
74
ings. Other punishments included head shaving, face shav­
ing with a pocketknife, and forcing a boy to stand and hold 
a chair at arm's length for long periods of time."^^ A par­
ticularly gruesome extra duty at Gatesville was forcing a 
boy to work in a sewage or garbage ditch. "After working in 
this ditch, up to the waist in garbage and stench for four
hours, a boy would then be required to go to lunch without
7 6changing his clothes or taking a shower."
^^Ibid. at 81. 
^^Ibid. at 80. 
^^Ibid. at 81. 
^^ibid.
^^ Ibid.
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Crockett
Although the girls at Crockett State School for Girls
received a copy of some of the rules, they were not fully
informed. Violation of the institutional rules sometimes
resulted in placement in the Security Treatment Cottage (STC)
or in "room lockup." The records showed that it was not
uncommon for a girl to be confined in the STC unit for more
than thirty days. In the superintendent's opinion, there
was no violation of TYC policy when a girl was placed in STC
for thirty days and returned to the confinement, after having
been released for a few hours, for an additional number of 
77
days. "Room lockup^ involved placing a girl in a room
stripped of furnishings for several days. She was forced to
sleep on the floor, sometimes denied clothes and shoes and
78had little opportunity for communication with anyone. 
Gainesville
Gainesville, like Gatesville and Mountain View, 
offered no introductory instruction as to the rules and regu­
lations of the institution, and the decision to punish was 
totally at the staff's discretion. Disciplinary measures at 
Gainesville involved a procedure similar to the STC concept 
at Crockett, except all of the locked rooms were furnished 
at least with a bed. On the average, the girls spent
7?lbid. at 82.
7Gibid.
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fourteen days in the STC and would be allowed to communicate 
with no one except the disciplinary committee. Some examples 
of misconduct resulting in STC placement were "whispering," 
'lagging' in line, calling a houseparent 'honey,' and chew­
ing gum.
Brownwood
The Brownwood facility had made provision for secur­
ity confinement similar to that of Crockett and Gainesville. 
However, girls confined in isolation were regularly visited 
by institutional personnel and, if placed in a stripped 
cell, provided with pajamas and a blanket. The Court took 
notice with approval that isolated confinement was rarely
used at Brownwood and that girls who posed problems were
80usually dealt with in their regular rooms.
In summary, the decision to punish or discipline the
students was made without notice of the rules, a hearing,
opportunity to confront the accusers or present evidence, a
neutral fact-finder, a written record, or an opportunity to
81appeal the decision. It was suggested by plaintiff's 
counsel that regular due process procedures should be fol­
lowed, prior to decision-making, which would result in dis­
ciplinary punishment; transfer to a more secure institution;
^^Ibid.
^°Ibid. at 83.
81
Sandmann at 42 ,
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a decision to continue custody of a child after he has
become eligible for parole; a decision to lengthen a child's
period of confinement beyond the committing Court's recommen-
82
dation and a decision concerning parole revocation.
Assessment and Placement
Assessment and placement of Texas juveniles took 
place at one of two centers operated by the TYC. Boys were 
dealt with at the Statewide Reception Center for Boys located 
at Gatesville, and girls, at the Statewide Reception Center 
for Girls located at Brownwood. At Gatesville, placement 
decisions were made by a classification committee which 
included "the Director of Admissions, the Director of the 
Reception Center, a clinical psychologist, a medical psych­
iatric social worker, a chaplin, a casework coordinator, and
83an academic superintendent." The equivalent group at 
Brownwood included "the medical psychiatric caseworker, the 
girl's caseworker, the academic educational-vocational coun­
selor, the houseparent supervisor, the chaplin, a school 
teacher, and, sometimes, the psychologist."®^ In neither 
case was the boy or girl present at the hearing which deter­
mined placement, nor were they or their families allowed to
82Ibid. at 34.
83
84
Morales at 85.
Ibid. at 87.
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participate in the decision. Also, there was no one on 
either committee acting in the role of advocate for the 
child.
Brownwood provided special attention to Mexican Amer­
ican girls by including two Spanish-speaking caseworkers on
p C
the staff. However, at Gatesville there were neither
Spanish-speaking caseworkers nor Blacks on the staff, even
though it was often the case that the child was a Mexican
National or a Mexican American and "approximately one-third
86
of the new admissions . . . "  were Black. The Mexican
American girls at Brownwood were disgnosed through tests
which were adjusted by a bilingual index but expert witnesses
testified that such an index is inadequate and inaccurate;
therefore, even though an attempt was made at Brownwood to
recognize cultural difference, it did not adequately compen- 
87sate for them.
Both of the intake centers attempted to provide for
psychiatric examinations. These were not always available 
88to the boys. When the boys were tested, the person who
had done the testing was frequently unavailable at the time
the placement decision was made because of "the frequent
89
turnover of personnel on the classification committee."
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid. at 85.
^^Ibid. at 87.
88lbid. at 86.
®^Ibid.
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In fact, it was found unlikely that any member of the
classification committee had had previous personal contact
with the child. When psychological recommendations were
available to the committee, there was apparently little or
no follow-up or feedback to determine whether the child was
90receiving the recommended treatment. It was found that
generally those who recommended specific treatment were not
even aware of whether that treatment was available at the
91
institution to which the youths were assigned.
There was some attempt at rational classification 
for the girls. At Brownwood, they were divided into cate­
gories; "immature delinquent, neurotics, unsocialized delin-
92quents, and subcultural delinquents." These categories 
were significant only at the Brownwood institution. They 
were not used at Crockett and Gainesville.
It appeared, in fact, that there were no formal 
written criteria for determining institutional placement of 
a child, for providing recommendations as to the necessary 
rehabilitative treatment, or for feedback in order to assure 
that the treatment was being provided. Placement decisions 
were made in a few minutes by a classification committee with 
the child's offense being the main criteria in deciding where
^^Ibid.
^^Amici at 9.
92
Morales at 86.
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93to send him. "Assignment to a particular institution" was
94
based "almost entirely on age, size, and prior record."
Other relevant criteria included aggressiveness, educational
95level, and institutional vacancies. In summary on the
question of assessment and placement. Judge Justice stated :
First, since so few choices in placement are pres­
ently available to the classification committee at 
the Gatesville Reception Center, the classification 
procedure itself is practically meaningless. . . . 
the present placement system accomplishes no more 
than would random placement on a space-available 
basis. Secondly, though the Brownwood classifica­
tion procedures provide more opportunities for mean­
ingful placement, these recommendations cannot be 
carried out at. the receiving schools.96
One of the superintendents stated, matter of factly, that
despite test results or recommendations, the institutions
97do as they please with a child once they receive him.
Academic Education
The academic testing procedure used for the purpose
of assigning children to academic programs was found to be
98
"inaccurate, outdated, and discriminatory." Even the TYC
staff agreed that the particular tests used were not
^^Ibid. at 85-8.
Amici at 9.
^^Morales at 87.
^^Ibid.
^^Amici at 9.
98
Sandemann at 103.
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individualized and were inaccurate. Because the IQ tests
used were based to a great extent on verbal comprehension,
they were also discriminatory against Blacks and Mexican
Americans because their verbal comprehension is ordinarily
99lower than that of Anglo students. This problem was com­
pounded by almost exclusive reliance on these test scores 
for academic placement. Little or no attempt was made to 
justify the placement decisions on other grounds. For exam­
ple, there were no tests given for detecting "minimal brain 
dysfunction or dyslexia.
Plaintiff's counsel argued that the educational pro­
gram provided for TYC students was in violation of the Four­
teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The reason for 
this argument was that, although there were academic educa­
tional programs available, only a few of the students could 
benefit from them. The only ones who could benefit were the 
"normal" students who could have functioned in an average 
situation in a regular public school. For those students with 
educational and/or emotional handicaps, there was little or 
no academic education a v a i l a b l e . S p e c i f i c  figures point 
out the enormity of this lack. On May 1, 1973, the following
99Ibid.
100Ibid. at 105.
101
Ibid. at 91.
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numbers of children were diagnosed as being seriously
102emotionally disturbed:
Giddings 18
Gatesville 117
Mountain View 158
Brownwood 13
Crockett 35
Gainesville 31
In addition, there were found to be many students in TYC
institutions suffering from educational handicaps. The
following numbers of children were diagnosed, on the same
date, as having intelligence quotients lower than 70:^®^
Brownwood 17
Crockett 38
Gainesville 11
Giddings 5
Gatesville 102
Mountain View 36
At least these children, and probably more, were in need of 
some form of special education. In general, expert witnesses 
testified "that only four and six-tenths per cent of all juve­
niles incarcerated by the TYC are at their proper education- 
104al grade level." They also found that, on the average,
TYC students are five years behind the normal reading level 
for their age group.
Plaintiffs' counsel pointed out that, "With proper 
testing and diagnosis, approximately 80% of the TYC students
^^^Morales at 88. 
^°^Ibid. at 89. 
^^^Ibid. at 88. 
^°^Ibid.
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would be found to require special educational programs 
ranging from classes for mentally retarded children to pro-
II
grams for dyslexic children. 106
In spite of these statistics, the TYC at the time of
the Morales trial employed no certified special education
teachers at Gatesville or Gainesville, one such teacher at
Mountain View and Crockett, and two at Brownwood.
Although a substantial number of Mexican American
students are institutionalized in TYC facilities, there were
no bilingual programs offered at any of the institutions.
This situation existed despite the fact that approximately
25 percent of the juveniles were Mexican American and many
108
of them could speak little or no English. The practice
of offering education only in English resulted in Mexican
American students being placed in the same classes as retarded
children because the testing procedures did not adequately
deal with cultural differences. In other words, if a child
could not read English, for whatever reason, he was placed
in a separate class, even though these "special classes" were
109
not taught by certified teachers of special education.
106Sandmann at 87.
107Morales at 88.
108Sandmann at 105.
109
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Vocational Education
The facilities for providing vocational training at 
the TYC institutions were also found to be inadequate.
Training in useful job skills constitutes what has long been 
recognized as a successful rehabilitative technique.
The evidence presented with reference to vocational 
training, for the most part, referred to the prevailing situ­
ation at Gatesville. It was found, to begin with, that there 
were no provisions for counseling or t e s t i n g . T h e r e  was 
one vocational rehabilitation counselor but his job consisted 
mainly of "recommending students for vocational rehabilitation 
after their release from T Y C . ( e m p h a s i s  supplied)
The vocational program at Gatesville was divided into 
two parts. One involved educational courses which took boys 
on a space available basis. The other involved "work exper­
ience." The work experience served mainly the purpose of 
institutional maintenance. The instructors were not accred­
ited teachers and the boys received no school credit for their 
endeavors. They were not paid any wages for their work even 
though the institution was able to hire fewer employees as 
a result. The tasks undertaken by the boys consisted mainly 
of laundry and maintenance work. They also worked in a
^^°Ibid. at 91.
^^^Ibid.
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warehouse, the food service division, the dormitory clothing
112room or other areas.
The vocational education programs were fashioned 
with no input from employers or unions. Part of the reason 
for this was the physical distance of the TYC plants from 
the major Texas employers and union headquarters. There 
were no means provided for follow-up or feedback on the stu­
dents who had participated in the vocational program in 
order to evaluate the vocational training's effectiveness.
No one knew whether the programs were preparing the students 
in marketable skills, but it was doubtful because of the 
absence of employer or union participation.
Institutional Life
Institutional life includes those factors which are
deemed necessary for "normal" adolescent growth. According
to the Court:
The essential ingredients of normality for a youth 
are a sense of self-respect, warm and understanding 
adults, a chance to participate in decisions that 
affect him, adequate diet and recreation, opportun­
ity for adventure and challenge, and legitimate out­
lets for tension, anger and a n x i e t y . 114
These factors enable a youth to engage in the tasks necessary
to become an independent adult. The Court said:
^^^Ibid.
^^^Ibid. at 92.
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These tasks include establishing sexual identity, 
developing intellectual and occupational skills, 
achieving independence from parental authority, de­
veloping a capacity for genuinely intimate relation­
ships and, finally, evolving a moral code to govern 
future actions.
On an account by account basis, the Court recognized 
that various factors of institutional life are probably not 
paramount in the rehabilitation of youthful offenders. Taken 
as a whole, however, these factors of "normal" everyday liv­
ing were deemed to be important. These factors include life 
in general in the institutions, placement inside the institu­
tions, dormitories, regimentation, institutional indignities, 
diets and mealtime, recreation, personal identity, and the 
socialization process.
The Court recognized that without these normal ingred­
ients, no treatment program would be adequate or effective 
in the overall rehabilitation of the inmates. Any adolescent 
is dependent on these factors in order to become an inde­
pendent adult. Most of the youths incarcerated at TYC insti­
tutions have been deprived of many or all of the requirements 
of normal growth even before they came to the court's atten­
tion and, therefore, may have even greater needs than one 
who has not been institutionalized.
Personnel
Theoretically, each juvenile should be assigned one 
person who is responsible for the overall program designed
115Ibid.
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for his rehabilitation. This includes the decision as to 
which cottage or dormitory the juvenile is assigned. At 
Gainesville, Crockett, Gatesville and Mountain View there 
was no opportunity afforded the boys and girls to provide an 
input in the institutional placement decision and no attempt 
to place the juveniles in cottages where the houseparents' 
personalities would be compatible with the child's. Further­
more, in these four institutions, no one person is assigned 
responsibility for a particular juvenile's treatment plan.^^^ 
As mentioned previously, the younger juveniles are sent to 
Brownwood for girls or Giddings for boys. Life in these 
institutions was found to be a very different proposition. 
They had a more qualified staff and a more reasonable staff/ 
student ratio. They allowed a great deal more individual 
freedom to the children to make choices for themselves and 
to participate in the decisions that affect their lives.
The expert witnesses unanimously felt that a team 
treatment approach was crucial in the rehabilitative process. 
But at the four earlier mentioned institutions, the various 
staff members operated under separate lines of supervisory
authority with little or no communication among them as to
118
a particular child's program or needs.
^^^Ibid. at 93.
^^^Amici at 42-5. 
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Dormitories
In order to insure that the juveniles have adequate 
opportunity for personal growth, certain dormitory character­
istics were deemed important. A child needs a certain amount 
of privacy and solitude. He needs to feel secure, and he 
needs the warmth provided by a "normal" home. The dormitor­
ies at some of the institutions were open, designed to house 
thirty to forty boys in one room, with end to end cots. The 
expert witnesses testified that "it is necessary to have 
single rooms or rooms for 2-4 children for rehabilitative pur­
poses, and that the use of open dorms does not provide a sense
119of security for the children and is 'inexcusable.'" There 
was found to be a lack of security in at least two areas: 
one in regard to personal security; the other, in regard to 
the mental and emotional security that comes from knowing 
what behavior is expected. In terms of personal security the 
juveniles in some of the dormitories were supervised and "pro­
tected" by a single guard who sat in a wire mesh cage. If an 
attack on one of the juveniles, or some other sort of emer­
gency. arose, the guard was not allowed to leave the cage until 
assistance arrived. This situation was deemed to be espe­
cially insecure in dormitories which houses the hard core 
delinquent population. As far as dormitory rules and customs 
were concerned, it was found they varied from dorm to dorm
119
Sandmann at 33.
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and, in some cases, changed from day-to-day depending on the
duty officer's personality. A normal home situation is, in
all probability, impossible to achieve in institutional life,
but most of the dormitories under TYC jurisdiction were found
120to be "cold, impersonal, and insecure."
Daily Life
The Court found that, "The most striking character­
istic of daily life in most TYC institutions is overwhelming
121
monotony and regimentation." Even though it is agreed, as 
before mentioned, that the opportunity to make personal deci­
sions, be creative, meet challenges and act independently is 
imperative for rehabilitation purposes, there was little such 
opportunity available at the TYC institutions. Daily life 
was strictly routinized, though some institutions were found 
to be stricter than others. There was provision for a small 
amount of unsupervised recreation but various restrictions 
cancelled most of the opportunity for individuality. Tele­
vision, smoking, and, in some cases, board games, were appar­
ently the only recreational opportunities available. Horri­
fyingly, one of the expert witnesses, on one occasion, found
a dormitory room filled with boys numbly watching a broken 
122
television set!
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Morales at 95.
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Development of the full human potential of each
child was made impossible by various practices which degraded
his self-respect and led him to feel subhuman. Probably
even more destructive was the fact that these practices
taught that it is proper behavior for those in power to abuse
123others who are weaker and more gentle. These practices 
included derogatory name calling, forcing girls to use cham­
ber pots instead of letting them leave their rooms during the
night to use the restrooms, and abuse of the inmates' personal
124possessions through unannounced, unjustified room searches. 
Diet and Mealtime
A normal part of human environment is the need for
adequate nourishment taken under pleasant conditions. It
was found at some of the institutions that meals were starchy
and tasteless, and the girls particularly suffered excess
weight gain as a result of the diet and too little exercise.
Part of the reason for the lackluster meals was that the
125
TYC employed no dieticians.
In addition to the complaints of lack of balanced 
nutrition and tastelessness, there were others given in 
depositions. The girls complained of finding bugs in their 
food. The boys apparently perceived their food as being
123
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"contaminated by other boys having urinated, spit, or 
126
defecated in it." The inmates were severely regimented
upon entering the dining room, eating their food, and leaving
the premises. In some institutions they were made to eat in
haste, making the atmosphere tense and unnatural. Expert
witnesses felt that this practice, as with many others,
served to increase the disrespect the inmates held for them-
127
selves and others.
Recreation
At the TYC institutions, again with the exceptions 
of Giddings and Brownwood, which were reserved for the 
younger, "less sophisticated" children, there was little 
opportunity for recreation, especially outdoor types of 
activities. Smoking and watching television, as mentioned 
before, appeared to be the primary forms of recreation avail­
able. Some team sports were organized for the boys but this 
was left to the discretion of the correctional officer in 
charge. Indoor activities were occasionally planned for the 
girls but they were ordinarily childish and uninteresting. 
These games included such peurile activities as "hot potato," 
"musical chairs," and "poor kitty." For example, "poor 
kitty" is a game where "one girl crawls around on the floor
126
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and other girls pat her three times on the head and try to
128
say 'poor kitty' without laughing."
Expert witnesses testified that physical activity
serves as a natural outlet for hostility and aggression, and
the lack of provisions for such an outlet could be a basic
cause of fights among inmates as well as depression and sui-
129cidal tendencies.
Identity
Judge Justice quoted Emerson in order to define what 
is meant by a sense of identity. He said it is "the reflec­
tion of a man's own worthiness from other men."^^^ In other 
words, it is a primary task of humankind to establish a pos­
itive self-image. It follows that practices which diminish 
the individual's self-respect work against the rehabilita­
tive process. Regular institutional practices were found to 
degrade the self-image of the inmates. Some of these included 
calling the children by numbers or degrading nicknames, en­
forcing stereotyped dress codes, and refusing to permit indi­
vidualized hair styles.
Segregation According to Sex
It was unanimously agreed by the plaintiffs, defend­
ants, and expert witnesses that coeducational institutions
^^^Ibid. at 98, note #24. 
^^^Ibid.
^^^Ibid. at 99.
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are better then sex-segregated facilities, because the 
former offer an opportunity for contact with the opposite 
sex, a mandatory element in the normal growth and socializa­
tion process of adolescents. The TYC institutions were found 
to be almost totally segregated according to sex with little 
or no opportunity for heterosexual contact. Only one student 
out of many who testified at this trial said that he had
"participated in a coeducational activity, and he did so only
132
the one time." There was no sex education or counseling 
at any of the TYC institutions. Any form of emotional expres­
sion between members of the same sex was severely repressed. 
"At the girls' institutions, . . . actions such as holding
another girl's hand, borrowing her clothes, combing her hair
133
or sitting on her bed," were punished. Sexial experi­
mentation, considered normal adolescent behavior by the 
expert witnesses, such as masturbation and exhibitionism, 
was also repressed and p u n i s h e d . I t  was pointed out that 
the fear of homosexual behavior was so profound on the part 
of the staff, that the girls practiced a sort of "underground
^^^Ibid.
^^^Ibid. at 100.
^^^Ibid. at 99-100. As mentioned previously, at 
Mountain View, placement in the homosexual or "punk" dorms 
was a form of punishment. This resulted in active, aggres­
sive homosexuals being housed in the same dormitory with 
smaller, weaker boys and those boys simply confused about 
their sexual identity. This practice was considered so 
appalling that expert witnesses didn't even try to justify 
it.
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culture" in order to irritate the staff as a form of
win- 135 rebellion.
Judge Justice concluded that these various aspects
of institutional life amounted to a travesty because :
No matter how well intentioned and professional a 
juvenile's treatment plan, it will be rendered worth­
less by an accumulation of daily indignities, dis­
comforts, and harassments, such as were documented 
at the trial. Moreover, many of the practices des­
cribed at the trial force juveniles confined by the 
TYC to exist in an environment that is exceedingly 
deprived— psychologically, emotionally, and physi­
cally. 136
Medical and Psychiatric Care
The medical and psychiatric care afforded juveniles 
under TYC jurisdiction was found to be lacking in quantity, 
as well as quality. In order to examine quantitive medical 
care standards, the Court took notice of a medical expert's 
testimony. He stated that minimal care demanded a nurse on 
duty 24 hours a day for every hundred students, and a doctor 
on duty during the day, and on call all other times, for 
every hundred students. He further testified that all medi­
cal personnel should have special training in the field of
137adolescent medicine.
To begin with, there were no medical doctors employed 
138
full time by the TYC. It was noted that a doctor visited
^^^Ibid. at 100.
^^^Ibid. at 101.
^^®Ibid. at 102.
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Gainesville and Crockett one day each week; Gatesville, two 
days per week; and Mountain View, three days each week. Al­
though all the institutions hired registered nurses, they 
were not on duty at all times, particularly nights and week­
ends. This left important medical decisions to licensed
vocational nurses or to infirmary aides. These aides were
139correctional officers with no mandatory medical training.
Many instances were reported at the trial where stu­
dents, in need of medical attention, received treatment 
long after it was called for or not at all. For example, 
a student at Crocket testified that she had been taking pen­
icillin when she attempted to escape and was placed in soli­
tary confinement. She subsequently began to vomit blood. A 
nurse checked her more than an hour later, but she never saw 
a doctor nor received any medication. Another student re­
ported being delayed in seeing a doctor for approximately 
two days after having a miscarriage. A third incident 
reported at Crockett involved the death of a girl who had 
inhaled the contents of an aerosol can. There were no medi­
cally trained personnel on hand at the time.^^^
Experts testified that besides regular medical care, 
there should also be a full-time psychiatrist available for 
every one hundred children. They also believed that, for
139
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the same number of students, minimal standards required one
psychologist with a Doctorate, two with Master's degrees,
and psychiatric nurses. None of the TYC institutions met
these standards. They were all found to be extremely inade-
141quate in terms of available psychiatric care. This was 
in part due to the remoteness of the TYC institutions from 
urban settings. Under these circumstances, it is difficult 
to recruit qualified people. Psychological services were 
also found to be inadequate.
In discussing medical and psychiatric services, the 
Court took notice of abusive practices relating to psycho­
tropic medication. Major tranquilizers, such as Thorazine, 
were being dispensed for a variety of reasons including 
sleep induction. These medicines were often prescribed and 
administered by personnel lacking the necessary knowledge 
and experience of the drugs' expected results and possible 
side effects. The houseparents, dormitory supervisors, 
teachers, correctional officers and other staff members were 
not kept informed of a student's medication by any system­
atic procedure. As a result of this communication gap, stu­
dents taking sleep-indueing- drugs were often punished for 
1 4 2
falling asleep.
^^^Ibid. at 102-3. 
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^Ibid. at 103-4.
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Houseparents and Correctional Officers
Staff members who spend the greatest amount of time
with the juveniles are the houseparents and correctional
officers, or other staff members, assigned to the position
of supervising dormitories. The expert witnesses agreed
that these particular people should be able to help the
children express their anxieties and other emotions in a
constructive manner, and certainly not simply suppress 
143them. They are also important as role models, particu­
larly because many of the juveniles come from homes where
there is no role model, or the choice of models has been 
144
unfortunate. The majority of supervisory personnel ques­
tioned, however, viewed their role as one of maintaining 
control and little else. For example, it was observed at 
Gainesville that the houseparents perform no treatment role, 
discourage the expression of emotion, and believe the "best"
girls to be the ones who were quiet and passive. 145
Psychological Screening
In recruiting the dormitory supervisors and house­
parents there was no attempt made at psychological screen­
ing; even though it is known that corrections work, for an 
unexplained reason, is particularly attractive to violent
143Ibid. at 106.
144Ibid.
145 Ibid. at 107.
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and sadistic p e o p l e . A t  least in part because there was 
no provision for psychological screening of prospective 
staff members, in 1972 there were eleven staff members at 
Gatesville and six at Mountain View discharged for use of 
excessive force. Based on the testimony given at this trial, 
the court learned that there were undoubtedly many others 
who should or could be discharged for the same reason.
Educational Background and Training
Educational background was another characteristic 
taken into account in assessing the quality of these staff 
members. "Some experts thought houseparents should have a 
minimum of two years of college training, because of their 
prime importance in the treatment process. Ideally,
the houseparents should also have an interest in, as well 
as prior experience in, working with children.
Although state law requires that these staff members 
have a high school education or its equivalent, it was found 
that at least one houseparent supervisor at Gainesville did 
not have a diploma. It was not determined at the trial whe­
ther or not the houseparents at Crockett had degrees because 
the superintendent was unable to supply that information. 
Employees at Gatesville and Mountain View generally tended 
to have no prior experience working with juveniles. They
l^^ibid. at 106.
^^^Ibid.
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were often retired military personnel or citizens of the
local community who held other full-time jobs. The Court
said that "minimally, houseparents should have both pre-job
148
training and in-service training and supervision." House­
parents should be given a basic understanding of the insti­
tutional goals and purposes, and should have some knowledge 
of the principles of child care. They should be supervised 
by trained and qualified personnel. The Court observed that 
each newly hired staff member's training should last three
to four months with a minimum of thirty hours devoted to
. ^ , . . . 149sensitivity training.
The training situation at Brownwood was described 
as model. It included in-service training for houseparents 
which consisted of lectures discussing work "with Mexican 
American children, drug abuse, normal adolescent behavior, 
family therapy, and discipline techniques." For some unex­
plained reason, however, this training was not persued at 
the other institutions. The best circumstances available, 
elsewhere in the system, afforded the houseparents and cor­
rectional officers "several hours of lecture and one or two 
weeks of on-the-job training." Although there had been a 
few sporadic attempts at in-service training, it was pro­
vided only when funds were available and had been stopped 
altogether in 1972.^^^
l^Gibid. at 109.
149ibid. at 109-10.
ISOibid. at 110.
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Much of the so-called training of correctional 
employees was determined to be worse than none at all. The 
instruction was rigid, haphazard, and difficult to inter­
pret, leaving the employee confused and frustrated. For 
example, at Gainesville, the houseparents were presented 
with a memorandum explaining the delinquent sub-cultures 
that develop within institutions. They were instructed to 
discourage the development of these sub-cultures. As a 
result, "This mandate was interpreted by houseparents as a 
directive to discourage any show of leadership or ability
151
by a girl."^ "At Gatesville, training for new correctional 
officers consisted exclusively of having them sit in dormi­
tories and watch other correctional officers at work. They
were also provided with a book entitled 'Manual for Con- 
152
trol.'" Mountain View officers received no prior train­
ing, and there was no in-service training at either Gates­
ville or Mountain View. At the boys' institutions, the offi­
cers were instructed to use force when the boys were "out of 
control." There were no instructions concerning what kind of 
force, when to use it, or what "out of control" meant.
The result was the abusive and brutal treatment discussed 
earlier in this chapter. As a result of poor training and
IS^ibid.
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the lack of consistent discipline techniques, the juvenile 
developed a distrust and disrespect for the law.^^^
Environment and Racial Background 
Expert witnesses testified as to the importance of 
staff members understanding the environment from which a 
juvenile comes. It was found, that despite many of the stu­
dents coming from urban settings, most of the staff was of a
155rural orientation. Also, it was deemed important by the 
experts that the racial mix of the staff adequately reflect 
that of the students. It is necessary for one thing to the 
rehabilitative process that all the children see members of 
their own race, particularly the minorities, in positions of 
respect, status, and a u t h o r i t y . T h e r e  was no apparent 
attempt to hire Blacks or Mexican Americans, which would 
have been difficult to do because of the geographical loca­
tion of the institutions. In the TYC institutions, at the 
time of this trial, 41.9 per cent of the students were Anglo; 
34.1 per cent were Black; and 23.9 per cent were Mexican 
American. The staff percentages were as follows; 83.5 per 
cent— Anglo, 13.7 per cent— Black, and 2.5 per cent— Mexican 
American. At Mountain View, in particular, 68.7 per cent of 
the students were non-Anglo, but 88.6 per cent of the staff
154
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were Anglo. At Gatesville, 61 per cent of the students were
157
non-Anglo but 85.7 per cent of the staff was Anglo.
In terms of those individuals who work the most 
closely with the children, the recruitment and training pro­
grams were far below the requirements for development of a 
professional treatment approach. Even if the staff had been 
properly recruited and trained, the evidence indicated that 
their numbers were inadequate for treating each child indi­
vidually. There is no agreed upon formula for staff/student 
ratios, but the experts suggested that one staff member to 
every twelve inmates is minimal. A one-to-six ratio was 
even suggested as the best figure. The TYC institutions 
were again found inadequate in this matter. For example, 
there was one correctional officer to supervise every thirty 
boys at Gatesville. The ratio at Gainesville was approxi­
mately one to sixteen or seventeen. This problem was further
complicated by a high rate of staff turnover; fifty-two per
158
cent annually at Mountain View, for instance.
Caseworkers
While the houseparents and correctional officers 
have the greatest amount of day-to-day contact with the 
children, the caseworkers are also vital to the rehabilita­
tive process. They are responsible for coordinating the
IS^ibid. at 108.
^^®Ibid. at 111.
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overall treatment plan and assuring that all staff members 
who deal with a particular child understand the purpose aiul 
goals of each individualized plan. Inadequacies concerning 
the caseworkers closely paralleled those of houseparents 
and correctional officers. Except at Brownwood, the case­
workers were found to be understaffed and undertrained. In 
most cases, a juvenile saw his caseworker about once a month,
if that. The caseworkers were responsible for more than a
159satisfactory number of children. Their office hours 
usually did not coincide with hours that were convenient for 
the children, and there was no apparent attempt on the part 
of the caseworkers to actively seek contact with the chil­
dren. They passively waited in their offices for the chil­
dren to initiate c o n t a c t . T h e  caseworkers were, in general, 
poorly trained in the relevant knowledge and experience nec­
essary to carry out their jobs.^^^ It was again agreed by
159
Ibid. at 112. Several of the experts testified 
that a one-to-twenty ratio was minimal. Yet, the caseloads 
at the institutions were one caseworker to "twenty-five to 
thirty-five girls at Gainesville; at Crockett, thirty to 
forty girls; at Brownwood, twenty to twenty-five girls; at 
Gatesville, forty to forty-five boys; and at Mountain View, 
forty to fifty boys."
^^^Ibid. "Expert witnesses agreed that most chil­
dren are not aware of the potential uses of a caseworker and 
will not initiate a contact."
^^^Ibid. Expert witnesses testified that minimally 
the caseworkers should have a Bachelor of Arts degree in 
psychology or social work and preferably a Master's of Social 
Work. "At the time of the trial there was only one caseworker 
at Gainesville with a Master's degree. Others had college 
degrees, but in subjects unrelated to social work. None of
146
the expert witnesses that the minority children should have 
caseworkers of their own race in order to improve communica­
tion. The percentage of minority caseworkers was found,
162however, to be extremely inadequate. Finally, expert 
witnesses testified that high quality supervision of the 
caseworkers was imperative in order to provide consultation 
and expert advice, especially on difficult cases. It was 
found that in no TYC institution did the caseworkers receive
aid and supervision from a staff member with a Master's
, 163degree.
The contact between caseworker and child was not con­
sidered to be a therapeutic relationship. The children's 
perception was that going to a caseworker did not alleviate 
any of their problems. They were often afraid to approach 
their caseworkers for fear of retaliation by the correctional 
officers.
The conclusion of the Court regarding the quality of 
casework care was that:
the caseworkers at Mountain View had any formal training in 
group work. . . .  No caseworker with a Master's degree in 
social work was employed in any of the seven subschools at 
Gatesville."
162
Ibid. at 113. There were no Mexican-American 
caseworkers at Crockett, Gatesville, and Mountain View.
There was a temporary one at Gainesville. In terms of Black 
caseworkers, there were two at Crockett, three at Gatesville 
and one each at Mountain View and Gainesville.
IG^ibid.
IG^ibid. at 115.
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. . . caseworkers throughout TYC institutions are 
not capable of doing their assigned tasks, have 
inadequate knowledge of the modalities of treatment 
and the dynamics of adolescent behavior, and do not 
receive adequate supervision or in-service train­
i n g . 1 6 5
Families and Friends
Aside from the important role that houseparents, cor­
rectional officers and caseworkers play in a child's chances 
for rehabilitation, the court recognized two other important 
sources of human contact— the family and the peer group. 
"Expert witnesses were in entire agreement as to the vital 
importance of involving the juvenile's family in his treat­
ment. The family is important to a child, regardless of
how it has treated him, for emotional support. Mexican 
American children are especially in need of contact from fam­
ily and friends because of the lack of Mexican American role 
models available on the institutional staffs.
Aside from Brownwood, there was little or no appar­
ent attempt in the other institutions to involve the family 
in a child's treatment program. The superintendent at Gaines­
ville testified that only thirty to forty per cent of the
girls there receive any visitors from the outside community
168
during their stay. Part of the reason for this is the
IG^ibid. at 116.
IGBibid. at 117.
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geographical remoteness of the facilities. El Paso, for 
example, is approximately 600 miles away from Gainesville. 
Most of the juveniles incarcerated in TYC institutions are 
the products of poor or low income f a m i l i e s . T h e  cost of 
financing a visit to a child in one of the remote institu­
tions is frequently impossible for such families. A second 
reason for the infrequent family visitations was institution­
al restrictions on such contacts. For example, Gainesville 
allowed visitation only on Sundays, and Gatesville invited 
families to visit one Sunday per month.
Despite the hardships faced by families desirous of 
visiting their children, it was even more impossible for 
friends to visit the TYC inmates. The Court found evidence 
that visits from friends were rarely allowed even though the 
experts testified that such visits would aid in the rehabil­
itation of the child.
Allowing the inmates an opportunity for home visits 
on furloughs was an even rarer practice. The boys at Gates­
ville and Mountain View were allowed no furloughs except in 
emergencies. The girls at Crockett and Gainesville had to 
wait nine months before they were considered eligible to 
apply for a furlough. Even if granted such a leave, the
l^ Oibid.
l^ libid.
149
girls were not allowed to go home if they or their families
172could not afford to pay for the trips.
Conclusions
The Morales case began essentially as an inquiry 
about the procedures by which Texas juveniles are institu­
tionalized. The use of investigation and expert witness 
testimony, however, expanded the subject of the case to 
include many questions about the institutional circumstances 
and practices which govern the juveniles' quality of life 
while residing in a Texas institution for delinquents.
It appears from a reading of the court's opinion in 
Morales that Judge Justice was especially disturbed by the 
physical, mental, and emotional brutality inflicted on the 
inmates. As a result of that concern, he discovered a wide 
variety of other circumstances which had created an environ­
ment that was conducive to brutality. The conditions and 
practices found in the TYC institutions were not conducive 
to rehabilitation and were, in many instances, harmful to the 
children.
Judge Justice felt compelled, as a result of his dis­
coveries, to order fundamental changes in the entire system 
of juvenile justice in Texas. The next chapter presents the 
policy pronouncements of the district court. It is a posi­
tive and active example of judicial intervention in an 
attempt to bring about change.
CHAPTER FOUR
MORALES V. TURMAN: THE STATEMENT
OF PUBLIC POLICY
The policy statements that emerged from Morales v. 
Turman came in essentially four stages. The first was a
Declaratory Judgment entered by the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas on December 27,
1972. The second stage involved the same court's decision 
to grant an emergency interim relief order on August 31,
1973. The third policy announcement was the final opinion 
of this court, entered August 30, 1974. The fourth and
final stage, to date, was handed down by the United States
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit in July, 1976. The case has
not yet reached finality as it is on appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court.
Declaratory Judgment 
The Declaratory Judgment was concerned with the 
adjudicatory stage of juvenile justice. The focus of the 
judgment was on the failure of the Texas juvenile system 
"to provide constitutionally required due process protections
150
151
for minor c h i l d r e n . J u d g e  William Justice said that 
several nonexistent protections must be implemented. These 
included the right to be fully informed as to the charges 
against the juvenile. The court said that minor children
2
are entitled to the protections stated in Miranda v. Arizona 
which include the right to remain silent; to be informed 
that anything said can be used against the defendant; the 
right to have an attorney present during interrogation or 
any discussion with law enforcement personnel; the obliga­
tion of the state to provide an attorney for those who are 
unable to afford one; the right to discontinue answering 
questions when one chooses to do so; and the right not to be 
penalized for failure to answer questions or make a state­
ment. Other rights not to be denied minor children in Texas, 
according to the Declaratory Judgment, include; the right 
to a hearing; the right to a trial by jury; the rights of 
confrontation and cross-examination; the right to present 
evidence on ones own behalf; the right to a transcript of 
the proceedings; the right to be informed about the impli­
cations of the proceedings; and the right to appeal.^
The evidence agreed to by both the plaintiffs and 
the defendants in this case showed that, in some cases, the
^383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), at 69, note #12. 
^384 U.S. 436 (1966).
^Ibid. at 69-70, note #12.
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right to counsel was ignored altogether. In many others, 
the minors or their parents or guardians were allowed to 
waive the right to be represented by an attorney. None of 
the minor children who were named in this action had ever 
had a court hearing, appeared before a judge, or had an 
opportunity to consult with a lawyer before being institu-
4
tionalized. A specific incident stated in the agreed upon 
evidence involved a Texas juvenile court judge who, between 
January 1, 1967 and March 30, 1971, ordered seventy-five 
minor children incarcerated without benefit of a court hear­
ing or appearance before a judge. This same judge ordered 
124 minors incarcerated who had never been represented by an 
attorney with regard to their adjudication.^ This situation 
was not found to be unique; there were others stated in the 
evidence.
Judge Justice stated that every minor child must be 
represented by counsel at every critical stage of adjudica­
tion. He defined "critical stages" as including but not 
limited to "any juvenile court hearing, whether it be for 
the purpose of detention, adjudication or disposition.
The Declaratory Judgment simply stated that this right may 
not be waived, and public monies must be expended in order
^Ibid. at 68, note #11.
^Ibid.
^Ibid. at 69-70, note #12.
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to hire attorneys for those who cannot afford to hire their 
own.^
Rather than issue an injunction enforcing the Declar­
atory Judgment, Judge Justice relied on a directive requir­
ing information periodically as to what steps were being 
taken to assure that all minors in the State of Texas are 
provided with counsel at the critical stages of adjudication. 
The court recognized that there were "over 250 juvenile 
court jurisdictions in Texas," and that, for the most part,
there had existed "a longstanding practice of not providing
8
counsel to minor children in juvenile court proceedings."
As a result of this knowledge, the court realized that impo­
sition of the order would be difficult and would require the 
creation of new approaches. Judge Justice, therefore, 
allowed sixty days for the defendants to prepare "a plan for 
the provision of legal representation and due process pro-
9
tections to minor children."
The directive ordered defendants to report to the 
court every sixty days on the progress of the implementation 
of the Declaratory Judgment. After one hundred twenty days, 
the defendants were ordered to contain in the reports the 
names of all minor children "adjudicated delinquent in
8
Ibid.
Ibid. at 69, note #12.
Ibid. at 70.
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derogation of the constitutional and statutory rights," as 
enumerated in the Declaratory Judgment. These reports were 
also to include "the name of the juvenile court which adjudi­
cated the delinquency of each said child" without benefit 
of the mandated due process protections.^®
Judge Justice said that his court would retain con­
tinuing jurisdiction over this matter and warned that fur­
ther relief would be entered if it were revealed, after 180 
days, that the Declaratory Judgment was not being imple­
mented.^^ Finally, the court ordered the Attorney General
to assume the responsibility for notifying all the juvenile
12
courts in Texas as to the provisions of this order.
Emergency Interim Relief Order 
On August 31, 1973, the second stage of this action 
evolved. On that day. Judge Justice entered an emergency 
interim relief order. The purpose of this order was to 
halt certain practices within the TYC institutions immedi­
ately, without waiting for the final court decision in the 
case. These practices were found by the court to be in 
violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment. Using Furman v. Georgia^^ and Jackson v.
^®Ibid.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
^^408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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Bishop as precedent. Judge Justice listed four grounds 
for enjoining these practices. The grounds were that:
(1) "such practices were so severe as to degrade human 
dignity"; (2) the practices "were inflicted in a wholly 
arbitrary fashion"; (3) they "were so severe as to be 
unacceptable to contemporary society"; and (4) they "were 
not justified as serving any necessary purpose.
Jackson v. Bishop was a case brought by three adult 
prisoners of the Arkansas penal system who asked for an 
injunction against whipping with a strap for disciplinary 
purposes. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the prisoners and 
ordered that the personnel of the penitentiary system be 
restrained from using the strap, or any other form of cor­
poral punishment, as a disciplinary measure.
The court recognized that a thorough analysis of the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish­
ment is a most difficult task. However, it said that the 
use of the strap "offends contemporary concepts of decency 
and human dignity and precepts of civilization . . . "  and 
also that it "violates those standards of good conscience 
and fundamental fairness . .
Following a general discussion of a definition of 
cruel and unusual punishment, the Eighth Circuit narrowed
^^404 F. 2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). 
^^Morales at 77.
Jackson at 579.
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its decision by naming specific problems raised by the use 
of the strap. Of the nine specific objections raised, six 
of them dealt with the problem of standards. The court 
explained, generally speaking, that it is simply impossible 
to establish rules and regulations that would assure the 
disciplinary measure would not be abused. Even though the 
State of Arkansas had attempted to prevent abuses by estab­
lishing certain standards, the court found that the stan­
dards were easily circumvented and not successful in achiev­
ing the goal.^^
The court further explained that whipping degrades
both the punisher and the punished and found the total
impact on attitudes and discipline to be a negative one.
Finally the court found public opinion to be adverse toward
whipping inmates since only two states even allowed it at
18that time— Arkansas and Mississippi. The distinction 
between Jackson and Morales is not difficult to find; it is 
age. While many would agree that whipping a grown man on 
the buttocks is so seriously degrading as to be counterre- 
habilitative, there is no such consensus when it comes to 
children.
Judge Justice relied also on Furman v. Georgia in 
his attempt to analyze the Eighth Amendment prohibitions.
^^Ibid.
^®Ibid. at 580.
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This case also dealt with adults but its subject was capital 
punishment which was never a question in Morales. Neverthe­
less, there was a serious attempt to define the concept of 
cruel and unusual punishment in the Furman case. The fact 
of the matter is that there were nine separate opinions 
filed in this case, and it is somewhat difficult to determine 
what the law truly is with respect to cruel and unusual pun­
ishment as a result of Furman. Generally speaking, the 
Court did not declare capital punishment per se unconstitu­
tional but said that the manner in which it is applied may 
violate the Constitution.
The district court appears to have relied heavily on
the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in that it lists the
identical components in the same order. Justice Brennan
admitted to the difficulty of defining cruel and unusual
punishment. Yet he recognized that the values embodied in
the clause force upon the Court "the duty, when the issue is
properly presented, to determine the constitutional validity
19of a challenged punishment."
The Court never assumed that the state does not 
have the power to punish but rather certain limits were 
stated within which punishment must fall. Brennan said that 
the basic concept to be considered is the dignity of man.
"A punishment is 'cruel and unusual' if it does not comport
19
Furman at 360.
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with human d i g n i t y . J u d g e  Justice was then correct on 
the basis of both Jackson and Furman when he named human 
dignity as a basic component in the proscription of certain 
punishments. This component means simply that, regardless 
of the crime, a state may not treat an individual as less 
than human.
A second component announced in Brennan's opinion
is the idea of arbitrariness. A state is not allowed to
inflict punishment arbitrarily because, if it inflicts
severe punishment on some and not on others, it shows lack
21of respect for human dignity. This was the primary con­
cern of the Furman case. The question was whether or not 
the state may impose capital punishment on some and not on 
others even though both groups have committed the same 
crime. The Court, of course, answered in the negative. The 
question of arbitrariness or lack of standards to assure 
fairness was a consideration in both cases and constituted 
the basis for Judge Justice's listing of it as the second 
important criteria in the definition of cruel and unusual 
punishment.
The third component, according to Justice Brennan, 
is that of societal rejection. When punishment is so severe 
that it is found not acceptable by contemporary society.
^°Ibid. at 367.
^^Ibid. at 369.
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there is a "strong indication" that it is believed not to
22
"comport with human dignity." Brennan said the key factor 
in determining whether or not a punishment is objectionable 
throughout society is not availability but use. Again both 
the Jackson and Furman cases give the basis for the district 
court's third component— unacceptability by contemporary 
society.
Judge Justice's fourth component was the idea that 
punishments are cruel and unusual when they do not serve a 
necessary purpose. This component was not a primary object 
of consideration in Jackson, but it was in Furman, although 
Justice Brennan stated it in terms of excessiveness. How­
ever, he defined excessive as unnecessary. He said, "If 
there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to 
achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted,
. . . the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore 
23
excessive."
Physical Abuse
Specific actions prohibited by the emergency interim 
relief order included various forms of violent and brutal 
physical abuse inflicted on the inmates such as kicking, 
beating, and slapping them without necessity or tear
^^Ibid. at 371.
^^Ibid. at 372.
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gassing them when no threat to human life or property was 
imminent.
In prohibiting these actions as being in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, the court referred to Ingraham v.
25
Wright. However, there is a major difference to be found 
in the two cases. The Ingraham case involved the paddling 
of students at Charles R. Drew Junior High School in Dade 
County, Florida, The Fifth Circuit found that, in this par­
ticular instance, there was an Eighth Amendment violation.
The evidence showed that at that particular school, punish­
ments were often severe, excessive and unnecessary. However, 
the Fifth Circuit stopped far short of declaring paddling as 
a form of discipline or punishment for school children as 
violative of cruel and unusual punishment. It maintained 
that paddling, in mild or moderate form, was neither exces­
sive nor degrading to the dignity of school children in the 
constitutional sense. It further stated that corporal 
punishment in the schools is not considered abhorant by 
society as "a large number of states continue to authorize 
the use of moderate corporal punishment, and that corporal
punishment apparently is still utilized in many school 
26
systems."
24
25
26
364 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Tex. 1973). 
498 F. 2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974). 
Ibid. at 260.
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While the Fifth Circuit distinguished between 
corporal punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment and 
corporal punishment that does not, the district court in 
Morales made no such distinction. It simply said that kick­
ing, beating or slapping the inmates of TYC institutions, 
when there is no imminent threat to human life or property, 
is unconstitutional because it violates the precepts of 
cruel and unusual punishment. Morales, unlike Ingraham, 
does not imply that as long as there is a set of standards 
governing the infliction of corporal punishment, it is per­
missible.
Solitary Confinement
Solitary confinement was also a subject of the emer­
gency relief order. The district court pointed out that 
certain types of confinement may require due process protec­
tions. Judge Justice relied on the case of Board of Regents 
27
V .  Roth for a determination of what types of liberty fall
under the Fourteenth Amendment due process protections. The
Supreme Court said that it was stretching the concept of due
process "too far to suggest that a person is deprived of
'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job but
28
remains as free as before to seek another." The Court did 
recognize that liberty is a broad term and that there must
^^408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
^®Ibid. at 572.
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be substantial procedural protection afforded, in some 
instances, before a deprivation can be justified. It in­
cluded "freedom from bodily restraint. . . . and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized. . . .  as essen-
29
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
Judge Justice used the dicta in Roth in order to question 
the extraordinary restrictions sometimes placed on the TYC 
inmates, such as solitary confinement.
In the relief order, the court identified three 
types of intrainstitutional confinement which constituted 
"a substantial deprivation of liberty requiring invocation 
of certain due process p r o c e d u r e s . O n e  was solitary 
confinement which is placing an inmate alone in a room other 
than his own. The order prohibited this practice except 
under circumstances where it is "clearly necessary to pre­
vent imminent physical harm to the inmate or to other per­
sons or clearly necessary to prevent imminent and substan­
tial destruction of p r o p e r t y . A n o t h e r  form of intrainsti­
tutional confinement was identified as "security" or the 
placement of an inmate in a locked building possibly having 
several solitary confinement cells. This practice was 
limited in the relief order to those circumstances where 
necessary to prevent escape or "to restrain behavior that
^^Ibid.
^^Morales at 177.
^^Ibid.
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creates substantial disruption of the routine of the 
32institution." The third category of confinement within 
the institutions was identified as "dormitory confinement," 
which is locking an inmate in his dormitory room. This was 
suggested as an alternative to solitary or security confine­
ment, but one that should be subjected to the same standards
33
as the other two.
The relief order went on to enumerate more specific 
standards that must be applied to these types of confinement. 
It said no inmate could be kept for longer than three days 
in confinement without a written justification for the prac­
tice by the child's caseworker. After five consecutive days 
of solitary confinement, the Executive Director of the TYC 
must assume the responsibility of preparing a justification 
report. The same is true after ten consecutive days of 
security confinement.^^
Other Relief Order Pronouncements
The emergency relief order also prohibited enforced 
silence as a punishment and "the performance of repetitive, 
nonfunctional, degrading and unnecessary t a s k s . T h e s e  
tasks, as discussed in chapter three, included grass pulling
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
164
duty, dirt shoveling duty arid floor buffing duty. The court 
denounced and prohibited situations where an inmate is con­
fined under conditions where physical danger to him is a 
probability. The court found that such conditions may be a 
violation of cruel and unusual punishment according to New
York State Association for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller:
36
That case involved the rights of patients in the Willowbrook
State School for the Mentally Retarded in New York. A major
focus of the case was on the lack of personnel in sufficient
numbers to adequately care for the children. The district
judge argued that the children had "the right to protection
from harm." He said this included "protection from assaults
37
by fellow inmates or by staff."
Although the Morales decision implies that the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause mandates an adequate staff/ 
student ratio in order to protect the inmates from harm, the 
New York decision did not lay the groundwork for such an 
assumption. The judge, in that case, said that the basis 
for the right to be protected from harm could be the Eighth 
Amendment, but he also said it could be either the Due Pro­
cess Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He claimed, in fact, that it was not necessary
38
to determine the basis of the right.
36
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357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.W. 1973). 
Ibid. at 764.
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The interesting aspect of Judge Justice's inclusion
of the case as precedent in the Morales decision is that
the New York decision thoroughly discusses the so-called
right to treatment and ultimately determines there is no 
39such right. As will be seen later in this chapter. Judge 
Justice reached a different conclusion.
In the relief order, the court found harmful condi­
tions with respect to two practices. One practice prohib­
ited by the court was housing up to forty boys in an open 
dormitory with a single supervisor on duty. If a boy were 
attacked or became ill, the supervisor was prevented from 
assisting him because he was locked in an elevated cage.
The supervisor's only alternative during an emergency was to 
call by telephone for outside assistance. The other pro­
hibited practice was hiring correctional officers who had 
not been properly screened through psychological testing,
making it possible for sick and sadistic people to assume 
40
staff positions.
The most blatant violations of cruel and unusual 
punishment were found at Mountain View, the maximum security 
institution for older boys. Because the changes to take 
place there were drastic and difficult, the court appointed 
a monitor, Charles Derrick, to aid in the process.
3*ibid. at 762, 764. 
40
383 F. Supp. 77-8.
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Morales v. Turman 
The third phase of this case was the court's decision 
in Morales v. Turman following a trial of six weeks' dura­
tion. Judge Justice first disposed of two points stressed 
by the defendants; one of which became important at the 
appellate level.
Eleventh Amendment
The defense argued that if the court granted the 
relief asked for by the plaintiffs, it would require the 
expenditure of state funds. The contention was that this 
constituted a "raid on the treasury" of the State of Texas 
and, therefore, a violation of the Eleventh Amendment. The 
court dismissed the argument both because of the evidence 
and legal precedent. The decision said that there was little 
or no evidence presented that might lead one to conclude 
that implementation of the court's pronouncements would be 
more costly than the system already in effect. In fact, the 
court pointed out that, by implementing the decision, there 
was some evidence to show the state could eventually save 
considerable sums of m o n e y . T h e  court discussed several 
cases with respect to the Eleventh Amendment argument.
Edelman v. Jordan
The court said it was not necessary to determine 
whether the decision would require additional expenditure
^^Ibid. at 60.
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of state funds. It referred without explanation to a 
Supreme Court case, Edelman v. Jordan. T h a t  case involved 
a group of welfare recipients in Illinois who were receiving 
less aid than was required by federal regulations. A fed­
eral district court issued an injunction in order to compel 
Illinois to comply with the federal regulations. The case 
went to the Supreme Court squarely on the issue of the 
Eleventh Amendment. The court did not overturn the injunc­
tive relief which compelled Illinois to comply with the fed­
eral regulations. However, the case was remanded, on the 
basis of the Eleventh Amendment, because the district court 
also granted relief in the form of retroactive payments.
The Supreme Court felt that the granting of retroactive 
relief constituted an award of damages against the state, 
while a proscriptive order which forced the state to comply 
with federal regulations did not. Although the case was 
remanded for further consideration. Judge Justice was cor­
rect in citing it as precedent because that part of the dis­
trict court's decision which required the future expenditure 
of additional state funds was left untouched by the Supreme 
Court.
Graham v. Richardson
The district court in Morales cited additional cases
such as Graham v. Richardson 43 That case involved the
42
43
415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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denial of welfare benefits to "resident aliens or to aliens
who have not resided in the United States for a specified
44
number of years." The Supreme Court said that such stat­
utes were in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, the state must pay the 
benefits. This decision obviously involved the expenditure 
of vast sums of money particularly in those states such as 
Arizona and Texas where a large number of aliens from Mexico 
reside.
Gaither v. Sterrett
The district court concluded that if the Eleventh 
Amendment constituted an obstacle, a large number of federal 
district court decisions, already affirmed by the Supreme 
Court, would be void, such as Gaither v. Sterrett.*^ * In 
the Gaither case, the district court declared unconstitu­
tional a state statute terminating AFDC benefits to certain 
children when a stepfather is in the home. The Supreme 
Court affirmed that case; however, the situation was some­
what different than Morales. In Gaither, the court was not 
ordering the expenditure of any funds. It was instead 
claiming that the expenditure of funds may not be reduced 
or terminated "under the auspices of an unconstitutional
44Ibid.
45
809 (1972).
346 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd 409 U.S.
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State statute. . The result, of course, would be
increased expenditure but the facts were different because 
the constitutionality of a state statute was not challenged 
in Morales.
Three-Judge Courts
The other point dismissed by the court was the 
defendant's position that the case should have been heard 
by a three-judge court. The statute in question is 28 U.S.C. 
Sect. 2281 (1970) which describes the circumstances that 
require the convening of a three-judge court. It reads as 
follows :
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining 
the enforcement, operation or execution of any State 
statute by restraining the action of any officer of 
such State in the enforcement or execution of such 
statute or of an order made by an administrative 
board or commission acting under State statutes, 
shall not be granted by any district court or judge 
thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality 
of such statute unless the application therefore is 
heard and determined by a district court of three 
judges under section 2284 of this title.47
The Fifth Circuit summarized the essential condi­
tions requiring a three-judge court in its appellate deci­
sion concerning this case. That court determined that a 
three-judge court is not necessary unless:
(1) a state statute with state-wide applicability 
is challenged, (2) an "officer of such" state is
46
47
Ibid. at 1099.
28 U.S.C. Sect. 2281 (1970).
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sought to be restrained, (3) injunctive relief is 
sought, and (4) there is a substantial question as 
to the validity of the statute under the Federal 
Constitution.^°
The district court agreed that two of the essential 
elements were present in this case. A state officer was 
present as a defendant, and the plaintiffs were asking for 
an injunction. However, it disagreed, supported by the 
plaintiffs, the United States and other amici, that the 
other two requirements were present in this case. According 
to the court's position, there was no statute with state­
wide applicability being challenged and no question as to 
the validity of any statute under the Federal Constitution.
The only statutes involved in this case, by the time 
it came to trial, were those giving general grants of author­
ity to the TYC. There was no quarrel on the part of the 
plaintiffs with these statutes. On the contrary, it was 
these statutes upon which the plaintiffs based their argu­
ment that juveniles, according to Texas law, have a right to 
treatment. According to Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann, art.
5143d (1971), the purpose of the TYC is "to provide a pro­
gram of constructive training aimed at rehabilitation and 
reestablishment in society of children adjudged delinquent
.49
The court said that the plaintiffs were attempting
48
49
535 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976).
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann, art 5143d (1971).
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to force implementation of the statute and certainly not 
questioning its validity or constitutionality.
Baker v. Estelle
The court agreed that plaintiffs were questioning 
the validity of a number of institutional practices and pro­
cedures. It noted the similarity, as pointed out by the 
defendants, of this case to Baker v. Estelle, sub nom. Sands 
V .  Wainwright.^^ The court found a significant difference 
between the two cases. In Baker, a prisoner was questioning 
the procedures followed by the Texas Department of Correc­
tions involving loss of good time, commitment to solitary 
confinement, and attorney-client mail censorship. The Fifth 
Circuit remanded this case for hearing by a three-judge 
court. The appellee argued in Baker that a three-judge 
court was unnecessary because he was objecting to practices, 
not regulations. The Fifth Circuit disagreed saying that 
the practices to which he was objecting were "in reality, 
the Rules and Regulations of the Texas Department of Correc­
tions, as applied.
The district court said that Morales was different 
from Baker because there were apparently no rules and regu­
lations that applied to all the TYC institutions as were 
found in the adult penal system. In describing the "central
^°491 F. 2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973). 
^^Ibid. at 428.
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policy" of the TYC, the court used adjectives such as
52"ephemeral, mythical, and, indeed, almost non-existent."
The defendants referred to the minutes of the TYC 
board meetings as the source of policy for operation of the 
institutions. However, Judge Justice pointed out that this 
was a rather haphazard means of establishing policy since, 
"There is apparently no stenographer who makes a verbatim 
transcript of the meetings," and, "The minutes are bound in 
a volume which is not codified, indexed by subject, or up­
dated . . . "  Judge Justice took it upon himself to study 
these minutes from 1957 to 1972. He found only "the most 
general discussion of issues," most of it concerned with 
such matters as "budget planning, building and construction 
projects, public relations, and other matters . . . "  The 
court said that such discussions were "only tenuously related 
to the task of rehabilitating individual c h i l d r e n . T h e  
defense could, of course, point to the manuals for employees 
and students as an embodiment of rules and regulations. 
However, the evidence showed that these manuals were not 
distributed at all institutions. Where they were distrib­
uted, they amounted to policy for that particular institu­
tion only. In fact, it was established that policy often 
differed within institutions because the rules varied
^^383 F. Supp. 61.
^^Ibid. at 62.
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"from dormitory to dormitory or cottage to cottage within 
the same institution.''^  ^ (emphasis in original)
Based on his own careful observations, the judge 
concluded that it was "impossible to construe the minutes 
as 'rules and regulations'."^^ He said, "TYC 'policy' as 
embodied in the minutes is close to undiscoverable and does 
not constitute a coherent body of regulations that are 
applied throughout the system; such rules and regulations 
as exist are local to single institutions or subdivisions 
t h e r e o f . T h e r e f o r e ,  the case was not considered to be 
one involving state statutes or policies for which three- 
judge courts were designed to consider.
Dorado. Neives, and Board of Regents
In reaching this final conclusion, Judge Justice
compared three cases. They were Dorado v. Kerr,**^  Nieves 
58
V. Oswald, and Board of Regents v. New Left Education Pro- 
5 9ject. The Neives case involved the infamous Attica prison 
revolt in September of 1971. As a result of alleged involve­
ment in that riot, a group of prisoners were facing disci­
plinary hearings, and they claimed that the manner in which
^'^Ibid. at 64
^^Ibid. at 62, 
^^Ibid. at 64,
^^454 F. 2d 892 (9th Cir. 1972). 
^®477 F. 2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1973). 
^^404 U.S. 541 (1972).
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these hearings would be conducted was violative of their
60
constitutional rights. The complainants claimed that the 
procedures followed at disciplinary hearings were constitu­
tionally deficient for a number of procedural reasons. The 
Second Circuit remanded this case for hearing by a three- 
judge court at the district court level because it deter­
mined that this case met the requirements of such a panel.
It held that "this challenge to the regulations sufficiently 
implicates well-considered state policy of state-wide appli­
cation to require three-judge court adjudication . . .
The Dorado decision was a case where the necessity 
for a three-judge court was denied in a prisoner's claim.
The setting involved not disciplinary hearings but hearings 
of the California Adult Authority. This board makes deci­
sions regarding paroles in the California penal system.
Again in this case, the prisoner challenged the procedure 
used in reaching a parole decision, such as the fact that
the Authority "denied prisoners the assistance of counsel at
62
these annual hearings . . . "  The Ninth Circuit denied 
the prayer for a three-judge court claiming that the pro­
cedures in question "were not set forth in any formally
^^Nieves at 1111.
61
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adopted resolution or order and, at most, represented the
63
Authority's informally established procedural policies."
The difference in these two cases is the different 
interpretation of what actually constitutes a policy. The 
court in Nieves felt the three-judge court was a necessity 
because there was a specific statute involved which governed 
procedures in state penal disciplinary proceedings.^^ The 
court in Dorado could make no such reference to statute and 
said the policy was informal and could not be considered a 
policy or regulation in the meaning of the three-judge court 
statute.
In Board of Regents v. New Left Education Project 
the question was statewide application. Such, of course, 
is not the case in Nieves, Dorado or Morales. All of those 
cases involved policy as applied to an entire class of indi­
viduals within the state. Certain university policies were 
in question in the Regents case. The Supreme Court found it 
unnecessary for the case to be heard by a three-judge court 
because the Board of Regents' authority extended to only 
three of the more than fifty state colleges, universities 
and junior colleges.Therefore, any policy established 
by that particular Board did not fulfill the requirement of
63Ibid. at 892.
^^Nieves at 1111, note #3. 
^^Board of Regents, at 543.
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statewide application. Inclusion of this case as precedent 
is curious, if not inapplicable.
Morales; Fifth Circuit
For the sake of clarity, it is pointed out here that 
the fourth stage of the policy pronouncement process was 
concerned with the procedural issue of whether Morales 
should have been heard by a three-judge court. Following 
the handing down of the decision by the district court, the 
state appealed to the Fifth District Circuit Court of 
Appeals. That court overturned the decision on the proce­
dural issue and remanded the case for a new trial to be heard 
by a three-judge court.
The Fifth Circuit said that the central question 
involved was whether the action seeks "to restrain the 
enforcement, operation or execution of a state policy with 
statewide applicability."^^ The court defined a statute as 
"a compendious summary of various enactments, by whatever 
method they may be adopted, to which a State gives her 
sanction.
The court found that there were in fact a number of 
state policies being challenged by plaintiffs' action regard­
less of whether they were written down in any formal manner. 
It listed some of those policies including: treatment and
66
67
535 F. 2d 870.
Ibid.
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placement; allowing, in the absence of procedural safeguards, 
extensive corporal punishment and extended periods of soli­
tary confinement; not providing adequate academic and voca­
tional education; staffing and hiring practices; the build­
ing of juvenile institutions in isolated rural settings and 
not providing treatment programs in the communities; mail 
censorship; segregating the inmates according to sex; and 
allowing institutional superintendents and other personnel
go
wide discretion in developing and implementing programs.
In other words, the Fifth Circuit found that there 
were, in fact, certain policies in operation to which plain­
tiffs had objected. Furthermore, the court said, the fail­
ure to do certain things in itself constitutes a policy.
The court summarized that:
Overall, then despite the fact that many of these 
programs and policies have not been reduced to 
writing or otherwise formalized, it is apparent 
that plaintiffs have launched an exhaustive attack 
on a set of policies and practices which, taken as 
a whole, constitute Texas' statewide program for 
dealing with juvenile delinquents.®^
In the Fifth Circuit's opinion this is precisely
the type of case which "warrants the added deliberation and
procedural protections provided by the three-judge court 
70
statute," because the decision, if implemented,, would be 
thoroughly disruptive of the state's legislative and
68
69
70
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administrative policies. At present the Fifth Circuit's 
decision is on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
At this writing (March 1, 1977), certiorari had neither been 
granted nor denied.
Morales v. Turman (continued)
Following the district court's discussion of the 
Eleventh Amendment and the necessity of a three-judge court, 
it proceeded to specific policy pronouncements.
Right to Counsel and Access to the Courts
The district court had discussed right to counsel 
and access to the courts, including the question of mail 
censorship, rather thoroughly in the emergency interim 
relief order and was not persuaded to modify that decision 
at this stage. It did, however, deliver additional informa­
tion on these questions in order to further clarify the 
situation.
In light of a Supreme Court decision which postdated
the emergency relief order, the court pointed out that there
were two criteria which might justify mail censorship. The
court noted that these criteria were established in the case
72of Procunier v. Martinez. In that case the Supreme Court 
said that mail censorship could be imposed if (1) the
^^Bercu, Steven, personal correspondence, 10/4/76. 
^^414 U.S. 973 (1974).
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regulation furthered "an important or substantial 
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of ex­
pression," and (2) the limitation was "no greater than is
necessary or essential to the protection of the particular
73governmental interest involved."
The court saw, on the basis of Procunier, no reason
to modify its prior decision as no important governmental
interest seemed to be involved. This was proven, the court
felt, by the actual practices that had evolved in the TYC
system since the relief order was granted. First of all,
there was no longer any policy existing which provided for
censorship of outgoing mail. Secondly, the testimony given
at the trial by the superintendents showed that several of
them had discontinued censoring incoming mail with no
unhappy consequences.
The court elaborated on its mandate concerning right
to counsel discussed earlier in this chapter. It explained
74
that; on the basis of Negron v. Wallace, there are certain 
instances where the right could be restricted by the state 
except in the event of a legitimate emergency. Otherwise 
the state may restrict the right to counsel when the juven­
iles have not expressed a desire to consult with an attorney
^^383 F. Supp. 67.
^^436 F. 2d 1139 (2d Circuit 1971).
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or when the attorney had not established his authority to
75speak for a juvenile.
More specifically, the Negron case involved a six­
teen year old girl in New York who was declared "in need of 
supervision" as opposed to delinquent. The "supervision" 
statutes involve status crimes such as truancy and running 
away from home which, if committed by an adult, would not 
be considered criminal acts. There were certain procedures 
required of an attorney who wished to visit an institution­
alized child who had been confined because of such status 
offenses. The requirements included that the attorney 
receive permission to visit the child from one of the judges 
of the Family Court or one of the parents. This was required 
in order to protect a child from unwanted visits from attor­
neys who had no established authority to speak for the child.^^ 
The second requirement was that the attorney make an appoint­
ment in advance. Supposedly the "visiting hours" were from
9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on weekdays, in the absence of an 
77
emergency. This time schedule could be restricted by the 
state except in the event of a legitimate emergency. The 
time schedule and advance notice requirement apparently 
insured the availability of the child when the attorney
75
Morales at 68.
^^Negron at 1144.
^^Ibid. at 1143-1144, note #2.
181
arrived. The third requirement was that an inmate desirous 
of contacting an attorney should do so by mail rather than 
by phone. While the court said that juveniles should be 
given access to the telephone, "under reasonable regula­
tions designed to prevent abuse," the evidence in this case
78did not show that such a privilege had been denied. The 
district court in Morales upheld these requirements as being 
reasonable in ordinary cases.
Damages
The plaintiffs had asked for damages against Assis­
tant Attorney General Green and Executive Director Turman 
based on the alleged denial of right to counsel and access 
to the courts, but the court in Morales denied the claim.
The claim was based on a federal statute, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 
1983. The court said that Green was not liable because he 
acted at all times as a quasi-judicial officer and was 
within the scope of his authority. Turman was also found to
be immune from suit because it was established that he "was
7 9
at all times acting pursuant to the advice of Green. . . . "
Secure Confinement and Transfers
In this decision the Court again dealt with due pro­
cess considerations in relation to solitary or security
^^Ibid. at 1145. 
79
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182
confinement and transfers to Mountain View. Although it had 
placed limitations on these practices in its emergency 
interim relief order, the court felt that further restric­
tions were necessary in order to make certain that there
would be "a constitutionally sufficient check on potential 
80
abuse." In order to determine the meaning of "a constitu­
tionally sufficient check" the court referred to a number of 
judicial decisions.
In general, the court concluded that the placement 
of a juvenile in a secure setting requires procedural due
81process. It referred to the case of Morris v. Travisano, 
which involved a group of Rhode Island prisoners who had 
been segregated from the rest of the prisoners in a special 
unit. Because of such segregation, the prisoners lost a 
variety of privileges and were forced to live under condi­
tions which, it was claimed, constituted a health hazard.
The court in Morris agreed with the necessity in 
some cases of classifying prisoners according to the amount 
of supervision they need. However, such classification pro­
cedures were not found to be without limitation. In this 
particular case, the parties to the suit negotiated a lengthy
^°Ibid. at 83.
®^310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
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and specific set of rules and regulations to govern the 
classification system. These regulations included a number 
of procedural rights such as notice, hearing and review pro­
cedures. However, the judge did not give lengthy treatment 
to the constitutional rights of prisoners. He was content 
to allow the negotiation process to work out the details and
adopt the document as interim decree, retaining jurisdiction 
82
for 18 months.
The court in Morales referred to three additional
cases in determining the necessity of attention to procedural
guarantees in the matter of solitary confinement. These
83cases were Nelson v. Heyne, Inmates of Boys Training
School V .  Affleck, a n d  Loilis v. New York State Department
85
of Social Services. Because Nelson v. Heyne did not spe­
cifically deal with placing children in a secure setting, 
treatment of that case follows later in this chapter.
Lollis V .  New York
The Lollis case dealt directly with the question of 
solitary confinement. Although the facts were somewhat in 
dispute, the court found that solitary confinement at the 
Brookwood Annex, a correctional institution for girls in
^^Ibid. at 857.
®^491 F. 2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
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New York, consisted, at a minimum, of isolation "in a room
stripped of everything but a wooden bunk bed, without a
mattress. . . ."at least during the daytime, "with a
86largely blocked window." Other allegations asserting con­
ditions of solitary confinement at Brookwood were denied by 
the superintendent, but the judge found it unnecessary to 
rule on the disputed facts. He said that isolation of 
children per se was not unconstitutional; however, the 
length of confinement and the circumstances surrounding the 
confinement may raise questions of cruel and unusual punish­
ment. He found that, in this particular case, the Constitu­
tion had been violated. Specifically, he determined that "a 
two-week confinement of a fourteen-year old girl in a 
stripped room in night clothes with no recreational facili­
ties or even reading matter must be held to violate the Con-
87stitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment."
The court granted a preliminary injunction and 
ordered the superintendent to submit, within ten days, stan­
dards for the use of confinement which would bring the prac-
8 8tice in line with the Eighth Amendment. These standards 
were to govern such matters as the maximum duration of
86322 F. Supp. 477.
87Ibid. at 482.
88
Ibid. at 483.
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confinement, "the place of confinement, conditions of
89
confinement, and reports as to confinement."
Inmates v. Affleck
Inmates v. Affleck was a wide-ranging case dealing 
with confinement of juveniles in Indiana in general and, 
only incidentally, with the question of solitary confine­
ment. However, there was one instance where the practice 
received attention. It involved two particular cells in one 
unit called "bugout" rooms that were used for solitary con­
finement. These cells were stripped. They contained only 
a mattress on the floor, a toilet and they were, at times,
devoid of artificial lighting. In one of the cells the
90
window was boarded over rendering no light whatsoever.
Counsel for the plaintiffs requested the court to
grant an injunction forbidding isolation of a juvenile for
more than two hours in the absence of a psychiatrist's
written certification to both the court and plaintiff's
counsel. It was further requested that the injunction
include a prohibition against isolating a juvenile for any
91reason for more than twenty-four hours a week.
Although the court expressed the belief that " . . .  
solitary confinement may be psychologically damaging.
P Q
328 F. Supp. 1116.
90
Inmates v. Affleck at 1359.
^^Ibid. at 1372.
186
amtirehabilitative, and at times inhumane . . ."it granted 
92
no relief. The court said there was insufficient evidence
to determine what constitutes solitary confinement and under
what conditions it is destructive; therefore^,it found itself
unable to frame an equitable order. It urged, however, that
defendants try "to find individualized methods of treatment
93for problem boys."
Morales Standards
The Morales decision is highly creative in terms of 
precedent. The cases referred to did, in some instances, 
deal with the question of solitary or secure confinement 
within the institutional setting. However, the major areas 
of concern were the length of time an individual may be con­
fined and the conditions surrounding his confinement. Where 
the courts issued orders of any kind, they referred to parties 
other than the court for making the particular decisions and 
establishing standards.
In Morales, the court concentrated on the procedures 
by which a juvenile may be placed in solitary rather than 
the conditions while there. Specific procedural duties were 
imposed upon TYC personnel in order to assure that the juve^- • 
nile's procedural guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment 
would be fulfilled. The district court announced that
^^ Ibid.
®^ Ibid.
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certain procedures must be invoked after five consecutive 
days in solitary confinement or ten consecutive days in 
security confinement beyond those already imposed in the 
emergency relief order. It said that due process requires 
that a juvenile be given a hearing before an impartial tri­
bunal. The judge did not designate the parties who were to 
make up this tribunal, leaving the matter to be decided by 
plaintiffs and defendants in their post-decision negotia­
tions. (These negotiations will be described in more detail 
later in this chapter.) The court declared that the juvenile 
has a right to have his caseworker, or any other advocate of 
his choice present, and the right to call witnesses on his 
own behalf and cross-examine those witnesses who give evi­
dence against him. The court required that the tribunal pre­
pare a written record within forty-eight hours of the hear­
ing and file it with the Executive Director of the TYC. The 
Executive Director must in turn prepare and distribute the 
written record with the court and all counsel involved in
the case. The court said this practice would continue until
94It was otherwise announced.
The Morales decision did more than elaborate on the 
relief order in connection with transfer to Mountain View; 
it actually changed its mind. In the relief order, it 
announced that, prior to such a transfer, it must be
^^383 F. Supp. 84.
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determined that the juvenile had committed an act that
would amount to a serious offense if committed by an adult.
In Morales, it was decided that the requirements should be
more stringent. One such offense, the court said, did not
justify transfer to a maximum security institution. The new
standard was to be that the juvenile must be determined
"exceptionally dangerous." Furthermore, that decision was
to be made by a council of "well-qualified psychiatrists and
95psychologists," not ordinary laymen. The court implied at 
this point in the decision that the psychiatrists and psy­
chologists employed by the TYC at the time of the trial were 
not "well-qualified." It pointed out that none of the psy­
chiatrists were Diplomats of the American Board of Psychiatry
and Neurology and none of the psychologists were members of
96the American Psychological Association.
For a finding of "exceptional dangerousness" and a
consequent authorization for transfer, the board or council
was ordered to make use of psychological testing, the juve-•
97
nile's history and psychiatric diagnosis. Procedurally, 
prior to transfer, the juvenile is entitled to three pro­
cedural guarantees: a hearing at which he may be present
and represented; to ask questions and make comments; and a
^^Ibid. at 84.
^^Ibid., note #17.
^^Ibid. at 84-5.
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98copy of a written statement justifying the decision. In
the case of juveniles entering TYC custody, the court said
if it were suspected that he is exceptionally dangerous, the
officials could place him in the maximum security facility
for a period not to exceed seven days before making a final
99placement decision.
Right to Treatment
The district court declared that juveniles committed 
to institutions in Texas on the basis of delinquency have a 
statutory and constitutional right to treatment. The statu­
tory right is to be fourid in the Texas Revised Civil Stat­
utes Ann. Art. 5143d, et seq. The defendants agreed to this 
decision in their Post-Trial Brief and Memorandum of Law.^^^
Dr. Morton Birnbaum
The most frequently acknowledged statement on the 
concept known as "right to treatment" was given in 1960 by 
Dr. Morton Birnbaum of New York. Birnbaum's article argued 
specifically for the development of a constitutional right 
to treatment for patients involuntarily committed to mental 
institutions. The article, published in the American Bar 
Association Journal, concentrated on the compelling social
^^Ibid. at 85.
9*lbid.
^°°Ibid. at 66-7.
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and humanitarian reasons for the development of such a right 
rather than an extensive investigation of the Due Process 
Clause.
The article points out that, for the most part, 
patients in public mental institutions receive inadequate 
medical treatment and that the trend is likely to continue." 
The condition is enforced by the state because of two prac­
tices. One is that the state compels "the institutionaliza­
tion of those persons whom it considers to be sufficiently 
mentally ill to require institutionalization for care and
101
treatment."102 The second reason is that the state does not
then appropriate adequate funds for providing therapeutic 
t r e a t m e n t . I n  other words, the state forces certain 
people to live in institutions which have been provided only 
the amount of funds adequate to provide custodial care 
rather than therapeutic treatment.
Dr. Birnbaum complained that the legal problem is 
one of focus. Lawyers for the mentally ill focus primarily 
on preinstitutionalization questions. The first focus is 
on protecting the right of the individual not to be insti­
tutionalized unless he is proven, according to the standards 
of due process, to be "sufficiently mentally ill to require
^Morton Birnbaum, M.D., "The Right to Treatment," 
46 American Bar Association Journal (May 1960): 499.
102
103
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institutionalization."^^^ The second focus of the legal 
profession is the concern that, once proven mentally ill, 
the individual be treated as a sick person rather than as a 
criminal. In other words, the mentally ill have a right to 
be segregated from criminals in mental institutions rather 
than placed in prisons.
Of course these two concentrations constitute reforms 
compared to historical treatment of the mentally ill. The 
problem, according to Dr. Birnbaum, is that the law needs 
to be reformed further. Once the individual is assured, by 
due process standards, protection from illegal involuntary 
commitment due to mental illness and guaranteed the right 
to be institutionalized in a mental hospital, he then needs 
assurance that he will receive proper medical treatment in 
order to guarantee his return to society as quickly as pos­
s i b l e . I t  becomes then a matter of liberty in the very 
basic physical sense of the word. A person who does not 
receive treatment must ordinarily remain in an institution 
and, therefore, is deprived of his liberty.
Birnbaum said that the right to treatment, if judi­
cially recognized, would mean an addition to the substantive 
connotation of due process of law. The included concepts
^°^Ibid. at 502.
^°^Ibid.
^°®Ibid. at 502-503.
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recommended were: (1) that a person committed to an
institution because of mental illness has a right to expect 
proper medical treatment; (2) that he is not considered a 
criminal; (3) that an institution not providing treatment is 
a mental prison rather than a hospital; and (4) "that sub­
stantive due process of law does not allow a mentally ill 
person who has committed no crime to be deprived of his lib­
erty by indefinitely institutionalizing him. . . .
He maintained that if the development of adequate 
treatment for the mentally ill was to become a reality, the 
necessary ingredient was judicial action. He said that 
courts must be willing to grant the unconditional release 
of a person being held against his will under the guise of 
treatment if he is, in fact, not receiving any treatment.
In his view, the only power this would subtract from the 
state would be "the absolute discretion to decide the stan­
dard of medical care for the inmates of public mental insti­
tutions.
The article acknowledged at the conclusion that 
there would be problems involved with the establishment of 
such a right and recommended solutions to the dilemma. Since, 
in the Morales case, all of the problems were present at 
some time, they are worth listing.
at 503.
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To begin with, Birnbaum acknowledged that courts 
would have to allow a reasonable length of time before 
enforcement of the right could become a reality. This situ­
ation is not new. Courts have been faced with this problem
before and have managed to deal with it, such as in the case
109
of school desegregation. Secondly, the establishment of 
such a right would surely increase litigation and create a 
burden on the courts. Birnbaum suggested simply that addi­
tional court personnel be h i r e d . T h e  third problem, and 
the one most often raised by those who object to a constitu­
tionally guaranteed right to treatment, is lack of judicial 
expertise in developing standards. Birnbaum suggested that 
the courts could consult the experts in whatever field the 
case arose.
Perhaps the most insoluble practical problem men­
tioned was the difficulty of hiring the additional personnel 
needed to work in the institutions in order to provide the 
patients with a qualified staff and allow for individually- 
based treatment. Here Birnbaum suggested there might be a 
serious problem but it could be greatly alleviated, if not
overcome, by the hiring of support personnel when more highly
112trained people are not available. Finally, of course,
109
110 
111
Ibid. at 504. 
Ibid.
112
Ibid.
Ibid. at 504-505.
194
there is the problem of how to finance the treatment 
programs mandated by the courts. Birnbaum suggested federal 
aid should allow adequate funding.
The problem of treatment for the mentally ill, Birn­
baum summarized, is legal, not medical, and it calls for a 
legal solution. His answer was the establishment, through 
the judiciary, of a constitutional right to treatment to be 
enforced by the courts.
Morales relies on a series of cases for explanation 
and establishment of a constitutional right to treatment for 
incarcerated juvenile delinquents. Cases involving the men­
tally ill, as well as delinquents, were mentioned. Gener­
ally speaking, the right to treatment has been judicially 
acknowledged in a variety of settings. The meaning of the 
doctrine, as explained by Judge Justice, is, however, crea­
tive in terms of specificity and established standards. In 
order to ascertain what, in Morales, is unique, it is first 
necessary to review the major cases cited as precedent.
Donaldson v. O'Connor
Judge Justice relied heavily on the case of Donaldson 
O ' C o n n o r for justification of the concept of a consti­
tutional right to treatment. Kenneth Donaldson was a mental 
patient in the Florida State Hospital for fourteen and a
113
114
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half years. Although there are distinctions to be made 
between persons confined for medical reasons and those con­
fined because of a finding of delinquency, it is not neces­
sary to point out those distinctions here. The point is 
that the first discussions to take place involving right to 
treatment were related to mental patients, and it was not 
until later that delinquents became a subject of the doc­
trine's concern.
While confined, Donaldson's "treatment" consisted of
religious and recreational therapy. This apparently amounted
to no more than attendance at church and the opportunity to
engage in some recreation. These are privileges he would
ordinarily have been allowed in a prison. He was denied
cuiy other form of therapy, for the most part, while confined.
The denial of medication and electroshock treatments was by
his own request because those forms of therapy violated his
115
religious beliefs as a Christian Scientist. But, he was 
also denied grounds privileges, occupational therapy and ses­
sions with a psychiatrist. All of these were deemed advis­
able and necessary by expert witnesses. The reasons given 
for denial of these forms of therapy varied from being incom­
prehensible to absolutely u n f o u n d e d . T h e  fact of the 
matter was that Donaldson "received only the kind of
^^^Ibid. at 511.
^^®Ibid. at 513-514.
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subsistence level custodial care he would have received in 
a prison, and perhaps less psychiatric treatment than a 
criminally committed inmate would have received.
Although there were other questions involved in the 
case, the central question was whether a civilly committed 
mental patient has a constitutional right to treatment. The 
Fifth Circuit recognized that such a right had never before 
been recognized by any federal appellate court. It pointed 
out, however, that three district courts had held that there 
is such a right. The court held that "a person involuntar­
ily civilly committed to a state mental hospital has a con­
stitutional right to receive such individual treatment as
will give him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to
118
improve his mental condition."
The Donaldson case announced a two part theory under­
lying the right to treatment doctrine which is a due process 
guarantee under the Fourteenth Amendment. The first part of 
this theory mandates that the government justify its actions 
in terms of some allowable goal when it seeks to enforce 
any "non-trivial" denial of liberty. "The governmental goals 
or interests typically advanced are danger to self, danger
to others, and the need for treatment, care, custody, or 
119supervision." According to previously mentioned
117
118
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197
statutory law, the State of Texas attempts to justify
institutionalizing of juveniles by declaring its purpose to
be rehabilitation and reestablishment of the juvenile in
society. This practice is, of course, based in the ration^
ale of the parens patriae doctrine, already discussed in the
second chapter of this paper. The first part, of the two
part theory, postulates that if rehabilitative treatment is
not offered, the act of commitment becomes an arbitrary
abridgement of individual liberty and, consequently, "an
arbitrary exercise of governmental power proscribed by the
120due process clause."
The second part of the due process right to treat­
ment theory is that the government must offer a quid pro quo 
or something in return when it involuntarily confines an 
individual without the usual due process protections of the 
criminal process. According to the district court in 
Morales, there are three basic limitations on the govern­
ment's ability to deny an individual his freedom. These 
are that a specific offense be the reason for detention, 
that the detention be for a specific amount of time, and 
that, prior to detention, the individual has the benefit of
"a proceeding where fundamental procedural safeguards are 
121
observed." When these criteria are not met, then the
^Donaldson at 521.
121
Morales at 71.
198
government must provide a quid pro quo in order to justify
122confinement. The quid pro quo for detention of juveniles
in Texas is the promise of rehabilitative treatment.
The Fifth Circuit in Donaldson explained the quid
pro quo theory on the basis of five groups of cases. The
relevant cases fall into procedural categories. The earliest
group of cases involved persons confined in regular penal
institutions who had not been convicted of crimes against
123
society. These included mental patients. As explained 
earlier in this chapter by Dr. Birnbaum, such is no longer 
the case. It is now considered a due process violation to 
confine an individual, who has committed no crime, in a 
penal institution. The court, in Donaldson, referred sec­
ondly to a group of cases where it was held not only that the 
mentally ill be held in places other than prisons but also
that "they must be held in places where the conditions are
124actually therapeutic. (emphasis in original)
The third approach was to challenge the constitution­
ality of state statutes which legalize the incarceration of 
nonconvicted criminals, such as delinquents, in order to 
provide rehabilitative care and protect society. In general, 
the courts have upheld these statutes but have at the same
122
123
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time reminded the states that "the constitutionality of
the statute is conditioned upon the realization of the statu-
125
tory promise of rehabilitative treatment."
The fourth approach or group of cases dealt with 
challenges to confinement upon the grounds that treatment 
was being denied. Although the courts did not pronounce in 
any of these cases that there is a constitutional right to 
treatment, they did not say that there is no such right. In 
all of these instances, the courts did agree that the plain­
tiff has a right to a hearing in order to determine whether
126or not he is receiving proper treatment.
According to Donaldson, the fifth group of cases 
amounts to the final approach to date in the development of 
the right to treatment doctrine. These cases have come from 
all court levels and involve the major forms of nonpenal 
commitment. Taken together, there is nearly unanimous agree­
ment that commitment to an institution must be accompanied 
by a governmental quid pro quo when the confinement circum­
stances include inattention to the "conventional limitations
127
of the criminal process."
In summary, Donaldson answered the claim that a con­
stitutional right to treatment should not be recognized 
because of the limited ability of the judiciary to set
^^^Ibid.
^^^Ibid. at 523-524.
^^^Ibid. at 524.
200
standards for such a right. Although the Fifth Circuit
did not attempt to establish standards, it disagreed that
such an attempt was beyond the competence of the judiciary.
In the first place, the court said, many judgments on this
matter will not require courts to deal with the question of
standards of adequate treatment. On the other hand, if such
is a requirement, the task is not beyond them. The court
mentioned two practical means of devising such standards;
making use of the advice and counsel of the parties involved
in the case, when they are able to agree, and the summoning
128of expert witnesses.
Rouse V .  Cameron
The major cases preceding Donaldson which established 
the idea of a right to treatment were concerned, as previous­
ly mentioned, with the mentally ill. The landmark case was
129Rouse V .  Cameron. This case involved a man who had been 
found not guilty, by reason of insanity, of carrying a dan­
gerous weapon, a misdemeanor. Rouse asked a federal district 
court to free him on a writ of habeas corpus, but the court 
refused because it was not convinced that recovery had been 
achieved. The judge rejected consideration of Rouse's con­
tention that he was not receiving adequate treatment by
^^^Ibid. at 526.
129
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commenting that he did not think he had "a right to consider 
whether" Rouse was receiving adequate treatment.
Rouse appealed his case to the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals. That court decided that the main 
issue involved was whether the plaintiff had a right to 
treatment. The Circuit Court remanded the case for recon­
sideration. It ordered the district court to determine whe­
ther, in fact. Rouse was receiving treatment. The court 
said, if not, his rights had been violated. The court found 
the basis for a right to treatment in statutory law rather 
than the Constitution. The law recognized was the 1964 
Hospitalization of the Mentally 111 Act. The court said 
Congress passed the act out of concern for the number of con­
stitutional problems that had been raised by noncriminal
131
inmates of institutions which provide only custodial care.
Although the Rouse case based its claim for a right
to treatment on statutory law, the decision suggested that
the right may also be found in the Constitution. In quoting
Sam Ervin who sponsored the Hospitalization Act in the Senate,
the court said, "Several experts advanced the opinion that to
deprive a person of liberty on the basis that he is in need
of treatment, without supplying the needed treatment, is
132tantamount to a denial of due process."
^^°Ibid. at 452.
^^^Ibid. at 453.
^^^Ibid. at 455.
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Although Rouse did not explain in detail the 
conditions which comply with right to treatment, Judge 
Bazelon did attempt to establish some standards for cases 
such as this one. He said, in the first place, the institu­
tions do not have to be able to guarantee success in their 
treatment, only that they are making a good faith effort to 
treat their patients. Secondly, the decision as to whether 
or not treatment is adequate should be determined on the 
basis of current knowledge. A third standard was that lack 
of staff and facilities should not be allowed as an excuse 
for lack of adequate treatment. Finally, Bazelon said that 
courts must continue to render judgments in these cases even
though there is no final scientific answer as to the consti-
133tution of effective therapy.
In the Donaldson opinion, the court mentioned cases 
in connection with the "fifth approach" that dealt specifi­
cally with juveniles and the right to treatment. These 
included In re Gault, Inmates v. Affleck, Martarella v. 
Kelley, Nelson v. Heyne and Morales v. Turman (interim 
emergency relief order).
In re Gault
Although the Supreme Court has never specifically 
dealt with the question of a constitutional right to treat­
ment for juveniles, the district court, in Morales, claimed
133
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972), quoting from Rouse at p. 601.
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that the Supreme Court spoke on the matter in the case of 
In re Gault. Judge Justice referred to a portion of that 
case where the Court recognized that other courts had claimed 
that juvenile custody is invalid in the absence of appro­
priate treatment and, as a consequence, "a juvenile may chal­
lenge the validity of his custody on the ground that he is
134
not in fact receiving any special treatment." The dis­
trict court implied that the Supreme Court had, in fact, 
dealt with the second part of the due process right to treat­
ment theory in Gault. The case, of course, did not estab­
lish a constitutional right to treatment. The basis of that 
case, in fact, did not concern itself with the treatment 
Gault received while incarcerated but rather the conditions 
and procedures surrounding his commitment to a juvenile 
institution.
Inmates v. Affleck
Taking the remaining cases in chronological order, 
the first was Inmates v. Affleck. The case was briefly men­
tioned earlier in this chapter with reference to solitary 
c o n f i n e m e n t . T h e  right to treatment statement in this 
case is explained somewhat differently than it was in 
Morales or Donaldson. In this case the United States Dis­
trict Court for the District of Rhode Island concentrated
134
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on the difference in purpose of incarceration rather than 
the theoretical justification for commitment. The court 
pointed out that society incarcerates adult prisoners for 
goals which include punishment, deterrence and retribution; 
while the stated purpose behind the institutionalization of 
juveniles is rehabilitation. Because the goals differ, the 
procedures differ and the adjudicative stage is understood 
differently in terms of due process. Thus, the court said, 
"due process in the juvenile justice system requires that 
the post-adjudicative stage of institutionalization further 
this goal of rehabilitation.
The court in Inmates drew an interesting distinction
between children incarcerated for conviction of criminal law
violations and those institutionalized for other reasons,
such as truancy or incorrigibility. The decision implied
that a lesser standard may be applied to the first category
of juveniles. The court said, "whatever deviations, if any,
from this goal of rehabilitation which might be tolerated as
to those incarcerated juveniles convicted of violations of
the criminal laws, such deviations are far less tolerable
for the other classes of children incarcerated by the 
137
state." There was no real attempt to delineate standards 
of treatment in this case.
^Inmates v. Affleck at 1364.
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Marta r e l l a v ^ K
Martarella v. Kelley was a case that dealt with 
"persons in need of supervision." These are children who 
are institutionalized but have not committed any criminal 
acts. Martarella and others claimed that their constitu­
tional rights were violated because they were placed in max-
138
imum security facilities operated by the City of New York.
Although this case did not specifically deal with 
delinquent children, as Morales does, its thrust was the 
same. The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York said that adequate treatment was the 
sine qua non for incarceration of juveniles. Without ade­
quate treatment, the state is in violation of the juvenile's
139
due process and cruel and unusual punishment rights.
Although the court did not distinguish between delin­
quent and nondelinquent children in terms of the right to 
treatment, it did distinguish between those temporeurily 
detained and those held for longer periods of time. In try­
ing to explain right to treatment standards, the court 
observed the difficulty of such a task. It pointed out that 
expert opinion on the subject was often in sharp contrast 
and that the economic problems involved in providing adequate 
treatment programs were enormous. However, the Court said.
1 IB
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"These limitations may be constitutionally acceptable for 
those who are in fact temporarily detained but not for those 
who are actually held for long p e r i o d s . T h e  judge did 
not grant relief to the class of children who brought this 
case before the court. He found that it is constitutionally 
permissible to confine persons in need of supervision along 
with those adjudged delinquent. The irony of the case is 
that relief asked for by the persons in need of supervision 
as a class was generally denied to them but granted to the 
long-term detainees.
The court discussed at length the constitutional 
right to treatment and agreed that the concept is legitimate. 
In fact, although the Supreme Court has never considered the 
issue in any direct manner, the district court implied such 
by saying, "There can be no doubt that the right to treat­
ment, generally, for those held in noncriminal custody . . .
has by now been recognized by the Supreme Court, the lower
141
federal courts and the courts of New York."
As to the meaning of right to treatment and the man­
datory standards involved, the court set standards of a very 
general nature and ordered a conference of the parties 
involved in order to determine what specific changes were to 
be made. In speaking of standards, the judge referred to
^^°Ibid.
^^^Ibid. at 599.
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142the Rouse case, discussed earlier, and applied the same
143
general standards to this case. Martarella provided 
additional standards, however, with respect to the quality 
of treatment. The decision emphasized the "tone" of insti­
tutions and explained that treatment can begin as soon as 
the child feels that the staff members who deal with him 
are concerned. In order to establish this "tone," the court 
set two standards to be met with regard to the staff. These 
were; (1) adequate numbers in order to provide individual­
ized treatment and (2) that the staff be properly trained,
knowledgeable about adolescent behavior, and have good rela-
144
tions with the children. Other than these two general 
attempts to set standards for right to treatment, the court 
was moot on the subject; even though there was a wide range 
of issues noted in the decision. For example, the court dis­
cussed psychiatric services, physical facilities, and recre­
ational activities. Still it cannot be determined by this 
case that standards were mandated beyond what has already 
been mentioned.
Nelsonv^He^e
Nelson V .  Heyne was concerned with a medium security 
facility for boys in Indiana. The Seventh Circuit Court of
142
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Appeals agreed in this case that juveniles have a
constitutional right to treatment. The court found the
beginnings of the development of the right in the social
reform movements of the nineteenth century and claimed it
145
had been nurtured and developed continuously since then.
The Seventh Circuit recognized explicitly that the 
Supreme Court had "never definitively decided that a youth 
confined under the jurisdiction of a juvenile court has a 
constitutionally guaranteed right to t r e a t m e n t . H o w e v e r ,  
it pointed to In re Gault and Kent v. United States as pre­
cedent. Although these cases concerned procedural due pro­
cess matters rather than rehabilitative treatment, the 
Nelson decision claims they constitute precedent through 
their discussions of the theory and practice of juvenile 
courts and their emphasis on the fact that juveniles must be 
provided with fair treatment.
The Nelson decision relies on Martarella and the 
Morales emergency relief order specifically. It does not 
pronounce right to treatment standards in any discernable 
manner. However, there are two recognizable conditions set 
down in this case. The first is that treatment "includes 
the right to, at a minimum, acceptable standards of care and
145
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148
treatment for juveniles . . . "  This is the point made
repeatedly in Morales. Secondly, the Nelson court said that
149juveniles have a right to individualized treatment.
Morales Standards
Morales set standards of right to treatment that are 
without precedent. They are intentionally specific and far- 
reaching. It should not be assumed that the statement is 
entirely without precedent even though the previous cases 
dealing with right to treatment for juveniles set standards 
of only a general nature.
Wyatt V .  Stickney
The important precedent for the manner in which 
Judge Justice proceeded is to be found in Wyatt v. Stickney.  ^
This case dealt with the rights of those institutionalized 
because of mental retardation. The district court said 
that mental retardates, who have been committed to institu­
tions because of their status condition, are possessed of 
"an inviolable constitutional right to habilitation.
The court used the devices of party negotiation and 
expert witness testimony to arrive at a comprehensive set of
^^^Ibid. at 360.
^^^Ibid.
^^°344 F. Supp. 387 (1972) 
^^^Ibid. at 390.
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standards. It allowed the parties involved six months to
submit plans for the implementation of these standards. The
forty-nine standards are unusually specific and cover all
phases of institutional life. To point out the specificity,
an example of one standard is shown here:
37. a. Each resident shall be assisted in learning 
normal grooming practices with individual toilet 
articles, including soap and toothbrush, that are 
available to each resident.
b. Teeth shall be brushed daily with an 
effective dentrifice. Individual brushes shall be 
properly marked, used, and stored.
c. Each resident shall have a shower or tub 
bath, at least daily, unless medically contraindi­
cated.
d. Residents shall be regularly scheduled 
for hair cutting and styling, in an individualized 
manner, by trained personnel.
e. For residents who require such assis­
tance, cutting of toe nails and fingernails shall 
be scheduled at regular i n t e r v a l s . 152
Since the subjects of Wyatt and Morales are not the 
same, the mandated standards are necessarily different. How­
ever, Morales followed the same basic procedures that were 
developed in Wyatt, for establishing right to treatment stan­
dards for involuntarily committed persons who have not been 
convicted of a violation of the criminal laws.
Assessment and Placement
The court said that adequate provisions for assess­
ment and placement are a mandate of the right to treatment.
152
Ibid. at 404.
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The inadequacies of these procedures were discussed 
thoroughly in chapter three. In describing the standards 
regarding assessment and placement, the judge set specific 
procedures to be f o l l o w e d . I n  the first place, he said 
that all juveniles are entitled to an individual assessment 
after commitment to the TYC by a juvenile court. Individual 
treatment plans are to be based on that assessment. The 
plans should include, among other things, "a family history, 
a developmental history, a physical examination, psychologi­
cal testing, a psychiatric interview, community evaluation,
154and a language and education analysis evaluation." The 
language and education analysis is to be based on the 
Weschler individualized intelligence quotient test. In the 
case of racial minorities, the Leiter and Weschler tests 
are to be used because they are "standardized for Blacks 
and Mexican Americans and are calculated to better alleviate 
the discrimination factor . . .
The court required approximately fifteen hours of 
psychological testing for each child and limited the number 
of children a psychologist could test to three per week.
This testing was to be done by, at the very least, a psy­
chologist with a Master's degree and trained in proper test­
ing procedures. All psychologists are to be under the
^^^Morales at 88.
^^^Ibid.
^^^Ibid.
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supervision of a Doctoral-level psychologist. The 
psychiatric interview, however, must be conducted by a qual­
ified p s y c h i a t r i s t . A n y  members of the social work staff 
involved in the assessment process must have at least a 
Master's degree in a field related to social welfare. These 
individuals' caseloads must not exceed fifteen cases per 
week.^^^ Finally, in order to evaluate a child's potential
responsiveness to guidance and counseling, the court said,
158
caseworkers and juveniles must be in daily contact.
Academic Education
With regard to academic educational standards, the
court declared that the juvenile's right to treatment
requires several specific elements. Included in these are
the use of the Weschler IQ Test, rather than the Lorge-
Thorndike IQ Test or the Gray-Votow-Rogers Achievement Test,
and "special emphasis on tests which are appropriate for the
159
student's background."
In order to detect mental retardation and provide 
appropriate academic education for such children, the court 
ordered the TYC to provide proper testing; include personnel 
on the staff who are familiar with the juvenile's background.
^^ I^bid.
^^ I^bid.
^^^Ibid.
^^^Ibid. at 89-90.
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culture and language; and obtain information on family 
background, emotional status, and the student's behavior. 
Special education teachers who are certified by the state 
must be hired for the mentally and/or emotionally handi­
capped. These teachers are to be provided with in-service 
training by an outside consultant at least once a week.
They are to have a student load of no more than eight, and 
supporting personnel are to be hired. "Supporting personnel" 
was defined by the court to include one educational "diagnos­
tician for every 150-200 children and a language pathologist 
or speech therapist
Bilingual Education
Finally, the court found that right to treatment 
requires the establishment of a bilingual education program 
as announced in United States v. Texas. T h i s  case was, 
in general, similar to Morales in two respects. One is that 
the same judge decided the case. The other is that it sets 
specific standards to be met by the State of Texas. Initi­
ally, it required desegregation of school facilities. The 
case further required that bilingual educational programs be 
developed in order to help Spanish speaking students and 
recognize their culture in order to promote their own self­
esteem. The court said bilingual education is a necessity
^®°Ibid. at 90.
^®^342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd 466 F.
2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972).
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for achievement of the goal "of true integration as opposed
.162
to mere desegregation .
The court announced a comprehensive set of practices 
to be implemented in the Texas schools which would achieve 
the overall purposes of curriculum development; which 
reflects "the learning styles, background and behavior of 
all segments of the student community"; which incorporates, 
recognizes and values "the cultural environment and language 
background of all of its children so that the development of 
positive self-concepts in all children of the district can 
proceed apace . . and which implements language programs 
that develop language skills in both a primary and secondary 
language "so that neither English nor Spanish is presented 
as a more valued language . . .
The standards were an attempt to eliminate some of 
the problems Texas schools face with Mexican American stu­
dents. Perhaps the main problem is the Mexican Americans 
view the school system as having no relevance for them.
Judge Justice obviously agreed with the mandate that "Social 
justice can no longer tolerate treatment of the Chicano 
people as strangers in their own land. In Morales, the 
court was simply saying what cannot be tolerated in the
^^^Ibid. at 28.
^^^Ibid. at 30.
Jorge C. Rangel and Carlos M. Alcala, "Project 
Report: De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in Texas Schools,"
7 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review (1972): 
391.
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public schools for nondelinquent children cannot be 
tolerated in the public institutions for delinquent chil-. • 
dren.
Vocational Education
The right to treatment doctrine required certain 
minimal professional standards with regard to the vocational 
education program discussed in Chapter Three. The court 
said that an "employability plan" should be created for each 
student. There should be emphasis placed on assuring that a 
juvenile can be eventually placed with a prospective employ­
er. Work release programs must exist to provide on-the-job 
training. Training in academic areas such as remedial read­
ing and mathematics skills must be provided. The work 
experience programs, which are essentially concerned with 
institutional maintenance, must be limited to assure that 
they do not dominate the daily activities of the students.
Institutional Life: The Least
Restrictive Alternative
The court made a variety of pronouncements concerning 
the milieu in which the juveniles under TYC jurisdiction 
exist. Although the mandates were justified as being essen­
tial to a minimally adequate "professional treatment plan" 
(emphasis supplied), they were also found to be necessary
^Morales at 92.
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in order to meet the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine
as announced in Covington v. Harris^^^ and Lake v.
167
Cameron.
Throughout the decision, Judge Justice referred to 
the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine as being an 
inseparable condition of right to treatment. He believes 
that juveniles have a right to liberty and that, if the 
state takes that liberty from them, it must do so in the 
least amount possible. Otherwise, their right to adequate 
treatment has been denied. The least restrictive alterna­
tive theory is important to Morales in the areas of solitary 
confinement, general living conditions in the institutions, 
and the order to abandon Mountain View and Gatesville. It 
is also the major consideration in the court's condemnation 
of the Texas policy which incarcerated nearly all of its 
juveniles who had been adjudged delinquent.
Sheldon v. Tucker
The earliest case cited in Morales with respect to
168
the doctrine is Shelton v. Tucker. That case probably 
contains the most familiar statement of the least restric­
tive alternative doctrine, but the doctrine had been used 
previously in relation to the commerce clause, economic
IG6419 F. 2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
^®^364 F. 2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
1^*364 U.S. 479 (1966).
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regulation. First Amendment rights, the right to vote, the 
right to travel and the right to procreate.
The Sheldon case arose because of an Arkansas stat­
ute that required teachers to file an annual list of all 
organizations they had belonged to or contributed to in the 
past five years. The filing of this list was a condition 
of employment in the Arkansas schools. The Supreme Court 
found the law to be unconstitutional because it abridged the 
First Amendment right of associational freedom as applied to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court 
agreed that the state has the responsibility, as well as 
the right, to inquire into the matter of a teacher's fitness 
and competence to educate its children. However, the manner 
in which the state acted in this case was found to be overly 
broad. Even though the purpose was legitimate, the Court 
said, "that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly 
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be 
more narrowly achieved.
Lake v. Cameron
The doctrine was first applied to the civil commit­
ment process in Lake v. Cameron. The District of Columbia 
Circuit Court remanded the case to the district court
"Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of
the Mentally 111," 87 Harvard Law Review (1974): 1246,
notes #235-241.
l^^Shelton at 488.
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ordering it to explore the possibility of finding a less
171
restrictive facility for the patient. Lake, the appel­
lant, was being confined in a hospital for the insane, but
the pertinent characteristics in her case were mainly based
172
on age or senility, not insanity. The circuit court 
ordered the district court to attempt to find a less re­
strictive environment for her. The court made this deci­
sion on the basis of a statute which was applicable only to
the District of Columbia. However, in a later case, Coving- 
173ton V .  Harris, the same court said that failure to con­
sider less restrictive alternatives before civilly commiting 
a person was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights.
Lessard v. Schmidt
Going a step further was a case especially pertinent
to Morales. The case was Lessard v. Schmidt,
174 which
stated that the state could not constitutionally commit an 
individual to full-time hospitalization until it had first 
established that other less restrictive alternatives were 
unsuitable. Virtually all of the cases mentioned in this 
study which deal with the incarcerated juvenile's right to
171
172
Lake at 662. 
Ibid. at 657.
173
174
419 F. 2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Mis. 1972), vacated and
remanded on other grounds 94 S.Ct. 713 (1974).
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treatment mention the least restrictive alternative doctrine 
as a standard in interpreting right to treatment.
The court, in Morales, discussed institutional liv­
ing conditions in terms of basic rights and ordered the par­
ties involved to discuss and agree upon the proper means for 
assuring that these rights are upheld in whatever environ­
ment a child, under TYC jurisdiction, must exist.
In terms of the TYC personnel who are responsible 
for the individual child, primarily the caseworkers, the 
court said that their numbers must be adequate and they must 
have experience and training in coping with the unique prob­
lems of juveniles. The court also announced that meal pre­
paration should be supervised by a licensed dietician to 
assure that the food is "adequate, we11-prepared, and well- 
served . . .
The decision concentrated on the concept of personal 
freedom. It discussed security, dignity and, especially, 
privacy. It referred to the need for adequate recreational 
opportunities and exercise. The children, according to Judge 
Justice, must be allowed to exercise personal freedom in such 
matters as hair style and the choice of friends and, further­
more, they have a right to at least frequent contact with the 
opposite sex, if not a coeducational living environment.
175
Morales at 100.
176
Ibid.
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Also they must be afforded free communication by mail and 
telephone with persons not in the institution. Finally, the 
decision announced that children have a right to free expres­
sion even if the emotions expressed are anger and hostility, 
as long as such expression is not "harmful or destruc­
tive.
Medical and Psychiatric Care
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the evi­
dence showed that the medical and psychiatric care afforded 
juveniles under TYC jurisdiction was inadequate. The court 
found two violations of the right to treatment philosophy in 
this respect. They are the right to adequate treatment and 
the right not to be treated indiscriminately, but individ­
ually. The basis given for these proclaimed rights consisted 
of several federal court cases, all mentioned before in this 
dissertation. These were Donaldson v. O'Connor, Nelson v. 
Heyne, Rouse v. Cameron, Wyatt v. Stickney.
In Nelson v. Heyne, for example, the evidence showed 
occasional abuse of drugs such as Thorazine and Sparine.
These tranquilizers were administered in intramuscular doses
as part of no "ongoing psychotherapeutic program, but for
178the purpose of controlling excited behavior." These 
injections were not prescribed by a doctor's orders. The
177
''ibid. at 100-101.
17ft
Nelson at 356.
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doctors merely left standing orders for dosages based on a 
boy's weight, and the decision of whether to administer the 
drug was left to the nurses or the custodial staff. The 
boys were never checked, either before or after the injec­
tions, "by medically competent staff members to determine
179their tolerances." The Nelson court found this practice 
to be in violation of the Eighth Amendment's proscription of 
cruel and unusual punishment and mentioned specific stan­
dards for the administration of drugs. The court implied 
that medication other than drugs must first be tried and, if
drugs are to be administered, there must be "adequate medi-
180cal guidance and prescription."
On the basis of the law as established by these 
cases, the Morales court declared that the children under 
TYC jurisdiction have the right to certain minimal profes­
sional standards. Again with respect to the standards, the 
court was content to state them. It left the specific 
details of how this was to be accomplished to the parties 
involved but warned that there appeared to be a great deal
of agreement among the expert witnesses "with respect to
181
professional criteria."
The minimal professional standards set down by the 
court included adequate infirmary facilities and personnel.
^^^Ibid.
^^°Ibid. at 357.
1 fil
■^■Morales at 105.
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The personnel must include medical staff; psychiatric staff 
who are "certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and 
Neurology as qualified in the field of child psychiatry"; 
psychological staff who have minimally a Master's degree 
and are "experienced in work with adolescents"; and psychi­
atric nurses. Staff personnel must exist in numbers ade­
quate to provide psychotherapy when the need is indicated, 
and also to provide an effective program of "preventive and 
curative" health care. Furthermore, the court said, med­
ication must not be dispensed in an indiscriminate manner 
but must be a supervised procedure and given to a child only 
when, and in the amount, needed.
Casework and Childcare
With respect to the related topics of casework and 
childcare, the court again stated the minimal standards which 
must be met and ordered the involved parties to negotiate and 
agree upon a formula for achieving at least those standards. 
For the legal basis of these right to treatment standards, 
the court again referred to the Donaldson, Rouse, and Nelson 
cases.
The decision demands that the TYC hire childcare 
workers, those persons responsible for daily supervision of 
the children, in sufficient numbers to assure that each juve­
nile receives individual attention. These persons must
182
Ibid.
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have a high school education, receive both pre-service and 
in-service training, and be tested for psychological fitness 
for dealing with children. Furthermore, the caseworkers as 
a whole "should reflect a diversity of ages, sexes and
ethnic origins" in order to meet the diverse needs of the
V.-1J 183children.
Caseworkers, those persons responsible for the 
child's individual and overall treatment plan, are required 
to have a Bachelor's degree. There must be a sufficient num­
ber of caseworkers to assure individual attention to each 
juvenile. These staff members are to be closely supervised 
by a casework supervisor, who is required to have minimally 
a Master's degree in the field of social work or an equiva­
lent in education and experience. The judge even found it 
necessary to require professionally standard record keeping.
Again he reiterated that these caseworkers should also
184
reflect diversity in age, sex, and race.
The family and friends of the juvenile must be
included in the treatment program. Particularly, this
requires the allowance of increased family visits, home fur-
185
loughs, and some provision for family therapy.
The most disturbed juveniles are to be afforded the 
most intensive care. The ratio of staff personnel, including
^^^Ibid. at 119.
^^‘^Ibid. at 120.
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psychologists, psychiatrists, caseworkers and childcare
186
workers, to juveniles was ordered to be "greatly enhanced."
The Monitor
The court advised that the parties in the suit dis­
cuss and reach agreement for the implementation of a monitor­
ing system of all TYC institutions. Judge Justice had ap­
pointed a monitor to aid in implementing the emergency inter­
im relief order at Mountain View and determined the experi­
ment to be successful enough to warrant system-wide expan­
sion. This monitor or group of monitors is to have wide 
discretion in several matters. They are to hear grievances 
on the part of inmates and report them to the court; investi­
gate and try to resolve juvenile and staff complaints; report 
to the court on any matters thought appropriate, such as 
violations of the court's orders; advise the TYC staff on 
matters deemed appropriate stemming from their independently 
gathered information; advise and communicate with counsel
for all parties in this suit. The monitors are responsible
187
directly to the court rather than the TYC.
Abandonment of Physical Plants
Counsel for plaintiffs and amici requested the court 
to order the abandonment of all large, geographically
'■®’lbid. at 121.
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isolated physical plants. Their argument stemmed, in part, 
from the evidence of repression and brutality, but also they 
claimed that these institutions were violative of the con­
stitutional principle that individuals have a right to expect 
the government "to seek to accomplish its ends in the manner
that is least inimical to the liberty of those whom it 
188
affects." The court was convinced by the evidence and 
expert testimony that the history of aggression, brutality 
and repression was so ingrained at Mountain View and Gates­
ville that rehabilitation of these institutions was an impos­
sibility. Conditions at these two institutions, taken as a 
whole, were found to be in violation of the juveniles'
Eighth Amendment rights as well as the right to treatment.
The judge pointed out that this approach was not entirely 
without precedent, and that courts had previously ordered 
the abandonment of physical plants because they "were inca­
pable of being used for humane treatment, and that confine­
ment in them constituted punishment of a kind forbidden by 
the Con s ti tut ion."^ ® ^
For example, in both Martarella and Inmates v.
Affleck the courts ordered the abandonment of specific units
of detention as unsuitable for housing juveniles. Inmates 
190
V. Eisenstadt, another case referred to in Morales,
188
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involved the partial closing of a county jail. The court 
found conditions so inadequate at this facility that incar­
ceration amounted to punishment. It was declared unsuitable^
at least for the pretrial detainees who made up the majority
191of the population.
192
Using the formula announced in Trop v. Dulles, 
the court decided that the "evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society" required the 
closing down of Gatesville and Mountain View. According to 
expert testimony, conditions at Mountain View compared unfa­
vorably with Angola Prison in Louisiana, often characterized
193as "the worst prison in America." The court said, "the 
confinement of juveniles in a facility that compares unfa­
vorably with one of the most notorious prisons in America is
194shocking and senseless."
The court went on to suggest that institutionalizing 
juveniles in large, geographically remote physical plants 
might also be in violation of their fundamental constitu­
tional rights. It assured, however, that it was not finding 
institutionalization, as a manner of dealing with delinquent 
children, altogether unconstitutional, but rather that
19]
Ibid. at 686.
^^^356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) 
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certain kinds of institutions have characteristics which
195raise serious questions. One characteristic mentioned
was simply that of size. "Large institutions oppress their 
residents by virtually forcing the staff to ignore the indi­
vidual needs of each c h i l d . T h e  rural setting of Texas 
institutions was another questionable characteristic.
Their remoteness generally prevents any family involvement 
in the rehabilitative process and makes it nearly impossible 
to attract the highly qualified personnel needed to help the 
children. The lack of any sort of systematic furlough plan 
results in the juveniles being released back into society 
without the aid of any sort of transition process. The set­
ting of TYC institutions also precludes the possibility of 
using community resources such as the educational, vocation­
al, and medical facilities more readily available in an urban 
atmosphere. Finally, the remoteness forces the TYC to hire 
local residents who generally "have no understanding what­
ever of the urban, tension-filled lives from which most of
1Q7
the institutions' inmates have been torn." In light of 
size, history, location and other factors, the court implied 
that Texas youth institutions may be unconstitutional regard­
less of other factors.
195
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Another category of questionable TYC policy is the 
tendency to incarcerate all juveniles adjudged delinquent. 
The judge reiterated his prior opinion that such a policy 
violates the least restrictive alternative doctrine.
In summary, the court declared the abandonment of 
Gatesville and Mountain View "as quickly as possible"; the 
discontinuation of TYC policy which incarcerates nearly all 
delinquent children "within a reasonable period, making 
allowance for careful planning but not for foot-dragging"; 
the creation, within the same period of time of "a system 
of community-based treatment alternatives adequate to serve 
the needs of those juveniles for whom the institution is not 
appropriate"; and "the actual treatment, not simply warehous­
ing, of those juveniles for whom institutionalization is
198deemed appropriate."
Submission of Plans
The court ordered all parties to this case to begin 
meeting within thirty days to create a juvenile justice sys­
tem consistent with this opinion. Judge Justice expressed 
the desire to have experts, persons with a Master's or 
Doctorate in a field related to social work or a medical 
degree with psychiatric certification, participate in the 
planning sessions. Accordingly, the court said, the plan­
ning group should consist of one attorney and one expert for
198
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each of three parties, the plaintiffs, the United States, 
and amici. The defense is entitled to two attorneys and 
three experts. To date, plans for the implementation of 
the Morales decision have not been submitted because the 
appellate process has not yet reached a conclusion. However, 
due to the emergency relief order and this decision, certain 
changes have already taken place. The final chapter of this 
study deals with the effects of Morales v. Turman on the 
Texas system of juvenile justice.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE AFTERMATH OF MORALES V. TURMAN AND 
THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
The purpose of this fifth, and last, chapter is 
twofold. The first is to examine the TYC policies and prac­
tices in the aftermath of Morales. The attempt is to ana­
lyze the effects of the decision in the practical sense of 
what judicially mandated changes did, and did not, take 
place. The second purpose is to reexamine and evaluate this 
study as a whole in terms of what it contributes to an under­
standing of judicial policy-making and its potential for 
effective change.
The Impact of Morales v. Turman 
on TYC Policies and Practices
In order to estimate the effect or impact of Morales, 
a series of interviews was conducted with the following Texas 
Youth Council administrative staff members: Ron Jackson,
Executive Director; Mart Hoffman, Deputy Executive Director; 
Dick Kiekbusch, Director of Evaluation and Research; Neil 
Nichols, General Counsel and Ombudsman; and Hy Steinberg,
230
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Director of Human Resource Development. Budget comparisons 
were considered, and a variety of reports and documents were 
gathered. These sources helped to clarify the previously 
mentioned "effect question." Generally speaking, the effects 
of Morales were vast in some areas and minimal in others.
There are no systematic measurements for studying 
the effect or impact of court decisions. It is not possible 
to know, with certainty, which events took place precisely 
because of the decision and which occurred for other reasons. 
In the introduction to this study, it was suggested that a 
case's effects could be divided into three categories:
(1) the judicial pronouncements which have been implemented,
(2) those which have been ignored, and (3) changes that have 
occurred since the judicial pronouncement, but not specifi­
cally mandated by the judge's decree. The findings, as might 
be expected, do not fit neatly into these categories. Never­
theless, the outline remains useful and appropriate.
The three categories are used here as a type of mea­
surement. Those standards implemented immediately were 
directly related to the judicial decree. The standards not 
implemented measure a degree of noncompliance. The third 
category reflects implemented standards which are especially 
difficult to relate to the Morales decision. However, it
The author is indebted to these administrative 
officials for their time and patience on February 22, 1977 
A copy of the questions around which the interviews were 
structured appears in the appendix.
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cannot be assumed that the decision played no role in the 
process of change simply because the implemented standards 
do not square with the policies enumerated by Morales.
Immediate Aftermath
Within a few days of the decision, there was a riot 
at Gatesville. It is not possible to find a direct correla­
tion between the riot and the Morales decision from the 
available information. The riot marked the final days of 
James Turman in the position of Executive Director. His 
inability to control the situation appeared to result in a 
forced resignation and the appointment of Ron Jackson in his 
place. Jackson began an entire reshuffling of personnel at 
the administative level of the TYC which lasted several 
months. He also hired a number of additional assistants in 
order to develop and implement a master plan for juvenile 
justice in Texas.
Implemented Judicial Pronouncements
It was mentioned earlier in this dissertation that 
Judge Justice found certain conditions at the TYC institu­
tions, particularly Mountain View and Gatesville, so unaccept­
able that he saw fit to issue an emergency interim relief 
order in August, 1973, preceding the actual Morales trial by 
nearly a year. In the opinion of both Ron Jackson, Executive 
Director, and Neil Nichols, General Counsel, that particular 
mandate has met with full compliance and remains operational.
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Physical Force
The widespread use of corporal punishment and 
physical brutality was a major concern of the court. Those 
practices, according to Nichols, are no longer tolerated, 
at least as a matter of policy. He pointed out that it is 
probably not possible totally to eliminate all such abuses. 
When an abuse does occur, however, it is believed to be an 
exception to regular practices. In order to assure the dis­
continuation of physical abuse, procedures have been de­
veloped and implemented which allow a juvenile to register a 
formal complaint with the Executive Director about his mis­
treatment. This system will be discussed in more detail 
later in the chapter as it applies to all decisions affect­
ing the inmates, not merely punishment decisions.
In the emergency order, the court criticized the 
lack of a uniform set of rules governing inmate behavior. 
Judge Justice said the circumstance of not knowing what be­
havior is punishable constitutes mental and emotional cruel­
ty. TYC policy now requires that all institutions provide 
to each inmate a list of institutional rules and the corres­
ponding punishment for infraction of the rules. However, 
these lists are not uniform throughout the institutions. 
According to Nichols, all of the rules booklets contain a 
"catch 22" clause which allows punishment for "any behavior 
which is disruptive of the routine of the institution." He 
did not view this situation as satisfactory and believed
234
this clause would eventually be eliminated as a result of 
the planning and systemization going on under his supervi­
sion.
Segregation
Prior to the Morales decision, all institutions were 
segregated according to sex. Since that time, Brownwood, 
Gainesville, and Giddings have been converted to coeduca­
tional facilities. Crockett has responsibility for both 
boys and girls, but they reside in campsites and the indi­
vidual sites are sexually segregated. Gatesville remains 
segregated, housing only boys. It operates as an institu­
tion for the more serious offenders. Segregation by race, 
color, national origin, and sexual preference tendencies has 
also been stopped within institutions, as well as individual 
dormitories.
Solitary, Security and
Dormitory Confinement
TYC policy has changed to eliminate any sort of 
general room lockup at night. If there is an imminent 
threat to person or property involved, a juvenile can be 
placed in a secure setting but only according to specific 
standards. These standards include: a written statement by
the child's caseworker, within one hour of confinement, 
assuring that the setting meets certain standards such as 
providing the youth with a bed, mattress, bedding, toilet, 
one hour recreation per day, school books and daily lesson
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plans; a caseworker visitation for ten minutes every hour 
except between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.; visitation by a 
registered nurse once a day; visitation by a psychiatrist 
or psychologist once a day beginning with the second day; a 
written report prepared by the caseworker and sent to the 
Executive Director after three consecutive days of "lock­
up" giving in detail a justification for the confinement; 
and written reports prepared and filed by the Executive 
Director justifying any extra confinement lasting longer 
than five days. In addition to these standards, TYC policy 
has eliminated the enforced silence of juveniles in lockup 
and make-work practices, and has mandated that a member of 
the institutional staff, with a key to the secure room or 
cell, be within calling distance at all times.
Despite these restrictions on the use of solitary/ 
security confinement, it remains the principal form of pun­
ishment in use at all TYC institutions. According to Nichols, 
this situation, even though it fully complies with the relief 
order, remains unsatisfactory. He explained that solitary 
confinement is not a rational punishment because it separates 
the punisher from the punished. In other words, the indi­
vidual who actually inflicts and supervises the punishment 
is not the same person as the individual who makes the deci­
sion to punish. This, in Nichol's opinion, is not a meaning­
ful form of punishment because the juvenile does not relate 
his condition of punishment to any particular act he has 
committed.
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Nichol's office is presently compiling reports on 
the use of solitary, the rehabilitative results, alternative 
punishment methods in use, and further suggestions of the 
staff personnel. He said the problem at present is quite 
simply that no one knows the answer to this dilemma. Further 
alternatives must be created before a more effective punish­
ment scheme can be devised.
Communication
According to Nichols, there is essentially no longer 
any mail censorship at the TYC institutions. The only excep­
tion to this rule involves an inmate's receiving a package.
In that event, the package is examined for contraband in the 
presence of the juvenile, but no written material may be read 
by the staff personnel. Contraband, those items denied an 
inmate, includes things considered dangerous and things of 
which possession constitutes a crime.
The inmates are allowed to correspond with anyone 
they please. They are supplied with pens, pencils, paper, 
envelopes and a minimum of three stamps each week. Corres­
pondence to and from the inmates is allowed in any language. 
Previous policy allowed communication only in English.
Visitation
TYC policy requires all institutions to provide 
reasonable visitation privileges for the inmates. Minimally, 
this means that each institution allows the inmates
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visitation privileges at least two hours a day on two 
separate week days and from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Satur­
days, Sundays, and holidays.
Nursing Care
Since the Morales decision, the TYC has implemented 
the court's order that at least one registered nurse be 
available at each institution on a 24 hour-a-day basis.
TYC Personnel Screening
TYC policy requires that all prospective personnel 
be psychologically evaluated for fitness to work with chil­
dren. It further requires that persons hired, rehired, or 
promoted to any position meet the standards established by 
the Texas State Auditor in the Texas Position Classification 
Plan.
Reduction of Inmate Populations
According to TYC personnel there was a tiemendous 
reduction in inmate population figures in the aftermath of 
the emergency interim relief order and the final Morales 
decision. However, juvenile court judges have, in the past 
year, begun again to require TYC jurisdiction of an increas­
ing number of juveniles and the figures have begun to rise. 
For example, the institutional population in June, 1976 was 
1232. It rose to 1374 by November 29, 1976. By that time, 
the TYC institutions were housing 300 more delinquents than
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2had been predicted or planned for. Ron Jackson explained 
that the fluctuations, at least initially, had little to do
with TYC policy. In his opinion the reduction in inmate
population figures was a result of the fear instilled by 
Morales. He believes that juvenile court judges in Texas 
were so horrified by the conditions and practices revealed 
in the relief order, the trial, and the final opinion that 
they simply refused to commit juveniles to TYC jurisdiction.
Assessment and Placement Decisions
The reception center for boys at Gatesville was 
closed, and all incoming delinquents are currently received 
at Brownwood. The major factor involved in placement deci­
sions is location of the family. According to Mart Hoffman, 
placement decisions follow a "regional concept," and the 
initial consideration is whether or not it is possible to 
place a child near his family. Where that is possible, it 
is done. The only exception to this general rule is the 
decision to place a boy in Gatesville or the Hackberry Unit 
of Gatesville. Those decisions are made on the basis of the 
juvenile's committed offense. Boys who commit serious crim­
inal offenses are automatically sent to Gatesville, and the 
Hackberry Unit is reserved for the most serious offenders.
Juvenile court judges are no longer allowed by TYC 
policy to commit a child and send him to a reception center
2
"Population," TYC Notes (Austin, Texas: December,
1976), p. 3.
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accompanied merely by a court order. The judges must now 
provide the TYC with the child's medical records, school 
records, an updated social history, and, if available, a 
psychological or psychiatric evaluation.^
In addition to using the records which accompany the 
child to the reception center, the staff there conducts 
thorough medical, dental and psychological examinations and 
evaluates the results. Where the need is indicated, a psy­
chiatric interview and evaluation is also arranged. The cen­
ter attempts to measure, at this point, a number of interper­
sonal skills. This program is still in the developmental 
stages and will be further discussed later in this chapter.^ 
With the regional concept in mind, together with the court 
produced records and the center's evaluations, the staff 
makes a placement decision based on each child's rehabilita­
tive needs.
The assessment and placement practices of the TYC 
are in general compliance with the court's order, but there 
are some exceptions. In the first place, the mandated num­
ber of psychologists at the reception center has not been 
hired because, according to Hoffman, the legislature has not 
appropriated the necessary funds. Secondly, the standardized 
tests objected to in the Morales decision remain in use.
^Texas Youth Council; An Overview (Austin, Texas: 
Texas Youth Council, December 1, 1976), p. 1.
^Ibid. at 2.
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although they are being reevaluated and change is expected. 
Finally, Hoffman admitted that although every effort is made 
to follow the agreed upon procedures for making placement 
decisions, the factor of open bed space remains important.
In other words, in some cases, regardless of a child's 
assessed rehabilitative needs he is placed in an institution 
on a space available basis.
Abandonment of Mountain View
The court ordered the abandonment of Mountain View 
altogether, saying that the degradation and brutality there 
were so ingrained, no amount of reform could make it an 
acceptable place for children to reside. The institution 
has been abandoned in terms of juvenile delinquents and is 
now used as a medium security prison for adult female 
offenders. According to Jackson, this change resulted from 
the reduction of TYC inmate populations, not as a result of 
Morales. He simply believes that the space provided by the 
institution became unnecessary, so it was abandoned. On the 
other hand, he did agree that Morales caused the population 
reduction so the two results are entertwined. The implica­
tion appeared to be that, if Mountain View were needed to 
house juveniles delinquents, it would be used, regardless of 
the court order.
The Creation of Alternatives
Judge Justice was particularly alarmed by the total 
lack of alternatives available to juvenile court judges.
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Prior to Morales, a judge's choice was essentially twofold: 
either the child was released from custody, at best under 
the supervision of a poorly funded and inadequate probation 
system; or he was incarcerated in a large, geographically 
remote institution. The court ordered the TYC to develop 
alternatives.
This pronouncement was taken quite seriously by the 
TYC. At least five new programs have been developed. Four 
of these have been developed within Texas communities. A 
fifth new program is the Wilderness Program at Crockett. In 
terms of the central office budget, the difference in expend­
itures for community treatment services is profound. In 
fiscal 1974, before Morales, the TYC spent $891,679 for com­
munity services. This amount provided only for personnel 
in the area of parole. For 1977, the legislature has bud­
geted $9,183,513 for personnel in the community services 
division. The increase in expenditure for fiscal 1977 
amounts to more than eight million dollars as compared to 
fiscal 1974. These funds have provided for the development 
of a number of community-based facilities including the resi­
dential contract program, halfway houses, the community 
assistance program, and the youth resource development pro­
gram. The Crockett Wilderness program is an alternative to 
the conventional form of institutionalizing juveniles in 
Texas prior to Morales, but it is not funded under the com­
munity services program.
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Residential Contract Program
The residential contract program, operated by the 
TYC, involves arrangements with 50 to 60 privately-owned 
childcare facilities. The TYC, as it sees fit, places 
children committed to its care in these private facilities 
located in the child's community wherever possible. In 
return the residential treatment facility receives from 
$30.00 to $33.00 a day per child depending on the particular 
facility. This program is primarily for those juveniles 
adjudged delinquent. Some go to a residential center fol­
lowing a period of institutional confinement; others, how­
ever, are sent to a residential center directly from the 
reception center at Brownwood. This program alone shows 
that juvenile delinquents are no longer automatically incar­
cerated in the sense of placing them in large, geographically 
remote institutions.
All children in residential treatment facilities are 
considered a part of the field placement program. This is 
equivalent to the probation and parole division in adult 
corrections. Each juvenile is assigned a field service 
counselor, the equivalent of a probation officer, who over­
sees the child's development. To insure that the treatment 
plans contracted for are delivered "on a regular basis, TYC 
conducts fiscal and program audits of residential contract 
programs . .
^Ibid. at 4.
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There were no funds appropriated for a residential 
contract program for delinquents prior to fiscal 1976. The 
legislature provided $803,000 for fiscal 1976-77. This 
pilot program is designed to provide services for an average 
of 30 delinquents in 1976 and 50 in 1977 in the El Paso and 
Valley regions of Texas. The need is especially essential 
for these juveniles because of the distance of the regions 
from the existing TYC institutions and the resulting inabil­
ity of the parents to visit their children and take part in 
their rehabilitation program. Furthermore, a large propor­
tion of these juveniles are of Mexican American descent, 
and they have special language and cultural background dif­
ferences and needs which are not met by existing TYC facil­
ities.^
In addition to payment for room and board, the resi­
dential facilities are expected to provide group and indi­
vidual counseling, educational programs, and some sort of 
recreation for at least nine hours per week. As the program 
grows and becomes operational, the budget provides an addi­
tional $10.00 per day for each child committed in 1976 and 
$11.00 per day for each child committed in 1977 in order to 
provide expanded services. It is expected that this program 
will reduce recidivism rates in these areas by 40 percent.^
^Budget Estimates; Fiscal Years 1976 and 1977 
(Austin: Texas Youth Council, August 1, 1974), pp. 109-12.
^Budget at 110-112.
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Halfway Houses
Halfway houses provide much the same service as 
residential contract centers, but the environment is gener­
ally more structured, and they operate in communities where 
residential contract facilities are not available. There
are four halfway houses in operation with an average popula-
8tion of 14 to 24. The locations include Nueces House in 
Corpus Christi; Travis House in Austin; Chelsea Hall in 
Houston; and Dallas House in Dallas.
The Texas legislature appropriated $273,957 in fis­
cal 1974-75 for the purpose of establishing these halfway 
houses. It is unclear from the 76-77 budget what level of
9
expenditure is currently being provided. The TYC has 
recommended to the legislature that additional halfway 
houses be developed in 1978-79. The Legislative Budget 
Board, however, has recommended that the legislature deny 
the request.
Community Assistance Program
The TYC asked for, and received, $2,500,000 in fiscal 
1976 and $5,000,000 in fiscal 1977 for development of a com­
munity assistance p r o g r a m . T h i s  project pays communities
g
Overview at 4-5.
9
Budget at 77.
"Budget Board Approves Reduced TYC Appropriations," 
TYC Notes (Austin, Texas: January, 1977), p. 1.
^^Budget at 76.
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not to commit children to the TYC. The purpose is to 
encourage local communities to develop their own unique pro­
grams for dealing with juveniles, and the effort constitutes 
the TYC's principal means of reducing commitments to the 
Council.
County juvenile probation departments receive approxi­
mately 80 percent of these funds, while the other 20 percent goes 
to private chi ldcare agencies. The TYC has established a base 
commitment rate for each county by taking into consideration 
the juvenile population and the number of committed juveniles 
from a particular county over the past ten years. On a 
monthly basis, it then pays the county $4,050 for each com­
mitment below the base rate. This figure is reached by con­
sideration of the costs of placing a child in a community
12placement facility with field supervision for 7.7 months.
According to Mart Hoffman, as of January, 1977, only 
50 of the 250 counties in Texas were involved in this program. 
He blamed the lack of county acceptance on poor relations 
between the county judges and the TYC and pointed out that 
there are plans being developed for public relations efforts 
with the local county governments.
Youth Resource Development Program
In addition to programs developed for those juvenile 
delinquents already committed to TYC supervision, a program
12
Overview at 11.
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of preventive delinquency has been developed to divert 
young people from the Texas juvenile justice system. It is 
known as the Youth Resource Development (YRD) Diversion Pro­
gram, and $6/064,717 was appropriated for fiscal 1976-77 to 
implement its goals. The program contracts community ser­
vices for juveniles identified as potentially delinquent.
The emphasis is on providing help for the juveniles in 
learning skills, career skills and recreational skills. In 
addition, there are programs for helping parents improve 
their parenting skills. The program expects to reduce juve­
nile absenteeism from school and work by 53-40 percent. It 
expects to divert 40-50 percent of the young people it works with 
from the juvenile court's attention. When the program is 
fully developed, it will offer services to 35,000 young 
people throughout the State of Texas.
Crockett Wilderness Camp
The Crockett school has been transformed into a 
series of campsites, all located near the main campus in the 
Davy Crockett National Forest. One of the campsites is for 
female status offenders. The other is for boys, both delin­
quents and status offenders, although these categories are 
segregated in the individual camps. The emphasis in this 
program is on "self-reliance, team work, and the immediate 
experiencing of the consequences of ones acts.
^^Budget at 86-'“3. 
14
Overview at 3.
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The juveniles in the camps live under extraordinarily 
primitive conditions. They reside in plastic tents and 
their days consist of cleaning, cooking, building and group 
therapy sessions. Living in the camps forces the inmates to 
learn to get along with one another because there is no out­
side contact. When a problem arises, the youths "huddle-up" 
and are required to work out a solution. Some parents have 
objected to the Wilderness Program because of the harsh con­
ditions and are threatening to file suit. As of March, 1977, 
however, the program was still in operation, and staff mem­
bers are generally optimistic about the expected results.
Family Involvement
There is no formally stated program concerning 
involvement of a juvenile's family in the rehabilitation 
process. However, the court order on this issue has been 
at least partially met by a variety of methods. Family 
visitation privileges have been expanded and the ability of 
families to visit the juveniles has increased as a result 
of the efforts to place all juveniles as close to their geo­
graphical homes as possible. Although there is no percep­
tible standard, all institutions have some sort of home fur­
lough program which allows those considered deserving to 
leave the institution for a designated period of time and 
visit their families. All of the institutions, according 
to Ron Jackson, allow Christmas furloughs for the majority 
of their inmates. Finally the field placement supervisors
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(probation/parole officers) are directed to contact and 
begin working with the parents of a juvenile from the time 
he comes to the court's attention, whether he is awaiting a 
hearing, committed to a TYC institution or some other pro­
gram, or on probation or parole.
Statewide Ombudsman System
The court ordered the TYC to establish a statewide 
ombudsman system based on the Mountain View program that 
resulted from the emergency relief order. The Mountain View 
Ombudsman was established primarily to hear inmate griev­
ances concerning staff brutality and other forms of mis­
treatment and to report to the court on matters concerning 
the implementation of the relief order.
Judge Justice ordered the expansion of the Mountain 
View program to a statewide system and suggested that TYC 
hire Charles Derrick, the Mountain View Ombudsman, for that 
position. Ron Jackson instead hired Neil Nichols, an attor­
ney. Mr. Derrick has since been dismissed by the TYC.
There are two aspects to Nichols' job. He is respon­
sible for supervising a group of hearing examiners through­
out the state. These people preside at field placement 
revocation hearings. Each juvenile who is in the process of 
having his field placement status revoked, and being sent or 
returned to an institution, is entitled to a hearing at 
which a trained TYC examiner presides. Third year law stu­
dents are hired to preside at the hearings.
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The second aspect involves development of a 
standardized list of procedures by which administrative 
decisions are made that affect the juveniles' lives, and a 
procedural format to be utilized by the juvenile for appeal­
ing any decision which affects him. The use of grievance 
procedures is not limited to disciplinary decisions but 
applies to all administratively formulated decisions. The 
second phase of Nichols' job is funded by a federal grant 
not included in the 1976-77 biennium budget.
The second phase remains in the developmental stage, 
but procedures for the airing of grievances have been estab­
lished. Although Judge Justice recommended that juveniles 
be allowed full procedural rights in order to protect them 
against abuse of administrative discretion, the system as 
implemented allows only appeal. In other words, the juvenile 
has no rights which enable him to question an administrative 
decision prior to its being made; but afterward, he has a 
right to appeal the decision.
The subjects of grievance procedures may include: 
personnel in instances of neglect, harassment, the use of 
unnecessary force, etc.; conditions concerning food, cloth­
ing, medical care, etc.; and programs including rules and 
p r a c t i c e s . T h e  TYC staff has been informed by the Executive 
Director that ignoring any complaint as frivolous is not 
acceptable behavior.
^^Ron Jackson, Memorandum to TYC Staff Concerning 
Grievance Procedures, October 5, 1976, p. 2.
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The procedure for filing a grievance must be 
implemented within 60 days of a particular decision. The 
juvenile's caseworker files the appeal on his behalf and 
acts as his advocate. The Executive Director, within two 
days, is required to distribute copies of the appeal to the 
responding party and other interested persons. These parties 
are allowed to submit a response to the appeal if they so 
desire. The appeal is evaluated by the Executive Committee 
which includes the Deputy Executive Director, the Director 
of Community Services and the Director of Institutional 
Services. The Committee makes a recommendation to the 
Executive Director, who makes the final decision. If the 
Executive Director is not satisfied with the recommendation, 
he may call for an investigation, which is the responsibil­
ity of the Ombudsman, Neil Nichols. The Executive Director 
is expected to make a decision within 15 days of the time 
he receives the appeal. The opinion must be in writing and 
include reasons for the decision. Copies are distributed 
to the involved parties and other interested persons. All 
such decisions are kept on file at the TYC's central office. 
There are provisions in the procedures for oral argument and 
rehearing; however, once the Executive Director files his 
decision, the juvenile's administrative remedies are con­
sidered exhausted.
Texas Youth Council Procedure for Appeals to the 
Executive Director, mimeographed memorandum to TYC staff, 
1976, pp. 1-6.
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According to Nichols, the grievance procedures are 
successful. Based on visits by himself and his staff to 
the institutions, he believes that the inmates have a good 
attitude toward the procedures and feel free to use them.
On the other hand, since the procedures were implemented 
(October, 1976) only 30 appeals have been filed. Therefore, 
it is difficult to make an assessment at this point about 
the program's effectiveness. The long range desired result 
of Nichol's office. The Office of Youth Justice, is the 
establishment of procedural guidelines for administrative 
decision-making which apply to all institutions. This, in 
Nichol's opinion, should eliminate, as nearly as possible, 
unfair administrative discretionary practices.
The general effect of the statewide ombudsman system 
is, it appears, in concurrence with the court order even 
though due process requirements do not govern the procedure 
by which decisions affecting the juveniles are made. Accord­
ing to Nichols, an interesting effect of the appeals proce­
dure is the caseworkers' comments. In helping the child pre­
pare his appeal, the caseworkers often include comments. In 
effect, this provides an appeals procedure or an outlet for 
the caseworker to criticize institutional policies and sug­
gest alternatives, without having to go through the superin­
tendent of the institution where they are employed.
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Nonimplemented Justicial Pronouncements
There are certain policy pronouncements in Morales 
which have not been implemented. The reasons given for this 
noncompliance, by Ron Jackson and members of his administra­
tive staff, were: (1) the legislature has not appropriated
the necessary funds; (2) the policies are unwise or unneces­
sary, in the TYC staff's opinion; or (3) there has not been 
sufficient knowledge generated or time allowed to accomplish 
some of the court's directives.
TYC Policy Procedures
In the Morales decision. Judge Justice was disturbed 
by the fact that there was no ascertainable set of policies 
which govern the TYC's operations. This situation remains 
unchanged. TYC policy is still established by a Board of 
Directors, which meets every two months. Policy is then 
made operational by an Executive Director. The only written 
source of policy statements remains the minutes of the bi­
monthly meetings which are taken by a secretary. There is 
an ongoing attempt to develop policy papers at the present 
time. For example, there was a policy statement drawn up 
in January, 1977, involving the rehabilitation programs for 
juveniles committed to the TYC. The paper is extremely 
general in direction and scope. It was the Executive Direc­
tor's request that the paper not be copied or quoted as he 
considered it unfinished and not particularly useful.
253
Abandonment of Gatesville
The court ordered that the Gatesville facility be 
abandoned. Here again, as in the case of Mountain View, the 
judge found conditions and practices there so ingrained and 
intolerable as to be unsuitable, under any circumstances, 
to serve as a juvenile institution. There has been no 
attempt to implement that order. Gatesville is an institu­
tion, consisting of four units, designed to house the more 
serious male offenders. The most aggressive of the boys 
are placed in a special unit, Hackberry.^^
There has been some attempt to improve the Gatesville 
institution. Of the $4,020,712 appropriated in 1976 for
physical improvements of the institutions, nearly one half,
18
$1,956,180, was designated to be used at Gatesville. The 
major budgetary expenditure was for dormitory remodeling 
($1,400,000). The purpose, among other things, was to par­
tition the open dorms, provide privacy in bathroom facili­
ties, and install air conditioning.^^ Since the vocational 
training facility had been destroyed by fire, $513,250 was 
appropriated for its replacement.^^ It is obvious from a 
reading of the budget analysis and expenditures that the TYC
^^Overview at 3.
^^Budget at 170-6. 
^^Ibid. at 174. 
^°Ibid. at 176.
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has considered no alternatives to the maintenance of an 
institution at Gatesville.
Academic and Vocational
Education Programs
Academic and vocational education program appropria­
tions are contained in the budgets for each individual insti­
tution. These were not made available during the course of 
this research effort. Ron Jackson pointed out that little, 
if any, emphasis has been placed on the improvement of exist­
ing programs or the development of new ones in this area.
He said, in fact, that the educational programs are currently 
weaker, for the most part, than they were at the time of 
the Morales decision. He explained that the emphasis has 
changed from developing educational skills to developing 
"interpersonal" skills and that all efforts had been in the 
direction of developing guided group interaction programs.
With respect to the court's order to establish 
bilingual educational programs, nothing has been done to 
date. When questioned about this, Jackson's answer was some­
what evasive. He said that nothing had been done primarily 
because the term "bilingual" is not definable.
TYC Policy Changes: Beyond Morales
There have been many changes in TYC policy since 
the Morales decision which appear on the surface, at least, 
not to have been based on the court order. These changes, 
however, appear to have resulted from the general thrust of
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Morales. They are all included in an ongoing process to 
improve the practices and circumstances surrounding the pre­
vention and treatment of juvenile delinquency.
Medical and Psychiatric Care
Medical care is an area included in this section 
because the overall program appears to be in line with the 
court order even though some of the specifically mandated 
changes have not been implemented. In June, 1976, the 
Texas State Department of Public Welfare published a set of 
medical and psychiatric care standards which are applicable 
to TYC institutions. According to Jackson, it is these stan­
dards that are followed by the TYC rather than the Morales 
standards.
Mart Hoffman explained that TYC personnel found the 
Morales standards to be, in some instances, unrealistic and 
unnecessary. In terms of psychiatric services, for example, 
consultants are used in preference to the hiring of full-time 
psychiatrists. He said hiring full-time personnel was not 
only unnecessary but also too expensive. All of the insti­
tutions do have, however, registered nurses on the staff and 
a medical doctor on call 24 hours a day. Hoffman said that 
all institutions now have adeuqate infirmary facilities.
Judge Justice also expressed concern about the dis­
pensation of medication that is too potent or unnecessary. 
Currently, all institutions are working on a set of guide­
lines to set standards for medication. According to Nichols,
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each institution is required to submit a monthly report to 
the TYC listing the children taking prescribed medication, 
what medicine he is taking, and the purpose of the medica­
tion. This report is examined on a monthly basis by the 
Executive Director.
The Carkhuff Theory
Following the Morales instigated investigation, the 
TYC hired Carkhuff Associates, Inc. to assess the needs of 
juvenile justice on a statewide basis and develop a master 
plan for juvenile correctional services. According to Hy 
Steinberg, the man primarily responsible for implementing 
the Carkhuff plan, many of Jackson's program ideas are based 
on Carkhuff's theories.
Simply stated the Carkhuff theory is: in order to
be a productive citizen, one must acquire certain skills—  
living, learning and working skills. Carkhuff defines skills 
as "the quantity and quality of responses to a given situa­
tion that an individual has in his repertoire at a given 
21point of time." He says these skills are observable, 
measurable, trainable, repeatable and, within limits, pre­
dictable.^^
21
Robert R. Carkhuff, Living, Learning and Working:
The Effective Ingredients of Human Resource Development, 
unpublished keynote address to the American Education Research 
Association, February 26, 1973) p. 4.
22 Ibid. at 4,
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According to the Carkhuff's theory, the teaching of 
skills is equivalent to rehabilitation. A child is rehabil­
itated in three essential stages: teaching him to explore
or "see" his situation and understand his experiences; 
helping him to understand "where he is in relation to where
he wants to be," and teaching him to act "upon how to get
21
from where he is to where he wants to be." Skills in 
these areas need to be developed with respect to interper­
sonal relationships or "human achievement," "educational 
achievement" and "career achievement."
The practical impact of Carkhuff on the Texas juven­
ile justice system is that an extraordinary proportion of 
the post-1974 resources available to the TYC has been allo­
cated to employee training programs. The emphasis in train­
ing is on individual staff members because the belief is 
that trained staff can rehabilitate juvenile delinquents 
regardless of their individual characteristics. Jackson 
expressed the opinion that 90 percent of all incarcerated youth 
in Texas were amenable to rehabilitation through the use of 
the Carkhuff methods.
The current emphasis, then, of the TYC is on the 
development of training programs in the communities as well 
as in the institutions for people who work with and teach 
the children. Also, TYC personnel are attempting to devise
^^Ibid.
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methods for measuring the taught skills. The ultimate 
goal is a computer-based means for evaluating the success 
of individual staff members in their ability to teach the 
children the skills which enable them to become productive 
citizens.
Personnel Training Programs
A program by which teaching skills can be measured 
and evaluated has not yet been developed, but pre-service and 
in-service training at the institutions is currently being 
practiced. Each employee is required to attend pre-service 
training for a minimum of 104 hours. Three days are devoted 
to a general orientation, and eight days are used for the 
teaching of teaching skills. In addition, in-service train­
ing is provided at all institutions. The amount varies at 
each one depending on the attitude of the superintendent and 
the funds available, but according to Steinberg, it is 
increasingly becoming a standardized program.
TYC Growth and Expansion
The Morales decision called for personnel expansion 
at the institutional level in terms of caseworkers and 
houseparents. This has not been accomplished. Judge Justice 
said, at the minimum, there should be one caseworker and 
houseparent for every 20 inmates. Currently, according to 
Hoffman, the ratio is one to 36 or 38. However, the expan­
sion of personnel at the higher administrative levels has
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been extraordinary because of the attempt to develop programs 
which fully implement the master plan developed by Carkhuff 
Associates, Inc. The number of paid TYC positions in 1973 
was 99. By 1977, that number had increased to 679 1/2. In 
order to attract top level talent, the salaries of TYC admin­
istrators have also become more attractive. For example, in 
1973, the Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director 
were paid $27,500 and $23,000 respectively. In fiscal 1977, 
$42,900 and $37,400 were appropriated for those positions.
Two other sets of figures will serve to illuminate and prove 
the point concerning TYC growth and expansion. One involves 
central office operating expenses such as rent, telephones 
and postage. In 1974, the expenditure for this purpose was 
$30,417; by fiscal 1977, the requirement had grown to 
$604,164. For rented office space, the TYC paid $2,400 in
1973, 1974 and 1975. In 1976, the cost was $78,485, and in 
1977 it rose to $86,988. The other set of figures involves 
a comparison of the total TYC appropriations. For fiscal
1974, the total TYC budget was $1,710,949. This figure 
refers to central office expenses only— not including the 
individual institutional budgets. The 1976-77 biennium bud­
get requested and received $9,959,608 and $15,429,568, 
respectively, for the two years. The central office budget, 
institutional budgets, and additional administrative appro­
priation requests amounted to $31,978, 860 for fiscal
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1977.^^ At the time of this writing, however, the 
legislature was considering a reduction in TYC appropria­
tions for fiscal 1978-79. The figure recommended by the 
Legislative Budget Board was slightly less than 95 percent of 
the 1977 budget.
General Impressions; The Effects of Morales
It is obvious from the above discussion that TYC 
policies are not yet fully defined or implemented and that 
fact prohibits data-based measurement of the effects. For 
example, it is impossible to tell whether the innovative 
programs have affected the rearrest or recidivism rates.
First of all, the statistics are not available and, second­
ly, there are plans that have not yet been implemented in 
terms of dealing with recidivism. Even the TYC administra­
tive personnel who were interviewed were not in agreement 
as to the specific impact of the case itself, but all did 
agree that it made a crucial difference and that the differ­
ence was a positive one.
Neil Nichols compared Morales to a "sunset law," or 
a law that requires governmental agencies to, in effect, 
prove their need every five to ten years or face abolishment. 
He called the decision a "reformation suit." Nichols viewed
24"tyc Requests Increased 1978-79 Appropriation," 
TYC Notes (Austin, Texas, February, 1977) , p 1.
25
"Budget Board Approves . . . " at 1.
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this as a positive approach and thought such court action 
was probably needed every five years with respect to juve­
nile justice systems, as well as other bureaucracies.
However, Nichols criticized the decision for not 
being progressive enough in terms of procedural rights. In 
his opinion, children should be "sentenced" like adults with 
a specific amount of time involved. He pointed out that 
adult and juvenile sentences need not be equivalent because 
"doing time" is more difficult for a child. He indicated 
that an adult can cope with five years of incarceration more 
easily than a child can cope with six months. However, he 
believes the child has a right to "know where he stands" 
and sentences which are merely based on statements such as 
"until he is rehabilitated or until he reaches majority age" 
confuse and frustrate the juveniles and are counterrehabil- 
itative.
Nichols said the problem was that Morales, like 
other juvenile suits, borrows from other areas— mental health 
law, adult penal law, and school law. In his view there is 
a need for a unique set of laws which apply to juveniles who, 
because they have committed criminal acts, have come to the 
attention of law enforcement agencies.
The TYC administrators in general played down the 
effects of Morales in terms of specific accomplishments; 
however, they were all quick to point out that the real 
changes that have taken place would probably not have
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happened in its absence. Ron Jackson believes that the 
direction of change stemmed from himself and Carkhuff 
Associates, not Morales. On the other hand, he admitted to 
using the decision as a "hammer." He explained that when 
he faced difficulties with other governmental agencies or 
the legislature, he could add weight to his program justi­
fications by pointing out that the TYC was under a court 
order to change. Furthermore, Hy Steinberg revealed that 
when the Fifth Circuit overturned the Morales decision, 
Jackson quickly informed the TYC staff that, regardless of 
the new decision, TYC policy and direction would continue 
as before. In summary, the overall attitude of those inter­
viewed was that Morales induced changes in TYC policy but 
the specific changes that occurred were the result of Ron 
Jackson, as guided by Carkhuff Associates, not Judge Justice.
Regardless of the TYC administrative staff's opin­
ions, it is apparent that three fundamental changes occurred 
in the aftermath of Morales that would not have occurred 
otherwise. The first is that inmate populations were 
reduced. That produced the second overall change which was 
the forced development of alternatives by the TYC staff, 
juvenile court judges, and county probation officers. Auto­
matic institutionalization of juvenile delinquents is no 
longer acceptable in Texas. Finally, the tremendous growth 
of the TYC as a government bureaucracy must be attributed 
to Morales. The leap in legislative appropriations from
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1974 to 1976 could not have been a result of mere 
bureaucratic incrementalism.
Overview; The Limits and 
Contributions of the Study
The preceding analysis has been a case study of 
judicial policy-making and the potential of courts to effect 
change. Obviously, there are limits to the generalizations 
that can be made from any case study such as this one. Each 
"case" is, by definition, a unique set of events; however, 
there are certain contributions this case makes to an under­
standing of the judicial process.
Contributions of the Study
This study examines the judiciary from a political 
perspective. There are a number of elements which must be 
discussed in order to understand such a perspective. One 
element is the environment in which policy decisions are 
made. The environment provides certain kinds of input which 
ultimately affects the form and substance of the decision. 
Another element is the view that judges, in their policy­
making role, are affected by their personal beliefs and 
values as well as the opinions of others. Finally the impact 
element is important in studying the judiciary from a politi­
cal perspective. It is necessary to study impact, or the 
effectiveness of judicial decision-making, in order to under­
stand realistically whether change occurs as a result of 
judicial pronouncements.
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There is, at present, no general theory of judicial 
26
impact. Stephen Wasby has approached the task by outlin­
ing a set of hypotheses that have resulted from various case 
studies such as this one. He believes that a major theo­
retical problem is this "after the fact" approach. The 
studies have come first followed by the hypothesis. Wasby 
believes there is a need for general, nationwide studies in 
order fully to test the hypotheses. This study, of course, 
makes no such attempt. However, where relevant, the Wasby 
outline is discussed. For the most part, it is not relevant 
because the available research deals almost exclusively with 
Supreme Court impact and, consequently, the hypotheses are 
related to that particular institution. There are some, 
however, that can be related to judicial policy-making at 
all levels.
The Environment
The first three chapters of this study clearly por­
trayed the environmental characteristics which may have 
affected the judge's willingness to hear the case, the form 
in which it was heard, the ultimate judicial pronouncements 
or outputs of the case, and the resulting impact, including 
the degree of compliance or noncompliance. The environmental
2 6
Stephen L. Wasby, The Impact of the United States 
Supreme Court; Some Perspectives (Homewood, Illinois; The 
Dorsey Press, 1970).
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characteristics surrounding Morales are not necessarily 
unique consequences of juvenile delinquency. The national 
concern with crime and delinquency has increasingly caused 
courts to participate in the resolution of the issue. They 
have been asked to support "law and order" as well as to 
protect individual liberties; tasks which are often in con­
flict. Reports like the President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, together with 
prior delinquency cases, clearly showed that the prevailing 
methods for the prevention and treatment of delinquency have 
not been successful.
Paralleling these developments was growing judicial 
interest in the treatment of adult prisoners and involuntar­
ily committed mental health patients. In both instances, 
although clearly established standards are generally lack­
ing, the courts have increasingly placed limits on the dis­
cretionary power of administrative officials to control the 
lives of their clients.
The case adds to an understanding of the procedures 
involved in judicial investigation. The information pro­
vided is contrary to the notion that judges are unable to 
decide certain types of cases because they lack expertise 
about the subject matter involved in a case. Morales shows 
that judges, through testimony by expert witnesses and party 
negotiation, are able to expand their knowledge of a situa­
tion without becoming "experts." Consequently, the
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availability of expert witnesses is an important 
environmental factor.
Knowledge of these environmental factors aid in an 
understanding of the timeliness of judicial intervention. 
Although available research methodology does not allow, at 
this time, precise measurement of the weight of environment­
al factors, they can be isolated to some extent. The assump­
tion is that certain general environmental conditions must be 
met before judicial intervention will occur.
This study also isolates and examines the specific 
elements, in a particular environment, which resulted in 
judicial intervention. Knowledge of these elements increases 
understanding of environmental characteristics which result 
in intervention. Of course, it is necessary to study this 
subject further, taking into account other cases of judicial 
intervention into penal institutions, in order to isolate 
those factors which, when present, will result in judicially 
mandated change.
The influence of these environmental factors is, per­
haps, obvious. To recapitulate, they affect the timeliness 
of judicial intervention, the information gathering tech­
niques available, the output, and the effects of the output 
of a decision.
Judicial Policy-Making
Morales contributes to an understanding of judicial 
policy-making in a number of respects. Research in this
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area has been primarily confined to the higher appellate
courts and, particularly, the Supreme Court. This is
because of the "upper-court myth," a notion that "the only
place to look for 'the law' is in the doctrine of Supreme
27Court decisions." It appears that the prevailing research 
on judicial policy-making and its effect or impact continues 
to be influenced by the "myth." The predominance of judi­
cial research available investigates the higher courts, not
28
the "lower courts where the bulk of cases are decided."
Accordingly, Morales adds to the prevailing knowl­
edge in two respects. First, it is a study of a nonappel- 
late level court. It then, perhaps, begins to fill a gap 
in the knowledge about those particular institutions. 
Secondly, the "upper-court myth" is clearly refuted in this 
study. The case has been made that Morales did, in fact, 
create new law through the establishment of a constitutional 
right to treatment for incarcerated juvenile delinquents and 
the pronouncement of standards that define the right. These 
pronouncements were made even though, in at least one 
instance, the Supreme Court has denied the existence of a 
constitutionally-based right to treatment in the case of 
mental patients. Extensive investigation of lower court 
decisions might reveal that judicial policy-making is not 
necessarily a function of a hierarchical decision-making
^^Ibid. at 23.
^^Ibid.
268
structure, in which opinions flow downward from the Supreme 
Court. Rather it might be hypothesized that judges at all 
levels create new law, or, possibly, that judicial decisions 
flow upward in addition to, or rather than, downward in the 
judicial process.
Morales contributes to an understanding of judges 
as humans, rather than mechanical robots who "find" the law. 
It is not important whether one believes Judge Justice to 
be a hero or a villain, depending on individual beliefs con­
cerning activism and self-restraint. What is important is 
acknowledgement of the values and beliefs that affected his 
decision. In at least two respects, these factors appear 
important. The first is,his view of the proper judicial 
role follows that of an activist philosophy. This decision 
is at least as activist as Miranda in that Judge Justice 
not only created new law, he also literally wrote a manual 
governing the relationship between incarcerated juvenile 
delinquents and the State of Texas.
Secondly, although there is ongoing debate in the 
area of penal philosophy, it is obvious from this decision 
that the judge believed the state's responsibility is to 
rehabilitate rather than to punish. The impact of this 
belief deserves further study. There has been a large num­
ber of cases, in recent years, involving the rights of incar­
cerated persons. Litigation in this field is often followed 
by confused and contradictory opinions. Morales appears to
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indicate that the penal philosophy of a judge affects the 
amount of satisfaction an institutionalized person receives.
Finally, Morales contributes to the knowledge about 
judicial policy-makers in relation to groups. The role of 
amicus curiae in this case contributes to an awareness that 
there are often other personalities and opinions involved 
in a case besides the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense. 
The degree to which the "friends of the court" influenced 
the actual output is not measurable, but it is obvious from 
this study that amici * s participation can be a dominant— if 
not the dominant— controlling factor in a judicial decree.
Impact
Research concerned with the effect or impact of 
judicial decisions is of a fairly recent vintage, and less 
is known in this area than with respect to environmental and 
policy-making factors. This study examined effects in three 
categories: those involving compliance, noncompliance, and
actions taken that were not mandated. Perhaps the most val­
uable contribution of this viewpoint is, it shows that impact 
is not simply a matter of compliance or noncompliance. The 
study of reaction to judicial decisions, in any systematic 
manner, is not possible at the present time because the tools 
of political science research are not capable of accomplish­
ing an exact determination of a cause-effect relationship.
For one thing, as mentioned earlier, it is never obvious
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what actions were taken as a direct result of a judicial 
decision. In many instances, there were clearly other fac­
tors involved, such as the intent of the actors prior to 
the decision. Another factor could be the degree to which 
the court's intent was misunderstood.
It was earlier pointed out that, in Ron Jackson's 
opinion, the Morales decision so horrified juvenile judges 
that they simply, for a time, refused to commit juvenile 
delinquents to TYC institutions. If time and financial 
resources had permitted, it would have been revealing to 
discuss Morales with the Texas juvenile judges. One casual 
conversation with the district judge in Howard County 
revealed, not a sense of guilt about the mistreatment of 
juveniles, but a resigned and angry acceptance. That par­
ticular judge's understanding of Morales was, he had no 
choice. He thought he had, in fact, been ordered not to com­
mit juvenile delinquents to TYC institutions, and he was 
somewhat disgruntled and confused about what to do with 
them. There followed, in Howard County, a frequent attempt 
to transfer juveniles who had committed crimes to adult 
criminal court.
Limits of the Study
Morales is unique for a number of reasons. Such 
uniqueness precludes, to some extent, the ability to general­
ize from Morales about other judicial decisions. On the 
other hand, analysis of the unique characteristics of this
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case contributes to an understanding of the limitations of 
the available knowledge and points the direction for future 
research. This case is unique in terms of the nature of the 
policy statement; the information gathering techniques 
employed; the establishment of an Ombudsman, allowing for 
continued judicial supervision; and the threat of judicial 
sanction.
Policy Statement
The most obvious and important quality of uniqueness 
in Morales is that it provides a forceful and positive policy 
statement. Consideration of Chapter Four of this disserta­
tion reveals that the decision was more than a mere state­
ment of Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees. It is 
a specific and detailed statement of what Texas officials 
must do, and how they must behave, in relation to incarcer­
ated delinquents. Most court decisions do not state policy 
in such a definitive manner.
Wasby hypothesizes that the impact of a decision
will be greater when there was no policy, or no well devel-
29oped policy, prior to the judicial mandate. Morales 
appears to support this hypothesis because, although there 
were clearly certain policies and practices in operation, 
there was no available set of rules and regulations that 
applied to all of the institutions. However, Wasby also
^^Ibid. at 254.
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says that when a decision generally reinforces existing 
state policy, there will be greater compl i a n c e . O b v i o u s ­
ly, in this study, the criticism of state policy was wide­
spread, but there appears to be a high degree of compliance. 
The Morales decision tends to support the reverse of this 
hypothesis.
It is reasonable to assume that, in instances where
policy is clearly stated, the degree of compliance will be
greater than in cases where a wide degree of latitude is
allowed. Wasby hypothesizes that the degree of ambiguity
is an important factor because noncompliance is greater
31when a decision is ambiguous. He also says that compli­
ance will be greater and more immediate when clear guide-
32lines are provided by a judicial decree. The ambiguity 
factor is particularly important with respect to the right 
to treatment. Since this is a constitutional doctrine of 
fairly recent vintage, never having been upheld or thor­
oughly discussed at the Supreme Court level, it is particu­
larly difficult to define. The opinion in Morales attempts 
to define the right to treatment as it applies to incarcer­
ated juveniles in clearly stated terms. This effort may in 
part explain the high degree of compliance with Morales. A
^°Ibid. at 255.
^^Ibid. at 250.
^^Ibid. at 249.
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thorough study of cases involving detailed policy 
pronouncements is needed in order to determine further the 
reliability of these hypotheses.
Information Gathering Techniques
Morales is also unique in terms of the information 
gathering techniques used. Courts must generally rely on 
the evidence presented by opposing attorneys at a trial. 
Judge Justice ordered a thorough investigation of all TYC 
institutions. He appointed recognized experts to conduct 
the investigation and asked that they present the evidence 
as amicus curiae. This practice is not unprecedented but 
it is unusual. It would be useful to study other such 
cases by asking two questions. The obvious questions are: 
When judges consult with expert witnesses, are the result­
ing decisons more likely to be specific policy pronounce­
ments than mere statements of law? and. When judges consult 
with expert witnesses, is there likely to be a high or low 
degree of compliance?
Continued Judicial Supervision
A third and important degree of uniqueness accom­
panies this case with respect to the establishment of the 
Ombudsman. Although the Ombudsman is no longer directly 
responsible to the court, he may report to that institution 
if he feels it is necessary in order to assure compliance. 
This involves a degree of continued judicial supervision,
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a somewhat uncommon characteristic of court decisions.
Wasby says that compliance with court decisions is more
likely when there is a reviewing body available to hear
33complaints concerning noncompliance. The Morales decision 
requests the parties to report to the court on a number of 
factors. Ultimately, it directs the parties to submit to 
the court formalized and detailed statements of policy con­
cerning the implementation of the court's decision. It 
would be revealing to study other such cases involving con­
tinued judicial supervision to determine whether or not it 
affects the degree of compliance.
This final report has not been presented because the 
case has been on appeal. Nevertheless, it has been pointed 
out that there is an ongoing attempt by the TYC to develop 
such policy statements. It is hypothesized that compliance 
is likely to be delayed if there is a chance of reversal.
The aftermath of Morales tends to disagree with that hypoth­
esis because of the high degree of compliance, but, with 
respect to the court ordered submission of plans, there has 
clearly been a delay because of the appellate process.
Judicial Sanction
Finally Morales is unique because it includes the 
threat of specific judicial sanction if compliance does not
^^Ibid. at 259.
^^Ibid. at 253.
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occur. Judge Justice clearly indicated in the opinion 
that he would consider ordering the abandonment of all TYC 
delinquent institutions if they did not follow the Morales 
mandates. This author found no attempt in the impact litera­
ture to deal, in a theoretical manner, with the subject of 
judicial sanctions. Instances where judges have threatened 
that specific judicial action will be the result of noncom­
pliance should be further studied.
Summary
The degree of compliance with Morales appears to be 
high. However, as stated before, it is impossible to know 
exactly what happened specifically because of the opinion. 
Morales is an example of courts attempting to provide moral 
leadership. It is an attempt to create behavioral changes, 
both procedurally and substantively. Ron Jackson said the 
most obvious effect of Morales was an overall change in atti­
tudes. He said the attitudes of the legislators, the gover­
nor, the juvenile court judges and the TYC staff members had 
taken an 180® turn on the issue of juvenile justice. Gov­
ernmental policy-makers in Texas are now searching for the 
least, rather than the most, restrictive alternative for 
dealing with children.
In the introduction. Morales was described as a 
"building block." The case has been made that the study 
contributes to an understanding of judicial policy-making 
and its effects. Furthermore, given the unique
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characteristics of this decision, a comparative study of 
other decisions with similar characteristics would add con­
siderably to the knowledge of judicial decision-making and 
its potential for effective change.
APPENDIX
Interview: TYC Administrative Staff
Introduction:
In September of 1974, Judge William Wayne Justice of 
the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 
announced the decision of Morales v. Turman which demanded 
a number of policy changes and imposed certain standards on 
the Texas Youth Council and the institutions under its juris­
diction. The following questions represent an attempt to 
obtain research data concerning the effects of Morales on 
the Texas system of juvenile justice.
I. TYC policy
How is TYC policy established? In what form is this 
policy set down? (obtain copy if possible)
II. Assessment and Placement
Morales ordered the abandonment of Mountain View and 
Gatesville. Mountain View is no longer listed as an insti­
tution under TYC jurisdiction. What happened to it? Are 
there any plans for abandoning Gatesville?
Judge Justice questioned the policy, if not the legal­
ity, of placing adjudged delinquents in large, geograph­
ically remote physical plants. What has been done to 
alleviate this situation?
There are apparently three new institutions for hous­
ing children under TYC jurisdictions— Corsicana State 
Home, Waco State Home, and West Texas Children's 
Home. What types and ages of children are sent to 
these homes? Are these institutions in any way a 
result of the Morales decision?
Has the situation with respect to the availability of 
halfway houses, foster home care, and other community-
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based housing changed in any manner since the 
Morales decision?
In terms of official TYC policy, where, how and by whom, 
are the decisions made as to what institution a particu­
lar child will be sent?
Which of the following elements are relevant factors 
in the decision to place a child in a particular 
institution? Please comment on the weight given to 
the specific factors in the decision-making process: 
sex, age, race, family history, developmental his­
tory, physical examination, language and educational 
analysis evaluation.
How many psychologists are available per inmate at 
each of the assessment and placement centers?
Which of the following tests are utilized in deter­
mining child placement? Weschler, Leiter, Lorge- 
Thorndike? What other tests are in use?
III. Institutional Characteristics
Name of Institution
A. Student Demographic Data
Number of inmates for which the institution was 
intended.
How many students are housed here?
What is the breakdown of the students in terms of 
age and race?
B. Educational Policies
How is the educational level of the students deter­
mined? Is there an educational program in operation 
at this institution? How is this program made 
operational?
Is there a special program for the mentally/ 
emotionally handicapped students? How is the deter­
mination made as to what students will participate 
in these programs? How many students are involved 
in this program? How many special education teach­
ers are employed at this institution? Are the 
special education students segregated from those in 
the regular academic program in all phases of their 
educational experiences?
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Is there a vocational education program available at 
this institution? How is the determination made as 
to what students will participate in the program?
How many students are involved in vocational train­
ing at this institution? Is there a remedial mathe­
matics and reading program to accompany the voca­
tional training program? How many teachers are 
involved in the vocational program and the remedial 
program? Is there any employability plan for these 
students? How is it carried out?
C. Family Involvement
Are families allowed to visit inmates in this insti­
tution? When are the visiting hours? How often are 
they allowed to visit? Are there any special facil­
ities made available for family visitation?
Are the inmates' friends allowed to visit? When are 
the visiting hours? How often are they allowed to 
visit? Are there any special facilities made avail­
able for visits with friends on the outside?
Are the students allowed to go home on furloughs? 
Under what conditions? Who pays for their trip home?
Are the families of the students involved in the 
students' rehabilitative therapy programs? If so, 
please explain in what manner.
D. Medical Care
Which of the following and in what numbers are avail­
able at each of the institutions: a psychiatrist,
psychologists, psychologists with Masters' degrees, 
psychiatric nurses, a licensed dietician, speech 
therapists?
Are the infirmary facilities adequate at this insti­
tution?
Are there written guidelines for the dispensation of 
medication? (obtain copy if possible)
E. Personnel
What is the total number of supervisory personnel at 
this institution? (houseparents, dormitory super­
visors, and correctional officers) Please give a 
breakdown on these people according to education, 
race, and age. In what manner are these people
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pretrained for working with the children? Are they 
required to attend any in-service training? Please 
explain this program.
What is the total number of caseworkers at this 
institution? Please give a breakdown on these 
people according to education, race and age. In 
what manner are these people pretrained for working 
with the children? Are they required to attend any 
in-service training? Please explain. How many 
caseworker supervisors are employed at this institu­
tion? How many of those people are equipped with a 
Master's degree?
To what degree is there mobility of the personnel 
between the institutions?
F. Punishment
Please discuss TYC policy with respect to the follow­
ing practices: (Primarily the concern is whether or
not they are in use and, if so, what standards govern 
their use.) Corporal punishment (including paddling), 
solitary/security confinement, dormitory confinement, 
transfer to a more secure institution, tear gassing.
Which of the following elements of due process are 
made available to students at the time punishment 
decisions are made: a hearing (if so, before whom?),
provisions for calling witnesses and cross examining 
witnesses, provision for an inmate advocate to be 
present, a written record of the hearing?
In what, if any, instances are punishment incidents 
to be reported to the executive director?
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